CVE-2026-34384

描述

## Summary The create_user, assign_member, and assign_user action modes in modules/registration.php approve pending user registrations via GET request without validating a CSRF token. Unlike the delete_user mode in the same file (which correctly validates the token), these three approval actions read their parameters from $_GET and perform irreversible state changes without any protection. An attacker who has submitted a pending registration can extract their own user UUID from the registration confirmation email URL, then trick any user with the rol_approve_users right into visiting a crafted URL that automatically approves the registration. This bypasses the manual registration approval workflow entirely. ## Details ### CSRF Protection Is Present for delete_user but Absent for Approval Modes File: modules/registration.php, lines 90-128 The delete_user mode validates the CSRF token (line 99), but the three approval modes do not: ```php // assign_member and assign_user: no CSRF check } elseif (in_array($getMode, array('assign_member', 'assign_user'))) { $registrationService = new RegistrationService($gDb, $getUserUUID); $message = $registrationService->assignRegistration($getUserUUIDAssigned, $getMode === 'assign_member'); $gMessage->setForwardUrl($message['forwardUrl']); $gMessage->show($message['message']); // create_user: no CSRF check } elseif ($getMode === 'create_user') { $registrationUser->acceptRegistration(); if ($gCurrentUser->isAdministratorRoles()) { admRedirect(SecurityUtils::encodeUrl(ADMIDIO_URL . FOLDER_MODULES.'/profile/roles.php', array('accept_registration' => true, 'user_uuid' => $getUserUUID))); } // delete_user: CSRF IS validated } elseif ($getMode === 'delete_user') { SecurityUtils::validateCsrfToken($_POST['adm_csrf_token']); // <-- protected $registrationUser->delete(); } ``` The three approval modes read both UUIDs exclusively from $_GET (lines 41-43): The approve action modes accept $_GET parameters `user_uuid` and `user_uuid_assigned` without any POST body or CSRF token. Both parameters pass through `admFuncVariableIsValid()` with `uuid` type validation, which prevents SQL injection but provides no CSRF protection. ### User UUID Is Known to the Attacker from Registration Email File: `D:/bugcrowd/admidio/repo/src/Infrastructure/Service/RegistrationService.php`, lines 154-157 When a user submits a registration, Admidio sends a confirmation email containing a URL of the form: ``` https://TARGET/adm_program/modules/registration.php?id=VALIDATION_ID&user_uuid=REGISTRANT_UUID ``` The `user_uuid` in this URL is the registrant's own UUID. The attacker has this UUID because they received the confirmation email for their own registration. ### isAdministratorRegistration() Is a Delegated Right File: `D:/bugcrowd/admidio/repo/src/Users/Entity/User.php`, lines 1603-1606 ```php public function isAdministratorRegistration(): bool { return $this->checkRolesRight('rol_approve_users'); } ``` The `rol_approve_users` right is a delegated organizational privilege, not full system administrator access. Any member designated to review registrations -- for example, a membership secretary or club administrator -- is a valid CSRF victim. ## PoC **Scenario: Attacker bypasses manual registration approval** Prerequisites: (1) Manual registration approval is enabled. (2) The attacker submits a registration form and receives a confirmation email with their `user_uuid`. (3) After clicking the confirmation link, their registration enters the pending queue. **Step 1: Attacker extracts their own user_uuid from the registration email** The confirmation email contains a link of the form: ``` https://TARGET/adm_program/modules/registration.php?id=VALIDATION_ID&user_uuid=ATTACKER_UUID ``` The `ATTACKER_UUID` is visible to the attacker from their own email. **Step 2: CSRF auto-approval via image tag** The attacker hosts a page that the victim (admin with `rol_approve_users` right) visits: ```html <img src="https://TARGET/adm_program/modules/registration.php?mode=create_user&user_uuid=ATTACKER_UUID" width="1" height="1"> ``` When the victim loads this page, Admidio silently accepts the attacker registration and assigns default organization roles. No confirmation or token is required. **Step 3: Force-assign registration to an existing account (account takeover)** If the attacker knows the UUID of an existing member (obtainable from profile page URLs when the user list is visible) and has a pending registration: ```html <img src="https://TARGET/adm_program/modules/registration.php?mode=assign_user&user_uuid=ATTACKER_REG_UUID&user_uuid_assigned=EXISTING_USER_UUID" width="1" height="1"> ``` This merges the pending registration into the existing account, replacing that account login credentials with the attacker credentials. ## Impact - **Manual Approval Bypass:** An attacker with a pending registration can force auto-approval without waiting for an administrator to manually review it. This grants them organization membership, including access to events, documents, mailing lists, and other role-restricted features. - **Account Takeover via assign_user CSRF:** If the attacker knows any member UUID (visible in profile page URLs), the `assign_user` mode merges the attacker registration into that member account, replacing the existing member login with the attacker credentials. This is a full account takeover requiring only that the victim admin visit a crafted URL. - **Low Attack Complexity:** The attacker only needs their own registration email to get their UUID. The CSRF payload is a plain GET request via an image tag -- no JavaScript required. - **Delegated Right:** The required victim right (`rol_approve_users`) is a common delegation target in organizations with membership approval workflows. ## Recommended Fix Add `SecurityUtils::validateCsrfToken($_POST["adm_csrf_token"])` at the beginning of each approval action, consistent with how `delete_user` is already protected in the same file. ```php // File: modules/registration.php } elseif (in_array($getMode, array('assign_member', 'assign_user'))) { // ADD: validate CSRF token SecurityUtils::validateCsrfToken($_POST['adm_csrf_token']); $registrationService = new RegistrationService($gDb, $getUserUUID); $message = $registrationService->assignRegistration($getUserUUIDAssigned, $getMode === 'assign_member'); ... } elseif ($getMode === 'create_user') { // ADD: validate CSRF token SecurityUtils::validateCsrfToken($_POST['adm_csrf_token']); $registrationUser->acceptRegistration(); ... } elseif ($getMode === 'delete_user') { SecurityUtils::validateCsrfToken($_POST['adm_csrf_token']); // already protected $registrationUser->delete(); } ``` Additionally, convert the approval action URLs from GET-based links to POST-form buttons (with the CSRF token in a hidden field). The existing `delete_user` button uses `callUrlHideElement()` which already sends the token in the POST body -- use the same pattern for approval buttons.

受影響套件(1)

• Packagist/admidio/admidiofrom 0, < 5.0.8

CVSS 分數

參考連結(4)

• ADVISORYhttps://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-34384
• PATCHhttps://github.com/Admidio/admidio
• WEBhttps://github.com/Admidio/admidio/commit/707171c188b3e8f36007fc3f2bccbfac896ed019
• WEBhttps://github.com/Admidio/admidio/security/advisories/GHSA-ph84-r98x-2j22