CVE-2026-39857

Description

## Summary The `choices` and `counts` query parameters in the Apostrophe CMS REST API allow unauthenticated users to extract distinct field values for any schema field that has a registered query builder, completely bypassing `publicApiProjection` restrictions that are intended to limit which fields are exposed publicly. Fields protected by `viewPermission` are similarly exposed. ## Details When a piece type configures `publicApiProjection` to enable public API access while restricting visible fields, the restriction is enforced via a MongoDB projection on the main query (piece-type/index.js:1130-1134). However, the `choices` and `counts` query builders bypass this protection through a separate code path. The vulnerable flow: 1. `getRestQuery` at piece-type/index.js:1120 calls `applyBuildersSafely(req.query)` (line 1122), which processes query parameters including `choices` and `counts` since both have `launder` methods (doc-type/index.js:2627-2628 and 2675-2676). 2. The `publicApiProjection` is applied afterward (line 1130-1134) as a MongoDB projection on the main query. 3. During query execution, the `choices` builder's `after` handler (doc-type/index.js:2636-2668) iterates over requested field names. The only validation is: - The field has a registered builder (`_.has(query.builders, filter)` at line 2651) - The builder has a `launder` method (line 2656) All schema field types (string, integer, float, select, boolean, date, slug, relationship) register query builders with `launder` methods via `addQueryBuilder` in `addFieldTypes.js`. 4. `toChoices` (line 2661) calls the field's `choices` function, which typically calls `sortedDistinct` → `toDistinct`. The `toDistinct` method (doc-type/index.js:2811) executes `db.distinct(property, criteria)` — a MongoDB operation that returns all distinct values for the given property matching the criteria. **MongoDB's `distinct` operation does not respect projections**; it operates directly on the specified field regardless of any projection set on the query. 5. The results are stored via `query.set('choicesResults', choices)` (line 2666) and returned directly in the API response at piece-type/index.js:292-296 without any filtering against `publicApiProjection` or `removeForbiddenFields`. The same bypass applies to `viewPermission`-protected fields: `removeForbiddenFields` (doc-type/index.js:1585-1611) only processes document results from `toArray()`, not the separate choices/counts data. The page REST API has the same issue at page/index.js:371-376. ## PoC ```bash # Prerequisites: # - An Apostrophe 4.x instance with a piece type configured with publicApiProjection # - Example: an 'article' piece type with: # publicApiProjection: { title: 1, slug: 1, _url: 1 } # and additional schema fields like 'status' (select), 'priority' (integer), # or 'internalNotes' (string) NOT in the projection # 1. Verify normal API access only returns projected fields curl -s 'http://localhost:3000/api/v1/article' | python3 -m json.tool # Response results contain only: title, slug, _url (as configured) # 2. Extract distinct values of a non-projected field via choices curl -s 'http://localhost:3000/api/v1/article?choices=status' | python3 -m json.tool # Response includes: # "choices": {"status": [{"value": "draft", "label": "draft"}, {"value": "published", "label": "published"}, ...]} # 3. Extract distinct values with document counts via counts curl -s 'http://localhost:3000/api/v1/article?counts=priority' | python3 -m json.tool # Response includes: # "counts": {"priority": [{"value": 1, "label": "1", "count": 15}, {"value": 2, "label": "2", "count": 8}, ...]} # 4. Multiple fields can be extracted at once curl -s 'http://localhost:3000/api/v1/article?choices=status,priority,internalNotes' ``` ## Impact - **Distinct field values leaked**: An unauthenticated attacker can extract all distinct values of any schema field on any piece type that has `publicApiProjection` configured, even when those fields are explicitly excluded from the projection. - **Field types affected**: All field types that register query builders: string, slug, integer, float, select, boolean, date, and relationship fields. - **Count disclosure**: The `counts` variant additionally reveals how many documents have each distinct value, providing statistical information about the dataset. - **viewPermission bypass**: Fields protected with `viewPermission` (intended for role-based field access) are also exposed via this path. - **Both APIs affected**: The piece-type REST API (piece-type/index.js:292-296) and page REST API (page/index.js:371-376) are both vulnerable. - **Real-world impact**: If a CMS stores sensitive data in schema fields (e.g., internal status values, priority levels, internal categories, user-facing content marked as restricted), all distinct values are extractable by any unauthenticated visitor. ## Recommended Fix In the `choices` builder's `after` handler (doc-type/index.js:2636-2668), add validation to skip fields not permitted by `publicApiProjection` and `viewPermission`: ```javascript // doc-type/index.js, in the choices builder's after handler (line 2644 area) for (const filter of filters) { if (!_.has(query.builders, filter)) { continue; } if (!query.builders[filter].launder) { continue; } // NEW: Enforce publicApiProjection restrictions on choices/counts const publicApiProjection = query.get('project'); if (publicApiProjection && !publicApiProjection[filter]) { continue; } // NEW: Enforce viewPermission field restrictions const field = self.schema.find(f => f.name === filter); if (field && field.viewPermission && !self.apos.permission.can(query.req, field.viewPermission.action, field.viewPermission.type)) { continue; } const _query = baseQuery.clone(); _query[filter](null); choices[filter] = await _query.toChoices(filter, { counts: query.get('counts') }); } ``` Additionally, apply the same fix in the page REST API handler (page/index.js) for consistency.