CVE-2026-24767

Description

## Summary A **blind Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)** vulnerability exists in the `uploadViaURL` functionality due to an unprotected `HEAD` request. While the subsequent file retrieval logic correctly enforces SSRF protections, the initial metadata request executes without validation. This allows limited outbound requests to arbitrary URLs before SSRF controls are applied. --- ## Vulnerability Details The `uploadViaURL()` function issues an `axios.head()` request to retrieve metadata (content type, content length, and final URL after redirects). This request is performed **without SSRF filtering**. Although the actual file download is protected by request filtering, the initial `HEAD` request occurs prior to these checks and can be triggered with an attacker-controlled URL. ### Vulnerable Code ```ts if (!url.startsWith('data:')) { response = await axios.head(url, { maxRedirects: 5 }); mimeType = response.headers['content-type']?.split(';')[0]; size = response.headers['content-length']; finalUrl = response.request.res.responseUrl; } ``` --- ## Impact The impact of this issue is **limited** due to the following constraints: * Only `HEAD` requests are affected (no response body is returned) * No direct exfiltration of response data occurs * The subsequent file-fetching logic enforces SSRF protections However, the vulnerability may still allow: * **Blind SSRF** via outbound `HEAD` requests * **Limited internal service probing** (reachability and response behavior) * **Interaction with sensitive internal endpoints** that respond to `HEAD` requests This issue does **not** provide arbitrary data access or full internal network compromise on its own. --- ## Severity **Moderate** The vulnerability is limited in scope and impact: * Only `HEAD` requests are affected * No response body or sensitive data is directly returned * The actual file download logic enforces SSRF protections While the issue permits blind outbound requests to attacker-controlled URLs, it does not enable direct data exfiltration or full internal network compromise on its own. --- ## Proof of Concept ```bash curl -X POST 'http://localhost:8080/api/v2/storage/upload-by-url' \ -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \ -H 'xc-auth: <token>' \ -d '[{ "url": "http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/", "fileName": "test.txt" }]' ``` This request causes the server to issue an unfiltered `HEAD` request before SSRF protections are applied. --- ## Acknowledgements This issue was first identified and responsibly disclosed by Faizan Raza of Kolega.dev as part of a security assessment using Kolega.dev Deep Code Scan, including validation and fix recommendations. NocoDB also acknowledges Neel B for independently reporting the same issue prior to publication. NocoDB thanks Kolega.dev for their contribution to improving the security posture of the project.