CVE-2026-44005

CRITICAL10.0EPSS 0.11%

vm2: Mutable Proxies for Host Intrinsic Prototypes Allows Sandbox Escape

Published: 5/7/2026Modified: 5/14/2026

Description

### Summary vm2's bridge exposes mutable proxies for real host-realm intrinsic prototypes and then forwards sandbox writes into the underlying host objects with otherReflectSet() and otherReflectDefineProperty(), which lets attacker-controlled JavaScript running in a default VM or inherited NodeVM mutate shared host Object.prototype, Array.prototype, and Function.prototype from inside the sandbox. ### Details BaseHandler.apply() unwraps sandbox-controlled receivers and arguments with otherFromThis() / otherFromThisArguments() and then directly invokes the real host function with ret = otherReflectApply(object, context, args), so any default-exposed host function that can surface a prototype getter becomes a prototype-walking primitive ([lib/bridge.js:665-676](https://github.com/patriksimek/vm2/blob/408fc855f1cc1bbc2985b029465ee0e732ada433/lib/bridge.js#L665-L676)). BaseHandler.get() special-cases __proto__ and returns the host-side descriptor or proxy target prototype, which is enough for the attacker to reuse the host __lookupGetter__('__proto__') accessor repeatedly until the walk lands on host Object.prototype, Array.prototype, or Function.prototype ([lib/bridge.js:590-616](https://github.com/patriksimek/vm2/blob/408fc855f1cc1bbc2985b029465ee0e732ada433/lib/bridge.js#L590-L616)). Once the attacker has a proxy to a host intrinsic prototype, BaseHandler.set() performs value = otherFromThis(value); return otherReflectSet(object, key, value) === true;, which writes attacker-controlled data directly into the shared host object instead of keeping the mutation sandbox-local; BaseHandler.defineProperty() repeats the same design at otherReflectDefineProperty(object, prop, otherDesc) for descriptor-based writes ([lib/bridge.js:641-649](https://github.com/patriksimek/vm2/blob/408fc855f1cc1bbc2985b029465ee0e732ada433/lib/bridge.js#L641-L649), [lib/bridge.js:753-774](https://github.com/patriksimek/vm2/blob/408fc855f1cc1bbc2985b029465ee0e732ada433/lib/bridge.js#L753-L774)). Existing validation does not stop the attack because the constructor filter only blocks one dangerous-property access pattern, setPrototypeOf() only blocks prototype replacement rather than ordinary property assignment, and containsDangerousConstructor() only protects one later re-unwrapping path instead of the initial host-prototype write sink ([lib/bridge.js:494-530](https://github.com/patriksimek/vm2/blob/408fc855f1cc1bbc2985b029465ee0e732ada433/lib/bridge.js#L494-L530), [lib/bridge.js:595-610](https://github.com/patriksimek/vm2/blob/408fc855f1cc1bbc2985b029465ee0e732ada433/lib/bridge.js#L595-L610), [lib/bridge.js:660-662](https://github.com/patriksimek/vm2/blob/408fc855f1cc1bbc2985b029465ee0e732ada433/lib/bridge.js#L660-L662)). ### PoC Run the following code snippet and observe that the value of vm2EscapeMarker is polluted: ``` const { VM } = require('vm2'); const vm = new VM(); vm.run(` const g = ({}).__lookupGetter__; const a = Buffer.apply; const p = a.apply(g, [Buffer, ['__proto__']]); const hostObjectProto = p.call(p.call(p.call(p.call(Buffer.of())))); hostObjectProto.vm2EscapeMarker = 'polluted-object-prototype'; `); console.log({}.vm2EscapeMarker) ``` ### Impact Sandbox escape and prototype pollution.

Affected packages (1)

CVSS scores

SourceVersionSeverityVector
osvCVSS 3.1CRITICAL10.0CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:N/I:H/A:H

References (4)