CVE-2026-50015

描述

## Summary pnpm's patch application pipeline (`@pnpm/patch-package`) performs no path validation on file paths extracted from `.patch` files. An attacker who contributes a malicious patch file via a pull request can write attacker-controlled content to or delete arbitrary files on the filesystem during `pnpm install`, as the user running the install. The `diff --git` header paths containing `../../` sequences traverse out of the package directory, and the traversal is difficult to catch in code review because patch file diff headers are opaque to most reviewers. ## Vulnerability Details During `pnpm install`, when a `patchedDependencies` entry is present in `pnpm-workspace.yaml`, pnpm reads the referenced `.patch` file and applies it via the embedded `@pnpm/patch-package` library. The `applyPatchToDir` function at `patching/apply-patch/src/index.ts:12-13` calls `process.chdir(opts.patchedDir)`, setting the working directory to the installed package location deep inside `node_modules/.pnpm/`. The patch parser at `@pnpm/patch-package/dist/patch/parse.js:88` extracts file paths from `diff --git a/(.*?) b/(.*?)` headers using a regex with no path sanitization. The `executeEffects` function in `apply.js` then operates on these unsanitized paths: **File write** (`apply.js:35-49`): ```javascript case 'file creation': { const eff = effect fs.ensureDirSync(dirname(eff.path)) fs.writeFileSync(eff.path, fileContents, { mode: eff.mode }) break } ``` **File delete** (`apply.js:13-22`): ```javascript case 'file deletion': { const eff = effect // TODO: integrity checks if (!opts.dryRun) { fs.unlinkSync(eff.path) } break } ``` A path like `../../../../../../../../../../home/user/.ssh/authorized_keys` in the patch header traverses out of the package directory to an arbitrary location. ## Proof of Concept ```bash # Write variant: bash autofyn_audit/exploits/vuln6_patch_traversal_write/exploit.sh # Result: PASS -- /tmp/vuln6_pwned created with attacker-controlled content # Delete variant: bash autofyn_audit/exploits/vuln7_patch_traversal_delete/exploit.sh # Result: PASS -- /tmp/vuln7_target deleted by malicious patch # Combined chain (delete + replace SSH authorized_keys): bash autofyn_audit/exploits/chain2_patch_ssh_backdoor/exploit.sh # Result: PASS -- authorized_keys replaced with attacker's public key ``` ## Impact Arbitrary file write and delete as the user running `pnpm install`, limited to paths writable by that user. An attacker who submits a PR adding a `.patch` file and `patchedDependencies` config can target SSH authorized_keys, shell configuration, CI/CD files, or other writable files. Patch files may receive less review scrutiny than `package.json` changes because the `../` traversal sequences are in `diff --git` headers that look like patch metadata. ## Suggested Remediation Validate parsed patch file paths against the package root directory. Reject any path that resolves outside the patched package directory via `path.resolve` + prefix check. Alternatively, sanitize at parse time by rejecting paths containing `..` components in `parse.js`. --- > Discovered by [AutoFyn](https://github.com/SignalPilot-Labs/AutoFyn) > Full audit report: [audit_report.md](https://github.com/tempcollab/pnpm/blob/main/autofyn_audit/audit_report.md) > Exploit script: [exploit.sh](https://github.com/tempcollab/pnpm/blob/main/autofyn_audit/exploits/vuln6_patch_traversal_write/exploit.sh)