CVE-2025-69206

描述

### Summary A Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) filter bypass vulnerability exists in the webhook URL validation of the Secret Requests feature. The application attempts to block internal/private IP addresses but can be bypassed using DNS rebinding (e.g., `localtest.me` which resolves to `127.0.0.1`) or open redirect services (e.g., `httpbin.org/redirect-to`). This allows an authenticated user to make the server initiate HTTP requests to internal network resources. ### Details The vulnerability exists in the `isPublicUrl` function located in `/api/lib/utils.ts`. The function validates webhook URLs against a blocklist of private IP patterns: ```typescript export const isPublicUrl = (url: string): boolean => { const parsed = new URL(url); const hostname = parsed.hostname.toLowerCase(); const blockedPatterns = [ /^localhost$/, /^127\.\d{1,3}\.\d{1,3}\.\d{1,3}$/, /^192\.168\.\d{1,3}\.\d{1,3}$/, // ... other patterns ]; return !blockedPatterns.some((pattern) => pattern.test(hostname)); }; ``` **The validation is flawed because:** 1. **DNS Rebinding Bypass**: It only checks the hostname string, not the resolved IP address. Domains like `localtest.me` pass validation (not matching any blocked pattern) but resolve to `127.0.0.1`. 2. **Open Redirect Bypass**: External URLs like `httpbin.org/redirect-to?url=http://127.0.0.1` pass validation since `httpbin.org` is a public domain. When the server follows the redirect, it connects to the internal address. ### PoC Optional: On the container that runs Hemmelig application, host a temporary port with the following command: ``` node -e "require('http').createServer((req,res)=>{console.log(req.method,req.url,req.headers);res.end('ok')}).listen(8080,()=>console.log('Listening on 8080'))" ``` 1. Log in as an user 2. Switch to `Secret Requests` tab and create a new request 3. When inside the request dialog, there are 2 possible payloads that can be used on the `Webhook URL` input to bypass SSRF ``` 1. Using domain redirect: http://localtest.me:PORT 2. Using httpbin to perform a redirect: httpbin.org/redirect-to?url=http://127.0.0.1:PORT ``` 4. Open a new browser/tab and confirm the request by creating a secret. Upon clicking save, the port we hosted we receive a request. <img width="795" height="310" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/95d559e5-ead2-4b5d-8e53-9ddec3416953" /> Otherwise, if the port doesn't exist, a similar error in the logs can be found: ``` Secret request webhook delivery failed after retries: TypeError: fetch failed at node:internal/deps/undici/undici:15845:13 at process.processTicksAndRejections (node:internal/process/task_queues:103:5) at async sendSecretRequestWebhook (/app/api/routes/secret-requests.ts:58:34) { [cause]: Error: connect ECONNREFUSED 127.0.0.1:80 at TCPConnectWrap.afterConnect [as oncomplete] (node:net:1637:16) { errno: -111, code: 'ECONNREFUSED', syscall: 'connect', address: '127.0.0.1', port: 80 } } ``` ### Impact While the SSRF filter can be bypassed, the practical impact is limited because this is a Blind SSRF, there is no response reflected. But with certain technique like response-timing, the attackers can still indicate whether or not a port is opened. ### Remediation Replace hostname-based validation with IP resolution checking: ```typescript import { isIP } from 'is-ip'; import dns from 'dns/promises'; export const isPublicUrl = async (url: string): Promise<boolean> => { const parsed = new URL(url); const hostname = parsed.hostname; // Resolve hostname to IP let addresses: string[]; try { if (isIP(hostname)) { addresses = [hostname]; } else { addresses = await dns.resolve4(hostname).catch(() => []); const ipv6 = await dns.resolve6(hostname).catch(() => []); addresses = [...addresses, ...ipv6]; } } catch { return false; } // Check resolved IPs against blocklist const privateRanges = [ /^127\./, /^10\./, /^192\.168\./, /^172\.(1[6-9]|2\d|3[0-1])\./, /^169\.254\./, /^::1$/, /^fe80:/i, /^fc00:/i, /^fd/i, ]; return addresses.length > 0 && !addresses.some(ip => privateRanges.some(pattern => pattern.test(ip)) ); }; ``` Additionally, disable following redirects in the webhook fetch call or re-validate the URL after each redirect.