CVE-2026-54247

描述

## Summary The Kubernetes admission webhook handler reads the entire request body using `io.ReadAll(r.Body)` without any size limit. Any client that can reach the webhook port within the cluster can send a multi-GB payload, causing the skipper process to exhaust memory and be OOM-killed. This disrupts all Kubernetes admission control, potentially blocking all pod creation and updates. ## Vulnerable Code ```go // dataclients/kubernetes/admission/admission.go:76 body, err := io.ReadAll(r.Body) // <-- NO SIZE LIMIT if err != nil { log.Errorf("Failed to read request: %v", err) w.WriteHeader(http.StatusInternalServerError) invalidRequests.WithLabelValues(admitterName).Inc() return } var review admissionReview err = json.Unmarshal(body, &review) ``` For comparison, the OPA filter has a body size limit: ```go // filters/openpolicyagent/openpolicyagent.go:68-70 const DefaultMaxRequestBodySize = 1 << 20 // 1MB // OPA uses a bufferedBodyReader with size limits ``` ## Attack Path 1. Attacker identifies the admission webhook endpoint (default: `:9443/admission` or configured path) 2. Attacker sends: `POST /admission HTTP/1.1, Content-Type: application/json` with a multi-GB request body 3. `io.ReadAll(r.Body)` allocates unbounded memory for the entire body 4. Skipper process is OOM-killed by the Kubernetes kubelet ## Permission Boundary Analysis - **Attacker**: Any client with network access to the admission webhook port within the Kubernetes cluster - **Boundary crossed**: Memory safety — unbounded allocation from attacker-controlled input - **Preconditions**: Admission webhook endpoint must be network-reachable (default Kubernetes deployment exposes it within cluster network) - **Comparison**: OPA filter has `DefaultMaxRequestBodySize` (1MB) and semaphore-based memory limit; admission handler has neither ## Evidence | File | Lines | Description | |------|-------|-------------| | `dataclients/kubernetes/admission/admission.go` | 76 | `io.ReadAll(r.Body)` without size limit | | `filters/openpolicyagent/openpolicyagent.go` | 68-70 | OPA filter has `DefaultMaxRequestBodySize` = 1MB | | `filters/openpolicyagent/openpolicyagent.go` | 1333-1336 | OPA uses `bufferedBodyReader` with size limits | ## Tests - `dataclients/kubernetes/admission/admission_test.go` exists but **does not test body size limits** ## Impact The admission webhook handler reads the entire request body using io.ReadAll(r.Body) without a size limit. An attacker with in-cluster network access and a valid Kubernetes client certificate can send a multi-GB payload to the webhook endpoint, causing the skipper process to exhaust memory and be OOM-killed. This disrupts admission control for Ingress and RouteGroup resources until the process is automatically restarted by the kubelet. Scope of impact: Ingress and RouteGroup admission only — not pod creation or other admission controllers. Recovery: Kubernetes automatically restarts the OOM-killed process, limiting downtime. Prerequisites: (1) In-cluster network access to the webhook port, (2) valid Kubernetes client certificate. ## Mitigation 1. Add `http.MaxBytesReader` or equivalent body size limit before `io.ReadAll` 2. Follow the OPA filter pattern: define `DefaultMaxRequestBodySize` and use a buffered reader with size limits 3. Add a configurable `--admission-max-body-size` flag