CVE-2026-55164

Description

## Summary `lemur.users.service.update()` writes a user's new password as plaintext to the `users.password` column. The `User` model wires bcrypt hashing to SQLAlchemy's `before_insert` event but registers no equivalent listener for `before_update`, and `service.update()` does not call `user.hash_password()` after assigning the new value. Every password change performed through the admin-gated `PUT /api/1/users/<id>` endpoint persists the user's password to the database in cleartext. ## Root Cause `lemur/users/models.py`: ```python # line 38 class User(BaseModel): __tablename__ = "users" id = Column(Integer, primary_key=True) password = Column(String(128)) # plain column, no setter, no Vault descriptor # line 74 def hash_password(self): if self.password: self.password = bcrypt.generate_password_hash(self.password).decode("utf-8") # line 111 listen(User, "before_insert", hash_password) # only before_insert is wired ``` `lemur/users/service.py`: ```python # line 46 def update(user_id, username, email, active, profile_picture, roles, password=None): ... user = get(user_id) user.username = username user.email = email user.active = active user.profile_picture = profile_picture if password: user.password = password # raw assignment update_roles(user, roles) return database.update(user) # commits, no hashing ``` No `before_update` listener exists. `User.password` is a plain `Column(String(128))` with no property setter that hashes on assignment. The bcrypt code path is bypassed entirely on every UPDATE statement that touches this column. ## Affected Endpoints | Method | Path | Source | |---|---|---| | PUT | /api/1/users/`<id>` | lemur/users/views.py:274 (gated by `@admin_permission.require`) | `lemur/auth/views.py:323` also calls `user_service.update()` during SSO/OAuth login, but passes only six positional arguments. `password` defaults to `None` on that path and the `if password:` guard short-circuits. The bug is triggered only through the admin-only PUT handler. ## Impact When an administrator changes a user's password via `PUT /api/1/users/<id>`, the cleartext password is persisted to `users.password`. Subsequent login attempts for that user will fail (`check_password` calls `bcrypt.check_password_hash` against an unhashed value), pushing operators toward workarounds. The more serious consequence is a defense-in-depth bypass. Bcrypt is the protection that prevents a database compromise from yielding usable credentials. With plaintext rows present, an attacker who exfiltrates the `users` table, a backup, a read replica, or query logs obtains directly usable login credentials — no offline cracking required. Because users reuse passwords across services, the blast radius extends beyond Lemur. The bug specifically affects admin-driven password resets, which are the normal post-incident workflow and exactly when plaintext storage is most harmful. ## Steps to Reproduce 1. Install Lemur with default config. Create an admin user and a target user 'alice' (created via the standard flow, password will be hashed correctly on insert). 2. Verify the initial hash: psql lemur -c "SELECT password FROM users WHERE username='alice';" # Output: $2b$12$N9Q... (bcrypt hash, as expected) 3. As admin, change alice's password via the API: curl -X PUT https://lemur.local/api/1/users/<alice_id> \ -H "Authorization: Bearer <admin_jwt>" \ -H "Content-Type: application/json" \ -d '{ "username": "alice", "email": "alice@example.com", "active": true, "profile_picture": null, "roles": [{"name": "operator"}], "password": "ProofOfConcept_2026" }' 4. Read the column again: psql lemur -c "SELECT password FROM users WHERE username='alice';" # Output: ProofOfConcept_2026 ← plaintext, not hashed 5. Confirm the failure mode: 'alice' can no longer log in with 'ProofOfConcept_2026' because check_password runs bcrypt.check_password_hash() against the cleartext column. ## Remediation Register the listener for both events: ```python # lemur/users/models.py listen(User, "before_insert", hash_password) listen(User, "before_update", hash_password) ``` Alternative, equivalent fix in the service layer: ```python # lemur/users/service.py, in update() if password: user.password = password user.hash_password() ``` The listener fix is preferred because it closes the gap for any future code path that mutates `user.password`. A one-time migration is recommended to detect and re-hash any rows already stored in cleartext. Bcrypt hashes begin with `$2b$`, `$2a$`, or `$2y$`. Any cleartext credential should be treated as **compromised** — rotate it, do not just re-hash it — since it has been at rest in plaintext and may exist in backups, audit logs, and replicas.