CVE-2026-46700

Description

## Summary In `@actual-app/sync-server`, the `GET /secret/:name` endpoint (`app-secrets.js:53`) checks only that the caller has a valid session — it does not verify the caller is an admin. The sibling `POST /secret/` handler does enforce an admin check in OpenID mode, exposing an authorization asymmetry. Any authenticated non-admin (BASIC) user in OpenID multi-user deployments can probe the secrets store and learn which admin-managed bank-sync integrations have been configured (existence, not values). This includes integration credentials that are not otherwise observable to non-admins, such as `simplefin_accessKey`, `pluggyai_clientSecret`, `pluggyai_itemIds`, and the `gocardless_*` secrets. ## Details `packages/sync-server/src/app-secrets.js` mounts `validateSessionMiddleware` at the router level (line 15), so all handlers inherit only "must be authenticated." The POST handler then explicitly upgrades to an admin check when the active auth method is `openid`: ```js // app-secrets.js:17-46 app.post('/', async (req, res) => { // ... look up active auth method ... if (method === 'openid') { const canSaveSecrets = isAdmin(res.locals.user_id); if (!canSaveSecrets) { res.status(403).send({ status: 'error', reason: 'not-admin', details: 'You have to be admin to set secrets', }); return; } } secretsService.set(name, value); // ... }); ``` The sibling GET handler skips both the method check and the admin check entirely: ```js // app-secrets.js:53-61 app.get('/:name', async (req, res) => { const name = req.params.name; const keyExists = secretsService.exists(name); if (keyExists) { res.sendStatus(204); } else { res.status(404).send('key not found'); } }); ``` The intent — visible from the POST handler's "You have to be admin to set secrets" — is that this store holds admin-managed credentials. The valid secret names enumerated in `services/secrets-service.js` (`SecretName`) are: `gocardless_secretId`, `gocardless_secretKey`, `simplefin_token`, `simplefin_accessKey`, `pluggyai_clientId`, `pluggyai_clientSecret`, `pluggyai_itemIds`. In OpenID mode, BASIC users obtain valid sessions through `packages/sync-server/src/accounts/openid.ts:264-274` — either auto-created (`userCreationMode=login`) or pre-provisioned by the admin (`userCreationMode=manual`). With that BASIC session token they can hit `GET /secret/:name` and distinguish 204 (configured) from 404 (missing), enumerating each admin-managed secret name. Some signals (`simplefin_token` existence, `pluggyai_clientId` existence) are already coarsely observable via the unauthenticated bank-sync status endpoints (`app-simplefin.js:18`, `app-pluggyai.js:18`); the rest (`simplefin_accessKey`, `pluggyai_clientSecret`, `pluggyai_itemIds`, both `gocardless_*` secrets) are not otherwise probeable. This is structurally identical to the previously reported missing-admin-check on `GET /admin/users/` (`app-admin.js:28`): a POST sibling enforces admin authorization while the GET sibling omits it. ## PoC Pre-requisites: - Server is configured for OpenID multi-user mode (`ACTUAL_OPENID_ENFORCE=true` or auth method is `openid`). - An admin has configured one or more bank-sync integrations. - The attacker is any authenticated BASIC user (auto-created via `userCreationMode=login`, or admin-provisioned in the default `manual` mode). Step 1 — capture a BASIC user's session token in `$TOKEN` (standard OpenID login flow, no admin role required). Step 2 — probe each admin-managed secret name: ```bash for name in gocardless_secretId gocardless_secretKey \ simplefin_token simplefin_accessKey \ pluggyai_clientId pluggyai_clientSecret pluggyai_itemIds; do status=$(curl -s -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code}' \ -H "X-ACTUAL-TOKEN: $TOKEN" \ https://actual.example.com/secret/$name) echo "$name -> $status" # 204 = configured, 404 = missing done ``` Step 3 — confirm the asymmetry by attempting to write a secret (correctly rejected for non-admins): ```bash curl -s -H "X-ACTUAL-TOKEN: $TOKEN" \ -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \ -d '{"name":"pluggyai_itemIds","value":"x"}' \ https://actual.example.com/secret/ # {"status":"error","reason":"not-admin","details":"You have to be admin to set secrets"} ``` The POST returns 403 `not-admin`; the GET returns 204/404 unauthenticated-against-role. ## Impact - A non-admin authenticated user in OpenID multi-user mode can enumerate which admin-managed bank-sync integrations the deployment uses. - This reveals whether GoCardless, SimpleFIN, and/or Pluggy AI are configured, and which auxiliary credentials the admin has set (e.g. `simplefin_accessKey`, `pluggyai_clientSecret`, `pluggyai_itemIds`) — none of which are otherwise observable to non-admins. - The disclosure is existence-only; secret values are not returned. Impact is limited to recon useful for targeted follow-on attacks (e.g. credential phishing, picking which integration to attack on a separate vulnerability). - No integrity or availability impact. ## Recommended Fix Mirror the POST handler's admin gate on the GET handler. Minimal patch in `packages/sync-server/src/app-secrets.js`: ```js app.get('/:name', async (req, res) => { let method; try { const result = getAccountDb().first( 'SELECT method FROM auth WHERE active = 1', ); method = result?.method; } catch (error) { console.error('Failed to fetch auth method:', error); return res.status(500).send({ status: 'error', reason: 'database-error', details: 'Failed to validate authentication method', }); } if (method === 'openid' && !isAdmin(res.locals.user_id)) { return res.status(403).send({ status: 'error', reason: 'not-admin', details: 'You have to be admin to read secret status', }); } const name = req.params.name; const keyExists = secretsService.exists(name); if (keyExists) { res.sendStatus(204); } else { res.status(404).send('key not found'); } }); ``` Consider factoring the method-lookup + admin-check into a shared helper used by both POST and GET to prevent the same asymmetry from recurring. Also consider restricting `:name` to the `SecretName` enum so unrelated probing is rejected up front.