CVE-2026-41693

Description

### Summary Versions of `i18next-fs-backend` prior to 2.6.4 interpolate the caller-supplied `lng` and `ns` values directly into the configured `loadPath` and `addPath` templates with no path-component validation and no sanitisation. When an application exposes the resolved language code to user-controlled input (`?lng=` query parameter, cookie, request header), a crafted value can break out of the intended locale directory. Affected call sites in `lib/index.js`: - `read` (line 38 pre-patch): `const filename = interpolate(loadPath, { lng: language, ns: namespace })` - `removeFile` (line 101 pre-patch): same pattern against `addPath` - `writeFile` (line 127 pre-patch): same pattern against `addPath` for queued missing-key writes The helper `interpolate` in `lib/utils.js` substitutes raw values with no encoding — unlike the `addQueryString` helper in `i18next-http-backend`, there is no equivalent safety for path interpolation. ### Impact - **Arbitrary file read.** With a `loadPath` like `/locales/{{lng}}/{{ns}}.json`, an attacker-controlled `lng = '../../etc'` (and matching `ns`) causes the backend to read a file outside the locale directory. For parsers that tolerate arbitrary content (YAML's freeform text), the file contents surface as a translation resource. - **Arbitrary file overwrite.** `addPath` is interpolated the same way for missing-key writes (the `create()` code path and the debounced writer in `writeFile`). A traversing `lng`/`ns` combination can cause the process to write JSON structures to an unintended filesystem location, potentially overwriting application files if the process user has write access. - **Chain with `.js`/`.ts` eval.** `i18next-fs-backend` supports loading `.js` and `.ts` locale files by `eval`-ing their content (intentional feature, documented as requiring trusted sources). Combining traversal with that path — for example `lng = '../../../app/config'` against `loadPath: '/locales/{{lng}}/{{ns}}.js'` — would cause the backend to **execute** a server-side file as JavaScript, exfiltrating whatever it can touch (`process.env`, connected services). Exploitation requires the application to pass an untrusted `lng`/`ns` value through to `i18next.t()` without its own validation. Many i18next setups do exactly this via `i18next-browser-languagedetector` (query string / cookie detection). ### Affected versions All versions of `i18next-fs-backend` prior to **2.6.4**. ### Patch Fixed in **2.6.4**. `lib/utils.js` now exports: - `isSafePathSegment(v)` — returns `true` only if `v` is a non-empty string of ≤ 128 chars that does not contain `..`, `/`, `\`, control characters, or a prototype key (`__proto__`, `constructor`, `prototype`). Legitimate i18next language-code shapes (BCP-47, `en_US`, `zh-Hant-HK`, `pirate-speak`, `my-custom.ns`, `+`-joined multi-language values) all pass. - `interpolatePath(template, data)` — substitutes variables like the existing `interpolate` but refuses the whole result if any segment fails `isSafePathSegment`. Callers bail out with an error (`read`) or silently drop the queued write (`writeFile`, `removeFile`). The `.js` / `.ts` `eval` behaviour is intentionally retained — dynamic expressions in locale files are a documented feature of this backend, and safe replacements like dynamic `import()` are async-only and incompatible with this backend's sync-capable code path. The README has a new "Security considerations" section that spells out the trust model: `.js`/`.ts` locale files must be treated as code. ### Workarounds No workaround short of upgrading. If you cannot upgrade immediately, sanitise `lng` / `ns` at your application boundary before passing them to i18next — reject values containing `..`, `/`, `\`, control characters, and cap the length. ### Credits Discovered via an internal security audit of the i18next ecosystem.