CVE-2026-3351

Description

## Summary The `GET /1.0/certificates` endpoint (non-recursive mode) returns URLs containing fingerprints for all certificates in the trust store, bypassing the per-object `can_view` authorization check that is correctly applied in the recursive path. Any authenticated identity — including restricted, non-admin users — can enumerate all certificate fingerprints, exposing the full set of trusted identities in the LXD deployment. ## Affected Component - `lxd/certificates.go` — `certificatesGet` (lines 185–192) — Non-recursive code path returns unfiltered certificate list. ## CWE - **CWE-862**: Missing Authorization ## Description ### Core vulnerability: missing permission filter in non-recursive listing path The `certificatesGet` handler obtains a permission checker at line 143 and correctly applies it when building the recursive response (lines 163-176). However, the non-recursive code path at lines 185-192 creates a fresh loop over the unfiltered `baseCerts` slice, completely bypassing the authorization check: ```go // lxd/certificates.go:139-193 func certificatesGet(d *Daemon, r *http.Request) response.Response { recursion := util.IsRecursionRequest(r) s := d.State() userHasPermission, err := s.Authorizer.GetPermissionChecker(r.Context(), auth.EntitlementCanView, entity.TypeCertificate) // ... for _, baseCert := range baseCerts { if !userHasPermission(entity.CertificateURL(baseCert.Fingerprint)) { continue // Correctly filters unauthorized certs } if recursion { // ... builds filtered certResponses ... } // NOTE: when !recursion, nothing is recorded — the filter result is discarded } if !recursion { body := []string{} for _, baseCert := range baseCerts { // <-- iterates UNFILTERED baseCerts certificateURL := api.NewURL().Path(version.APIVersion, "certificates", baseCert.Fingerprint).String() body = append(body, certificateURL) } return response.SyncResponse(true, body) // Returns ALL certificate fingerprints } return response.SyncResponse(true, certResponses) // Recursive path is correctly filtered } ``` ### Inconsistency with other list endpoints confirms the bug Five other list endpoints in the same codebase correctly filter results in both recursive and non-recursive paths: | Endpoint | File | Filters non-recursive? | |----------|------|----------------------| | Instances | `lxd/instances_get.go` — `instancesGet` | Yes — filters before either path | | Images | `lxd/images.go` — `doImagesGet` | Yes — checks `hasPermission` for both paths | | Networks | `lxd/networks.go` — `networksGet` | Yes — filters outside recursion check | | Profiles | `lxd/profiles.go` — `profilesGet` | Yes — separate filter in non-recursive path | | **Certificates** | **`lxd/certificates.go` — `certificatesGet`** | **No — unfiltered** | The certificates endpoint is the sole outlier, confirming this is an oversight rather than a design choice. ### Access handler provides no defense The endpoint uses `allowAuthenticated` as its `AccessHandler` (`certificates.go:45`), which only checks `requestor.IsTrusted()`: ```go // lxd/daemon.go:255-267 // allowAuthenticated is an AccessHandler which allows only authenticated requests. // This should be used in conjunction with further access control within the handler // (e.g. to filter resources the user is able to view/edit). func allowAuthenticated(_ *Daemon, r *http.Request) response.Response { requestor, err := request.GetRequestor(r.Context()) // ... if requestor.IsTrusted() { return response.EmptySyncResponse } return response.Forbidden(nil) } ``` The comment explicitly states that `allowAuthenticated` should be "used in conjunction with further access control within the handler" — which the non-recursive path fails to do. ### Execution chain 1. Restricted authenticated user sends `GET /1.0/certificates` (no `recursion` parameter) 2. `allowAuthenticated` access handler passes because user is trusted (`daemon.go:263`) 3. `certificatesGet` creates permission checker for `EntitlementCanView` on `TypeCertificate` (line 143) 4. Loop at lines 163-176 filters `baseCerts` by permission — but only populates `certResponses` for recursive mode 5. Since `!recursion`, control reaches lines 185-192 6. New loop iterates ALL `baseCerts` (unfiltered) and builds URL list with fingerprints 7. Full list of certificate fingerprints returned to restricted user ## Proof of Concept ```bash # Preconditions: restricted (non-admin) trusted client certificate HOST=target.example PORT=8443 # 1) Non-recursive list: returns ALL certificate fingerprints (UNFILTERED) curl -sk --cert restricted.crt --key restricted.key \ "https://${HOST}:${PORT}/1.0/certificates" | jq '.metadata | length' # 2) Recursive list: returns only authorized certificates (FILTERED) curl -sk --cert restricted.crt --key restricted.key \ "https://${HOST}:${PORT}/1.0/certificates?recursion=1" | jq '.metadata | length' # Expected: (1) returns MORE fingerprints than (2), proving the authorization bypass. # The difference reveals fingerprints of certificates the restricted user should not see. ``` ## Impact - **Identity enumeration**: A restricted user can discover the fingerprints of all trusted certificates, revealing the complete set of identities in the LXD trust store. - **Reconnaissance for targeted attacks**: Fingerprints identify specific certificates used for inter-cluster communication, admin access, and other privileged operations. - **RBAC bypass**: In deployments using fine-grained RBAC (OpenFGA or built-in TLS authorization), the non-recursive path completely bypasses the intended per-object visibility controls. - **Information asymmetry**: Restricted users gain knowledge of the full trust topology, which the administrator explicitly intended to hide via per-certificate `can_view` entitlements. ## Recommended Remediation ### Option 1: Apply the permission filter to the non-recursive path (preferred) Replace the unfiltered loop with one that checks `userHasPermission`, matching the pattern used in the recursive path and in all other list endpoints: ```go // lxd/certificates.go — replace lines 185-192 if !recursion { body := []string{} for _, baseCert := range baseCerts { if !userHasPermission(entity.CertificateURL(baseCert.Fingerprint)) { continue } certificateURL := api.NewURL().Path(version.APIVersion, "certificates", baseCert.Fingerprint).String() body = append(body, certificateURL) } return response.SyncResponse(true, body) } ``` ### Option 2: Build both response types in a single filtered loop Restructure the function to build both the URL list and the recursive response in the same permission-checked loop, eliminating the possibility of divergent filtering: ```go err = d.State().DB.Cluster.Transaction(r.Context(), func(ctx context.Context, tx *db.ClusterTx) error { baseCerts, err = dbCluster.GetCertificates(ctx, tx.Tx()) if err != nil { return err } certResponses = make([]*api.Certificate, 0, len(baseCerts)) certURLs = make([]string, 0, len(baseCerts)) for _, baseCert := range baseCerts { if !userHasPermission(entity.CertificateURL(baseCert.Fingerprint)) { continue } certURLs = append(certURLs, api.NewURL().Path(version.APIVersion, "certificates", baseCert.Fingerprint).String()) if recursion { apiCert, err := baseCert.ToAPI(ctx, tx.Tx()) if err != nil { return err } certResponses = append(certResponses, apiCert) urlToCertificate[entity.CertificateURL(apiCert.Fingerprint)] = apiCert } } return nil }) ``` Option 2 is structurally safer as it prevents the two paths from diverging in the future. ## Credit This vulnerability was discovered and reported by [bugbunny.ai](https://bugbunny.ai).

Affected packages (2)

• Go/github.com/canonical/lxdfrom 0, < 0.0.0-20260224152359-d936c90d47cf
• Go/github.com/canonical/lxdfrom 0

CVSS scores

References (5)

• ADVISORYhttps://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-3351
• PATCHhttps://github.com/canonical/lxd
• WEBhttps://github.com/canonical/lxd/commit/d936c90d47cf0be1e9757df897f769e9887ebde1
• WEBhttps://github.com/canonical/lxd/pull/17738
• WEBhttps://github.com/canonical/lxd/security/advisories/GHSA-crmg-9m86-636r