CVE-2026-43875

描述

## Summary `plugin/MobileManager/oauth2.php` completes an OAuth login by sending an HTTP 302 `Location: oauth2Success.php?user=<email>&pass=<HASH>` where `<HASH>` is the victim's stored password hash (`md5(hash("whirlpool", sha1(password)))`) read directly from the `users` table. AVideo's own login endpoint (`objects/login.json.php`) accepts an `encodedPass=1` flag that bypasses hashing and performs a direct string comparison between the supplied value and the stored hash. Anyone who captures the redirect URL — via server logs, referrer leakage, or browser history — therefore obtains a credential equivalent to the plaintext password and can fully take over the account, including admin accounts. ## Details ### Sink: hash inlined in a GET redirect `plugin/MobileManager/oauth2.php:98-102`: ```php $pass = rand(); $users_id = User::createUserIfNotExists($user, $pass, $name, $email, $photoURL); $adapter->disconnect(); $userObject = new User($users_id); header("Location: oauth2Success.php?user=" . $userObject->getUser() . "&pass=" . $userObject->getPassword()); ``` `$userObject->getPassword()` returns the raw database column (`objects/user.php:159-162`): ```php public function getPassword() { return strip_tags($this->password); } ``` The returned value is the stored password hash for the account (existing or freshly-created). It is transported to the browser as a query-string parameter in the `Location:` header, so it is written to: * Web-server access logs (`combined` / `main` log formats record the full request line including query string). * Upstream proxy / CDN / WAF logs. * Any error monitoring / APM that captures request URLs (Sentry, Datadog, New Relic defaults). * The victim's browser history (persistent local artifact). * The `Referer` header on subsequent navigation from the rendered `oauth2Success.php` page if the page or its assets load any external origin and the browser's `Referrer-Policy` is not strict. ### Hash equals plaintext for login `objects/login.json.php:182-209`: ```php if (!empty($_GET['user'])) { $_POST['user'] = $_GET['user']; } if (!empty($_GET['pass'])) { $_POST['pass'] = $_GET['pass']; } if (!empty($_GET['encodedPass'])) { $_POST['encodedPass'] = $_GET['encodedPass']; } ... $user = new User(0, $_POST['user'], $_POST['pass']); ... $resp = $user->login(false, @$_POST['encodedPass']); ``` `objects/user.php:1272-1279` passes `$encodedPass` to `find()`: ```php if (strtolower($encodedPass) === 'false') { $encodedPass = false; } ... $user = $this->find($this->user, $this->password, true, $encodedPass); ``` `objects/user.php:1785-1794`: ```php if ($pass !== false) { if (!encryptPasswordVerify($pass, $result['password'], $encodedPass)) { ... return false; } } ``` `objects/functions.php:2312-2331`: ```php function encryptPasswordVerify(#[\SensitiveParameter] $password, $hash, $encodedPass = false) { global $advancedCustom, $global; if (!$encodedPass || $encodedPass === 'false') { $passwordSalted = encryptPassword($password); $passwordUnSalted = encryptPassword($password, true); } else { $passwordSalted = $password; // <- direct use, no hashing $passwordUnSalted = $password; } $isValid = $passwordSalted === $hash || $passwordUnSalted === $hash; ... } ``` When `encodedPass` is truthy, the supplied value is compared as-is against the stored hash. The captured redirect parameter `pass=<HASH>` is therefore a valid login credential when replayed with `encodedPass=1`. ### Compounding factors * The redirect is a raw `Location:` (GET), not a POST — the secret is placed in a URL which is by definition non-confidential transport. * No CSRF token, no `state` parameter tied to the session, and no single-use token is used on `/plugin/MobileManager/oauth2.php`. * `login.json.php` does not require a CSRF token or captcha on the first attempt (`checkLoginAttempts()` at `objects/user.php:1282` only rate-limits after failures, and the attacker succeeds on the first try). * By contrast, the non-plugin flow in `objects/login.json.php:144-145` already sets session state server-side (`$userObject->login(true)`), demonstrating the project already has a safer pattern available. ## PoC Prerequisites: `MobileManager` plugin enabled and at least one supported login provider (e.g. `LoginGoogle`) configured with valid keys — both are common production settings for this product. 1. Victim initiates the mobile OAuth flow: ``` GET /plugin/MobileManager/oauth2.php?type=Google ``` 2. After the victim authorizes at the provider, the server sends: ``` HTTP/1.1 302 Found Location: oauth2Success.php?user=victim%40example.com&pass=9d7ab4...stored-hash... ``` This request-line — including the password hash — is written to the web server's access log (default `combined` format) and to any upstream proxy/CDN log. It also appears in the victim's browser history. 3. Attacker obtains `<HASH>` from any of those channels. 4. Attacker logs in as the victim without knowing the plaintext password: ``` curl -i -c cookies.txt \ 'https://target.example.com/objects/[email protected]&pass=<HASH>&encodedPass=1' ``` Expected response: `200 OK` with JSON containing `id`, `user`, `PHPSESSID`, `isAdmin`, `email`, and a `Set-Cookie: PHPSESSID=...` that grants full account access. The attacker can now browse, upload, modify the victim's channel, or — if the victim is an admin — access `/mvideos` and all admin endpoints. ## Impact * Full account takeover of any user who has ever logged in through the MobileManager OAuth endpoint. * If the victim is an administrator, the attacker gains administrative control of the AVideo instance (user management, plugin config, site-wide content). * The exposed hash works indefinitely: it remains valid for as long as the victim does not change their password, so a one-time log/history/referrer capture yields a persistent credential. * Passes silently — from the application's perspective, the attacker is just a legitimate login with `encodedPass=1` (a flag the product itself uses for mobile-app "remember me" flows). ## Recommended Fix 1. Never place the password hash (or any credential-equivalent material) in a URL. In `plugin/MobileManager/oauth2.php`, mirror what `objects/login.json.php:143-146` already does for the web flow — establish the session server-side and redirect to a URL with no credentials: ```php $userObject = new User(0, $user, $pass); $userObject->login(true); // server-side session header("Location: oauth2Success.php"); ``` 2. Additionally, remove or hard-restrict the `encodedPass` branch in `objects/functions.php:2319-2329`. If a "hash-equivalent" credential must exist for the mobile app, replace it with a short-lived, single-use, server-issued bearer token bound to the session, rather than the persistent database hash. 3. Add a `state` parameter and CSRF protection on `/plugin/MobileManager/oauth2.php` so the redirect cannot be initiated from a third-party origin. 4. For defense-in-depth, strip query strings containing `pass=` from access-log formats and ensure `oauth2Success.php` sets `Referrer-Policy: no-referrer` while it is being deprecated.

受影響套件(1)

• Packagist/wwbn/avideofrom 0, <= 29.0

CVSS 分數

參考連結(4)

• ADVISORYhttps://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-43875
• PATCHhttps://github.com/WWBN/AVideo
• WEBhttps://github.com/WWBN/AVideo/commit/977cd6930a97571a26da4239e25c8096dd4ecbc1
• WEBhttps://github.com/WWBN/AVideo/security/advisories/GHSA-5w8w-26ch-v5cw