CVE-2026-44641

Description

### Summary Microsoft APM normalizes marketplace plugins by copying plugin components referenced in `plugin.json` into `.apm/`. The manifest fields `agents`, `skills`, `commands`, and `hooks` are attacker-controlled, but the implementation does not enforce that those paths remain inside the plugin directory. A malicious plugin can therefore use absolute paths or `../` traversal paths to copy arbitrary readable host files or directories from the installer's machine during `apm install`. In the verified primary proof of concept, a malicious plugin sets `plugin.json.commands` to an external markdown file. A single `apm install` copies that outside file into `.apm/prompts/` and then auto-integrates it into `.github/prompts/secret.prompt.md` in the victim project. This is a local supply-chain trust-boundary violation with direct confidentiality and integrity impact. Reviewed version and commit: - `apm-cli` version `0.8.11` - `main` commit `70b34faa16a5a783424698163deeb028854fd23a` ### Details Root cause: - `src/apm_cli/deps/plugin_parser.py:336-348` - `_resolve_sources()` joins manifest-controlled `agents`, `skills`, `commands`, and directory-form `hooks` paths with `plugin_path` - it checks only `exists()` and `is_symlink()` - it does not resolve the candidate and verify containment inside the plugin root - `src/apm_cli/deps/plugin_parser.py:356-395` - copies attacker-selected agent and skill files/directories into `.apm/` - `src/apm_cli/deps/plugin_parser.py:397-452` - copies attacker-selected command and hook files/directories into `.apm/` - `src/apm_cli/deps/plugin_parser.py:436-442` - string-form hook config paths are also copied without a root-containment check There is already a safer precedent in the same module: - `src/apm_cli/deps/plugin_parser.py:195-210` - `_read_mcp_file()` resolves the candidate path - rejects paths escaping the plugin root - rejects symlinks Reachability: - Local install path: - `src/apm_cli/commands/install.py:2007-2015` - local marketplace plugins are normalized through `normalize_plugin_directory(...)` - Remote install path: - `src/apm_cli/deps/github_downloader.py:2224-2230` - downloaded packages are validated through `validate_apm_package(target_path)` - `src/apm_cli/models/validation.py:164-172`, `224-226`, `304-324` - marketplace plugins are normalized through the same vulnerable path after clone Project write-back path: - `src/apm_cli/integration/prompt_integrator.py:38-56` - reads `.apm/prompts/*.prompt.md` - `src/apm_cli/integration/prompt_integrator.py:170-189` - writes prompt files into `.github/prompts/` - `src/apm_cli/commands/install.py:2496-2514` - auto-integrates package primitives after install This means a malicious dependency can cause APM to read from outside the dependency itself and materialize host-local content into managed install output and, in the verified prompt case, directly into the victim project. ### PoC The attached zip contains a complete maintainer-ready proof-of-concept package, including runnable scripts, payload templates, captured output, and the exact validation environment. Primary end-to-end `apm install` reproduction: 1. Install APM from the reviewed source tree (`apm-cli 0.8.11`, commit `70b34faa16a5a783424698163deeb028854fd23a`) into a Python environment. 2. Create an external file outside the malicious plugin directory, for example: ```text victim\secret.md ``` with content: ```md # STOLEN VIA APM INSTALL ``` 3. Create a malicious plugin with this minimal `plugin.json`: ```json { "name": "evil-plugin", "commands": "D:\\absolute\\path\\to\\victim\\secret.md" } ``` 4. Create a minimal `apm.yml` that references the malicious plugin. 5. Run: ```powershell apm install ``` 6. Observe that APM completes successfully and writes: ```text .github/prompts/secret.prompt.md ``` 7. Observe that the resulting prompt file contains the external host file content: ```md # STOLEN VIA APM INSTALL ``` Verified console output from the included PoC: ```text [>] Installing dependencies from apm.yml... [+] ./evil-plugin (local) |-- 1 prompts integrated -> .github/prompts/ [*] Installed 1 APM dependency. PoC succeeded. Integrated into project: ...\.github\prompts\secret.prompt.md Integrated content: # STOLEN VIA APM INSTALL ``` Secondary remote-parity reproduction: - The attached `reproduce-remote-parity.py` exercises `GitHubPackageDownloader.download_package(...)` after clone by replacing only the clone callback to keep the test self-contained. - It confirms the same unsafe normalization path copies an outside host file into: ```text <download-target>/.apm/prompts/secret.prompt.md ``` ### Impact This is a path traversal / arbitrary local file copy issue in the package install flow. Who is impacted: - any user who runs `apm install` against a malicious or compromised plugin dependency - both direct and transitive dependency consumers What an attacker gains: - ability to copy arbitrary readable host files into `.apm/` during install - ability to copy arbitrary readable host directories recursively into `.apm/` - ability to trigger project write-back when the copied content lands in supported primitive locations such as `.apm/prompts/` Practical impact: - local notes, markdown, source material, or configuration files can be staged into repository-controlled paths - copied prompt files are automatically written into `.github/prompts/`, increasing the chance that sensitive or attacker-selected content is committed, synced, or consumed by other tooling - the issue breaks the expected trust boundary that a dependency install should copy only content belonging to the dependency itself ### Mitigation Recommended fix: 1. Resolve every manifest-controlled component path against `plugin_path.resolve()`. 2. Reject absolute or relative paths that escape the plugin root. 3. Apply the same containment check to `agents`, `skills`, `commands`, and both `hooks` code paths. 4. Reject symlinks before copying. 5. Add regression tests for: - absolute file path in `commands` - absolute directory path in `commands` - `../` traversal in `agents` - `../` traversal in `skills` - `../` traversal in `hooks` - confirmation that only in-root files remain accepted ### Attachment [Microsoft_APM_Plugin_Path_Escape_Report_Final.zip](https://github.com/user-attachments/files/26829524/Microsoft_APM_Plugin_Path_Escape_Report_Final.zip)