CVE-2026-49284

Description

## Summary SimpleSAMLphp's SAML SP ACS path does not enforce the IdP selected for an SP-initiated login. If a saved SP state contains `ExpectedIssuer = IdP A`, but the ACS receives a valid response from `IdP B`, the code logs a warning and continues processing instead of rejecting the response. That behavior becomes security-relevant when combined with the response-processing rule that accepts an unsigned `samlp:Response/@InResponseTo` outside the signed assertion whenever the signed assertion's `SubjectConfirmationData` does not carry its own `InResponseTo`. A response issued by one trusted IdP can therefore be bound to SP state created for another IdP. ## Impact In a multi-IdP deployment, a lower-trust IdP can satisfy SP state created for a different expected IdP. This can bypass an SP flow that intentionally routes the user to a specific IdP, including deployments that set `enable_unsolicited` to `false` to prevent IdP-initiated logins. The impact is highest when the SP trusts multiple IdPs with different assurance levels, tenant boundaries, or attribute namespaces, and application authorization depends on the selected/expected IdP. In those deployments this is an authentication/authorization bypass candidate. Impact strongly depends on whether an attacker can obtain a signed IdP-initiated assertion from a lower-trust trusted IdP and whether the downstream application maps identifiers globally.

How to fix CVE-2026-49284

No fixed version has been published yet. Mitigate by removing the affected package or applying upstream guidance from the references below.

• —no fix listed

Is CVE-2026-49284 being exploited?

Low — EPSS is 0.2%, meaning exploitation activity has not been observed at scale.

Affected packages (1)

• from 0